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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional and criminal procedure constellation, it 
is that torture is illegal and torture-introduced evidence is inadmissible. The purposes 
of this research are to (1) assess the exclusionary rule in the United Kingdom and 
United States; (2) explore the theoretical constitutional foundation of the rule; and (3) 
establish the Chinese exclusionary rule. Currently, there is no exclusionary rule 
explicitly in the Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure. If the wrongful conviction of 
the innocent is a pressing issue in China today, police torture is the flashpoint. Police 
torture in China is the prevalent evil not the isolated anecdote. This thesis combines 
diagnosis and prescription – the problem of police torture in China and the solution 
of the exclusionary rule. The ultimate goal of the research is to find a suitable 
exclusionary rule for China to solve the serious problem of police torture and 
wrongdoing. 
At the level of theory, my exclusionary rule framework is grounded in the 
separation of powers. Previous research about the separation of powers doctrine has 
focused almost entirely on constitutional law and political theory. They completely 
ignored the special role that the doctrine plays in the criminal justice system, a role 
consisting of the exercise of a reviewing function to ensure executive compliance 
with the criminal law. Separation of powers is a core component of the constitution’s 
system of checks and balances, a system in which each branch of the government is 
endowed with a constitutional control over the others. 
Without any judicial supervision or due process, the potential for arbitrary 
enforcement is high. The alternatives to the exclusionary rule are mainly illusory and 
of no practical avail. Past history also demonstrates that the very idea of protecting 
the defendant’s right is completely empty unless it is linked to an efficient 
mechanism. China grants the police too much power and has too little judicial 
supervision over police investigations. It creates imbalance in the existing Chinese 
criminal justice system. It is such an imbalance and the lack of separation of powers 
in the criminal justice system that poses a significant and growing threat for the 
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1.1 We are so very much alike 
 
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; 
the storm may enter; the rain may enter – but the King of England cannot 
enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
 
                                                  William Pitt1 
 
The power of a police officer in conducting a search is immense. He or she is entitled 
forcibly to enter the citizen’s home, even at midnight, to wake a person from sleep, 
rummage in his or her drawers, papers, letters and most private possessions, or upset 
the entire building. Although the particularity clause of the warrant defines the scope 
of a search, it is said that the police allegedly abuse their search authority.2 
The conduct of some police officers can only be described as outrageous and 
totally inconsistent with their responsibilities. In 1992, for example, London police 
                                                 
1 L.W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (Yale University Press, New Haven 1999) 151. 
2 R v. Reading JJ ex p South West Meats Ltd (1992) 4 Admin LR 401. This case illustrates ways in 
which the police can abuse their powers of search and seizure, even with a warrant. Large quantities 
of documents were removed from the premises which obviously did not fall within the terms of the 
warrant, contrary to Section 8(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984. 
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arrived at Mr. Hsu’s residence because a previous lodger complained to the police that 
Hsu was preventing her from collecting her belongings from his home. The officers 
demanded entrance but Hsu refused to admit them without a search warrant. The door 
was forcibly opened. They had no search warrant. He was arrested forcefully. He was 
punched in the face and kicked in the back (he later passed blood in his urine). He was 
also racially abused and placed in a cell for over one hour. He went home only to find 
that his house had been entered and some of his own property was missing. He had a 
predisposition to depression and was socially and culturally isolated and he was still 
suffering symptoms of a post traumatic distress disorder three years after the incident.3 
    Some people have even lost their lives during police searches in the United 
States. For example, in 2006, a police SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) team in 
Atlanta stormed a house and shot a 92-year-old woman, Kathryn Johnston, who lived 
alone in the roughest neighborhood in Georgia. The police claimed that they had 
bought drugs at the home from a man known only as Sam and were returning to 
search the residence.4 
The historical background of the exclusionary rule was rooted in English and 
American experiences. In 1604, the sheriff broke into Semayne’s home and seized 
his property in the United Kingdom. Sir Edward Coke declared that “[t]he house of 
everyone to him is his castle and fortress.”5 
In 1761, there was widespread objection against the writs of assistance in all 
American colonies. These writs were general search warrants that permitted the 
authorities, especially customs officials, to search whoever and wherever they 
                                                 
3 Thompson & Hsu v. The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, [1998] QB 498, 505-07. 
4 ‘92-year-old Killed in Roughest Neighborhood in Georgia’ 
<http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/11/22/woman.shot.ap/index.html> accessed January 1 2011. 
5 Semayne’s Case, [1558-1774] ALL E.R. 62, 63 (K.B. 1604). 
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pleased for any reason – or for no reason, without any necessity for a showing of 
probable cause. The officials did not need to have specific suspicions about any 
person in any place. Section 5(2) of the Act of Frauds of 1662 provided: 
 
And it shall be lawful to or for any Person or Persons, authorized by Writ 
of Assistance under the Seal of his Majesty’s Court of Exchequer, to take a 
Constable … or other publick Officer inhabiting near unto the Place, and in 
the Day-time to enter … Any House … Or other Place, and in Case of 
Resistance to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to 
seize, and from thence to bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize 
whatsoever, prohibited, and to put and secure the same in his Majesty’s 
Store-house.6 
 
    A group of Boston merchants retained Attorney James Otis, Jr. to challenge the 
legality of the writs of assistance for the first time. Otis attacked the writs: 
 
It appears to me the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty, and to the fundamental principles of law that 
was ever found in an English law book. It is the power that places the 
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer. … One of the most 
essential branches of English liberty is the freedom of one’s house. A man’s 
house is his castle; and whilst he is quiet, he is well guarded as a prince in 
his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate 
this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they 
please – we are commanded to permit their entry – their menial servants 
may entry – may break locks, bars and everything in their way – and 
whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can 
inquire – bare suspicion without oath is sufficient.7 
 
Although the Superior Court upheld the legality of the writs, John Adams, one of the 
                                                 
6 J.W. Hall, Jr., Search and Seizure, (2nd edn., Michie, Charlottesville 1991) 7. 
7 M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case, (University of California Press, Berkeley 1978) 344 
(emphasis added). 
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fathers of American independence, had recalled Otis’s memorable speech as the 
prologue to the American Revolution.8 
There were two most famous related English cases decided by Lord Charles 
Pratt Camden.9 The first is Wilkes v. Wood.10 The case was famous on both sides of 
the Atlantic. Broad search and seizure power for the first time was introduced in 
England by the Tudors.11 General warrants were frequently used to close down 
libelous printers during the era of the infamous Star Chamber.12 In 1763, John 
Wilkes, a member of the House of Commons, published a pamphlet series 
vehemently attacking the British government. Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State, 
issued a general warrant and ordered four messengers to search for, arrest and seize 
the authors, printers, and publisher, as well as their papers. Wilkes’ bureau was 
thoroughly ransacked, and all his books and private papers were seized and taken 
away. Forty-nine persons were arrested and five houses were searched in three days 
on the strength of that single warrant. Wilkes filed suits for trespass and challenged 
the legality of the general warrant in civil damage suits. Chief Justice Charles Pratt 
held the general warrants were null and void and that Wilkes could recover damages 
of five thousand pounds for the illegal search and seizure: 
 
To enter a man’s house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in order to procure 
evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no 
Englishman would wish to live an hour. … If such a power is truly 
                                                 
8 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); J.W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the 
Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1966) 37. 
9 Chief Justice Charles Pratt elevated to the peerage as Lord Camden after Wilkes. 
10 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (CD 1763). 
11  J.W. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional 
Interpretation (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966) 20. 
12 Potter Stewart, ‘The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of 
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases’, (1983) 83 Columbia Law Review 1365, 1369. 
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invested in a secretary of state, and he can delegate this power, it certainly 
may affect the person and property of every man in this kingdom, and is 
totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.13 
 
The second is Entick v. Carrington.14 In 1762, according to the executive 
warrant issued by the Earl of Halifax, the secretary of state, the defendants Nathan 
Carrington and others, with force and arms broke and entered John Entick’s 
dwelling-house, broke open the doors, chests, drawers, searched and examined all the 
rooms in his dwelling, house and all the boxes, and took away hundreds of printed 
charts, pamphlets and papers. Entick was suspected of publishing seditious libels. He 
sued the defendants for trespass. The jury found that the defendants did trespass and 
awarded Entick three hundred pounds. This judgment exercised great influence on 
the subsequent case law on search in England as well as in the United States. Lord 
Camden dismissed Star Chamber precedent and condemned the invasion of homes 
and found the warrant was wholly illegal and void: 
 
If this point should be determined in favor of the jurisdiction, the secret 
cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown open 
to the search and inspection of a messenger, whenever the Secretary of 
State shall think fit to charge, or even to suspect, a person to be the author, 
printer, or publisher of a seditious libel. … If this is the law it would be 
found in our books, but no such law ever existed in this country. Our law 
holds the property of every man so sacred that no man can set his foot 
upon his neighbour’s close without his leave. If he does, he is a trespasser, 
though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour’s 
ground, he must justify it by law. … We can safely say there is no law in 
this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if there was, 
it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers are often the dearest 
                                                 
13 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1153 (C.P. 1763). 
14 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1029 (C.P. 1765). 
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property a man can have.15 
 
As news spread about the ruling, Lord Camden was hailed both in England and 
America for his bold and clear-eyed expression of the common law and the rights of 
Englishmen.16 The United States Supreme Court described Entick as “one of the 
landmarks of English liberty” and “one of the permanent monuments of English 
liberty.”17 
During the last half of the eighteenth century, English and Americans were both 
suffering a recurrence of highhanded search and seizure measures, which violated the 
maxim that “a man’s house is his castle.” That is why both James Otis, Jr. and Lord 
Camden decried the evil of uneven, unchecked and progressively oppressive 
executive power of the officers. The roots of the exclusionary rule can be found in 
the common law distaste for intrusions by state officials. 
The United Kingdom (except Scotland) and United States share the same 
common law roots from England.18 In the past, English judges have often prided 
themselves as protectors of citizens’ rights.19 At first sight, the similarities of two 
respective criminal justice systems are particularly striking in many ways, for 
example, the emphasis on the adversary system, the presumption of innocence, and 
the sense of fundamental fairness required for a just procedure. Equally striking, 
however, is the lack of similarities between the two systems in significant areas, for 
                                                 
15 19 Howell’s State Trials, 1029 (C.P. 1765). 
16 A.R. Amar, ‘The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance’, (1996) 30 Suffolk 
University Law Review 53, 65. 
17 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886). 
18 M.R. Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal 
Process, (Yale University Press, New Haven 1986) 8-15. 
19 David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1997) 70. 
 7
instance, the process employed to correct wrongful convictions 20  and the 
admissibility of illegally or unfairly obtained physical evidence in criminal trials. 
 
 
1.2 But oh the difference 
 
Perhaps the most striking thing about the exclusionary rule of evidence is that 
nobody seems to have very clear idea what it is. Although the exclusionary rule is 
widely considered a hallmark of Anglo-American criminal evidence, courts and 
scholars have not formulated a universal definition of the rule. My definition is “a 
rule that excludes evidence obtained by illegal or unfair methods,” for example, by 
illegal search or torture. This research argues that the whole point of the rule is to 
regulate the intrusions and thus constrain every species of arbitrary or oppressive 
government. Historically,21 there are at least three differences of the exclusionary 
rule between the two criminal justice systems. 
    First, the English judges seemed reluctant to exclude illegal evidence from 
1978. 
    From the 1960s, English courts have increasingly extended police powers, 
especially in search and seizure and pre-charge detention for investigation.22 Since 
1978, courts were almost unwilling to exercise their discretion to exclude illegally or 
unfairly obtained evidence. I find this a dispiriting development. For instance, in R v. 
                                                 
20 Lissa Griffin, ‘The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective’ (2001) 16 
American University International Law Review 1241, 1241-2. 
21 For further analysis see 2.1. 
22 Ibid., ch 4. 
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Houghton and Franciosy,23 the Court ruled that a judge was right not to exclude a 
confession even though the defendant had been unlawfully arrested, unlawfully 
detained incommunicado for five days, and questioned without caution. In general, 
judges in postwar England and Wales became increasingly accommodating to police 
demands for additional powers: they retreated from control of police, while senior 
judges in America (in the 1960s) and Australia (in the 1980s) attempted to advance 
it.24 In the leading case of R v. Sang,25 Lord Diplock noted: “[The trial judge] has no 
discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was 
obtained by improper or unfair means. The court is not concerned with how it was 
obtained.”26 
    In the United States, under the exclusionary rule, evidence which is obtained by 
an unlawful search and seizure is excluded from admissibility in accordance with the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This provision provides that: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.27 
                                                 
23 (1978) 68 Cr App Rep 197. 
24 David Dixon, Law in Policing: Legal Regulation and Police Practices, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1997) 142. 
25 [1980] AC 402. 
26 [1980] AC 402, 437. 
27 Articles 8 and 24 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are relevant in this context: 
Article 8 declares that “everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure,” 
while Article 24 reinforces the rule that “(1) anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this 
Charter, have been infringed or denied may applied to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such 
remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. (2) where, in proceedings 
under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was obtained in manner that infringed or denied 
any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established 
that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.” In addition, the New Zealand Charter has a similar provision. 
Articles 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that “everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the person, property, or correspondence or 
 9
In 1914, in Weeks v. United States the Court first held that “in a federal 
prosecution the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an 
illegal search and seizure.” 28  Justice Day noted: “The effect of the Fourth 
Amendment is to put the courts of the United States … against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, 
whether accused of crime or not.”29 
Second, the rationales for the exclusionary rule are very different. 
The English courts have repudiated the idea of using exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence as a deterrent against police misconduct. It was believed that it 
was not the judges’ role to discipline police officers in courts. 
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Weeks first recognized that the 
only effective way to deter police misconduct is to exclude illegal evidence.30 Since 
1961, the Court has systematically ignored all but the deterrence rationale for the 
exclusionary rule. The essence of the rationale is that it allows the courts to control 
the activities of the law enforcement agencies and dissuade them from encroaching 
unjustifiably on the civil liberties of citizens. For example, in United States v. 
Calandra, Justice Powell observed that the exclusionary rule is: “A judicially created 
remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its 
deterrent effect.”31 
Third, there is a significant difference, it should be observed, about the 
admissibility of derivative evidence from illegally obtained real evidence and 
inadmissible confessions. 
                                                                                                                                          
otherwise.” 
28 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
29 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914). 
30 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914). 
31 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (emphasis added). 
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It is important to distinguish the exclusionary rule and the fruit of poisonous 
tree doctrine. The two are often mixed up. The former deals with the evidence which 
is directly derived from the illegal search or interrogation. The latter, however, 
concerns with the evidence discovered as a consequence of an illegal search. For 
example, an illegal search may find out a key to a railway station locker where the 
money of a robbery is being kept. Or a confession obtained by torture may reveal the 
whereabouts of the murder knife. 
Under English law, evidence derived from an illegal confession is admissible. In 
R v. Warickshall,32 Warickshall was charged with being an accessory after the fact to 
theft and with receiving the stolen property. The issue was the admissibility of stolen 
goods which had been found in her bed, to which her confession had led the 
authorities. The confession was made after the defendant was promised that she 
would not be prosecuted if she confessed. After she made a full confession, however, 
a prosecution took place. 
Counsel argued that “as the fact of finding the stolen property in her custody 
had been obtained through the means of an inadmissible confession, the proof of the 
fact that ought to also be rejected; for otherwise the faith which the prosecutor had 
pledged would be violated, and the prisoner made the deluded instrument of her own 
conviction.”33 Her confession was excluded as evidence, but the real evidence was 
included.34 The position in this case became broadly accepted. 
In addition, the Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1972 (CLRC) endorsed 
this practice. The Criminal Law Revision Committee recommended that the fact that 
evidence of a confession is inadmissible under the clause shall not affect the 
                                                 




admissibility in evidence of any facts discovered as a result of the confession.35 
Although, the confession is inadmissible, evidence of the fact discovered is 
admissible. Clause (5) of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill provides: 
 
The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of 
section (2) or (3) shall not affect the admissibility in evidence – (a) of any 
facts discovered as a result of the confession; or (b) as regards any fact so 
discovered as a result of a statement made by the accused; or (c) where the 
confession is relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or 
expresses himself in a particular way, of so much of the confession as is 
necessary to show this about him.36 
 
    The Criminal Law Revision Committee mentioned the criticism that it is 
illogical not to apply fully one or other of the reliability and disciplinary principle – 
either, first, to apply the reliability principle and admit the whole evidence, or, to 
apply the disciplinary principle and exclude the derivative evidence. Responding to 
above criticism, it merely said “there are sufficient practical reasons for accepting the 
mixture of the two principles as the basis of the law.”37 The Committee, however, 
neither provides any practical reason nor explains why they include the derivative 
evidence. Maybe the central practical reason is that it is too dangerous to exclude 
derivative evidence. 
This recommendation was implemented in Section 76(4) of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 which explicitly rejects the admissibility of 
derivative evidence and provides: 
                                                 
35 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, ‘Eleventh Report, Evidence (General)’ (Cm 4991, 1972) 
[56], [68]. 
36 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, ‘Eleventh Report, Evidence (General)’ (Cm 4991, 1972) 
draft bill cl2 (5). 
37 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, ‘Eleventh Report, Evidence (General)’ (Cm 4991, 1972) 
[56]. 
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The fact that a confession is wholly or partly excluded in pursuance of this 
section shall not affect the admissibility in evidence – (a) of any facts 
discovered as a result of the confession; or (b) where the confession is 
relevant as showing that the accused speaks, writes or expresses himself in 
a particular way, of so much of the confession as is necessary to show that 
he does so.38 
 
In contrast to the English approach, in the United States, the derivative evidence 
should be excluded, if there is close connexion between the initial illegality and 
subsequently discovered evidence. In addition, Justice Frankfurter first coined the 
phrase “fruit of poisonous tree” in Nardone v. United States39 in 1939 and stated: 
“[T]o forbid the direct use of methods [but] to put no curb on their full indirect use 
would only invite the very methods deemed inconsistent with ethical standards and 
destructive of personal liberty.”40 
 
 
1.3 Criminal Justice Models 
 
The construction of models serves multiple purposes and functions. First, models 
provide a useful way to cope with the complexity of the criminal process. They 
simplify the details of the process, highlight common themes and trends, evaluate 
criminal procedure values, and then assist in understanding the structure and content 
of the criminal justice system. They recognize “the value choices that underlie the 
details of the criminal process.”41 In Beloof’s word, the models remain “useful 
                                                 
38 s 76 (4) of PACE. 
39 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
40 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
41 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 
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constellations above the sea of the criminal process.”42  Second, they provide 
positive descriptions of the actual operation of the criminal justice system and a 
guide to judge the operational practices of the criminal operation in the criminal 
process. Third, the models assist in revealing the relationship of criminal process to 
substantive criminal law43 and evidence law. The models help us understand the 
criminal process as dynamic, rather than static. In the context of the exclusionary rule, 
models may proffer a normative guide to what values ought to influence the law of 
evidence. 
The criminal process refers to the wide range of actors and operational practices 
which respond to crime. The most successful attempt to construct models of the 
criminal process was achieved by Herbert Packer (1925-1972); these models have 
had remarkable durability. In his pioneering work, Packer first neatly synthesized the 
themes and identified two conceptual models of the criminal process: the crime 
control model and the due process model.44 He attempts to abstract two value 
systems that compete for priority in the operation of the criminal process. The 
models were extremes of a spectrum. 
This section explores different aspects of Packer’s two models, including the 
perspective of the exclusionary rule, as the rule is central to the relationship between 
Packer’s models of criminal justice. At the heart of the contention which surrounds 
the subject of the exclusionary rule lie two broad and conflicting concerns. The first 
is the concern for crime control, and the desire to include every single piece of 
evidence (including illegally obtained evidence), as long as the evidence can prove 
                                                 
42 Douglas Beloof, ‘The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model’ (1999) 
1999 Utah Law Review 289, 289. 
43 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 
152. 
44 Herbert Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 1, 2. 
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that the defendant is factually guilty. The second is the concern with due process, and 
the desire to exclude illegally obtained evidence. The debates and case law of the 
exclusionary rule can be analyzed in terms of whether a decision favours one or the 
other model. The model may provide guidance in deciding whether to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence. Packer’s models contain a basis and framework for 
evaluating the functioning of the criminal justice system. These best-known models 
can be used as ideal-types to analyze and expound trends in the criminal process. 
The section begins with Packer’s two dichotomized models of the criminal 
justice system. I will illuminate the differences between the two models. The essence 
of the two models can be captured by evocative metaphors: “assembly line”45 and 
“obstacle course”.46 The difference between the crime control model and due 
process model is that they disagree on four fundamental questions. The first question 
asks what the primary purpose of a criminal process is. The second question asks 
whether we should impose specific restraints on broad investigative powers of the 
police in order to protect the rights of the accused. The third question asks whether 
we should condone intrusive uses of state power in pursuit of the suppression of 
crime and tolerate wrongful conviction of the innocent defendants. Lastly, the fourth 
question asks whether we should exclude credible evidence for the sole reason that 
the methods used to obtain it were illegal or unfair. 
The suppression of crime is the exclusive predominant function for structuring 
the criminal process. In the words of Packer, “repression of criminal conduct is the 
                                                 
45 Herbert Packer, ‘Two Models of the Criminal Process’ in George Cole (ed.), Criminal Justice: Law 
and Politics (5th edn., Pacific Grove Brooks/Cole, California 1988) 15, 20; Herbert Packer, The Limits 
of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 159. 
46 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 
163. 
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most important function to be performed by the criminal process.”47 The crime 
control model’s emphasis on repressing crime leads it to reject safeguards which 
restrict the apprehension and conviction of offenders. The model was based on 
societal interests in law and order. According to Packer, “[t]he failure of law 
enforcement to bring criminal conduct under tight control is viewed as leading to the 
breakdown of public order and thence to the disappearance of an important condition 
of human freedom.”48 
Given its utilitarian nature, the combination of high crime and reality of limited 
law enforcement resources, the crime control model, therefore, stresses efficiency, 
which is defined in terms of speed and finality.49 To achieve such speed and 
finality50 and fulfill its purpose, first, the model aims to produce “efficiency” by 
disposing of criminal cases swiftly and dealing with the maximum number of cases 
in a criminal justice system with limited resources. The key to achieving that end is 
“the efficiency with which the criminal process operates to screen suspects, 
determine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of persons convicted of crime.”51 
Second, this prompts calls for the police to be equipped with broad investigative 
powers, for example, search, seizure, and arrest people for interrogating, to 
apprehend criminals efficiently. These broad powers are often the quickest methods 
to establish whether the defendant is factually guilty.52 The limitation on the police 
interrogation is that designed to ensure the reliability of the defendant’s statements. 
The model operated under an assumption that “preliminary screening processes 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 153. 
48 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 
153. 
49 Ibid., 159. 
50 In other words, low rates of appeal. 
51 Herbert Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1969) 
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operated by the police and the prosecuting officials contain adequate guarantees of 
reliable fact finding.”53 Packer describes this model as a high speed “assembly line 
conveyor belt”54 operated by the police and prosecutors. It can be described in terms 
of a criminal justice system for conveying suspects through from interrogation to 
conviction. The criminal process is merely an “assembly line” that processes criminal 
cases as quick as possible. The “assembly line” is primarily concerned with 
efficiency. It focuses on efficiency in apprehending, trying, and convicting offenders. 
Key to the formulation of the model is the concept of “factual guilt”, in which 
the accused committed the criminal act. This model is premised on a preference for 
fact-finding centered in police investigations and the belief that executive officials55 
identify those persons who are “factually guilty”. Once identified, to obtain a 
conviction and impose punishment as quickly as possible. The model depends on 
quick resolution of questions of factual guilt through informal investigation 
processes and interrogations with minimal oversight. In order to efficiently achieve 
the conviction and punishment of the factually guilty, it should be avoided to expend 
unnecessary resources. The function of the trial is not important in the model because 
its center of gravity lies in “the early, administrative fact-finding stages”.56 Court 
based processes are truncated or rejected as there is no reason to waste time on 
elaborate courtroom procedures. 
The model regards the state as an ally. Its “benevolent” view of state power 
means that it is willing to entrust the state with wider powers in order to give it great 
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leeway in its efforts to tackle crime. The model emphasizes the suppression of crime, 
and so is willing to condone more intrusive uses of state power in pursuit of this aim. 
The wrongful conviction of the innocent is not seen as a problem. Mistakes are 
acceptable as long as they did not interfere with the repression of crime. Where there 
is sufficient reliable evidence of guilt, even the most serious misconduct by the 
police should not result in the conviction being quashed. 
Credible evidence is not excluded simply because the methods to obtain it were 
illegal. The crime control model cannot tolerate that credible evidence is excluded 
for the sole reason that the methods used to obtain it were illegal or improper. To let 
factually guilty go free on such a “technicality” undermines crime control. The 
exclusionary rule, therefore, is viewed by the police as an unnecessary complication 
of the task of detecting and apprehending criminals, and suppressing crime.57 
In addition, the police should also have wide powers to conduct searches as only 
the factually guilty have something to hide.58 The model also opposes the search and 
seizure exclusionary rule. According to the model, illegally obtained physical 
evidence should be admissible at trial. Illegally obtained guns, drugs and stolen 
property should not be excluded as they reveal the truth. It does not matter how the 
police obtained them.59 If the evidence is reliable, as Justice Crompton has claimed 
in 1861 in England: “[i]t matters not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be 
admissible.”60 
By contrast, Packer’s due process model represents a human rights approach to 
the criminal process. The model has its predominant goal the regulation of 
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governmental intrusions in individual rights and the protection of the rights of the 
accused, which, it is assumed, will protect the rights of the individual. The model 
was based on the primacy of the rights of the individual in relation of the state, and 
emphasized protection of defendants, from official oppression. The model is 
concerned with ensuring sufficient protection for the individual against state power. 
Thus, the model is mindful of the potential for abuse and so insists on strict 
safeguards and based on the value of prevention of abuse of state power. 
The model is concerned with state power, the possibilities of abuse inherent in 
official power,61 “the primacy of the individual”,62 the protection of individual 
rights, the rights of the defendant, fairness to the defendant, and “quality control”.63 
The model stresses quality and thoroughness. The basic motivation underlying the 
model, according to Packer, is a desire to minimize mistakes in ascertaining guilt.64 
Conviction of those who are innocent is totally unacceptable and must be avoided. 
The model is skeptical of the administrative investigative process and its 
capacity to accurately assess guilt without judicial oversight. Thus, the model may 
impose procedural restrictions on application of criminal law even if these 
restrictions will limit the efficiency of the application.65 Packer describes this model 
as an “obstacle course”66 in which lawyers argue before judges that the prosecution 
may be rejected because the defendant’s rights have been violated. Quality control 
takes priority over quantitative outputs under this model. This model operates 
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according to the preoccupation of limiting state power over the individual. 
The model is skeptical of the motivations and fact-finding skills of law 
enforcement officers and animated by a fundamental distrust of the fact-finding 
process. The model insists instead on adherence to “formal, adjudicative, adversary 
fact-finding processes in which the factual case against the accused is publicly heard 
by an impartial tribunal.”67 To prevent such abuse the model subjects the exercise of 
investigative power to certain checks and balances. In addition, the model 
emphasizes the distinction between legal and factual guilt. There is a key concept of 
the model: “legal guilt”, in the sense that a defendant is deemed to be guilty only 
after the state establishes the fact by meeting the procedural demands of the system.68 
The model sees the criminal process as “conforming to the rule of law … 
emphasizing legal guilt over factual guilt.”69 The model uses the criminal process to 
police itself by its commitment to the concept of “legal guilt”.70 The model will not 
sacrifice the rights of the individual on the altar of “efficiency”. The model “stresses 
the possibilities of error.”71 Mistakes should be eliminated to the fullest extent 
possible. Thus, the model places great weight on avoiding mistakes. Wrongful 
conviction of the innocent defendants is intolerable. All possible steps should be 
taken to prevent abuses of state power. As Blackstone has stated, “[i]t is better that 
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”72 
The exclusionary rule is symbolic of the due process model as courts will be 
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more concerned with constitutional violation than discovering the truth about factual 
guilt. According to the model, strong “prophylactic and deterrent”73 exclusionary 
rules are necessary because much police abuse can never be remedied. Instead of 
focusing on factual guilt, the prosecutor and judge should put their efforts into 
establishing legal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of legally obtained 
evidence. Illegally obtained confessions should be excluded because they infringe the 
rights of the accused and were obtained through police misconduct. 
 
 
1.4 Problematic trends 
 
The exclusionary rule is one of the most difficult,74 controversial75 and complex76 
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doctrines in criminal procedure and evidence law. The difficulties are both in theory 
and practice. In theory, it is difficult to provide a compelling rationale for the rule; in 
practice, the extent of the rule is unclear. This rule is multifaceted and ever-changing. 
Dennis has also noticed that “the law in this area is complex and still developing.”77 
There are several types of evidence to be considered for exclusion. In this thesis 
these types fall into two main categories: (1) confessions: confessions obtained by 
torture or oppression; (2) non-confessional evidence: evidence secured by illegal 
search and seizure. A detailed consideration of all types of illegally or unfairly 
obtained evidence is beyond the scope of this research; there are far too many 
breaches of police powers. I am now mainly concerned with evidence obtained by 
torture and illegal searches. 
Some of the previous studies are insufficient and incomplete in terms of their 
scope and depth. They over-simplified this complicated issue. My intention here is to 
take matters further by providing a more principled discussion of the rule. First, 
Tapper notes that “in England, illegally obtained evidence is admissible as a matter 
of law, provided that it involves neither a reference to an inadmissible confession of 
guilt, nor the commission of an act of contempt of court.”78 Zander argues that 
“[b]roadly, confessions were liable to be excluded, whilst other evidence was 
normally admitted in evidence.”79 
As a matter of fact, in the past two decades, there has been a trend in Europe to 
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increasingly expand the use of the exclusionary rule, including the United Kingdom. 
In 1984, the English criminal justice system began a process of reconstruction. There 
are four grounds of exclusion under of the PACE. Section 76(2) requires exclusion of 
confession (a) obtained by oppression or (b) likely to have been rendered unreliable 
by anything said or done by anyone.80 What matters is how the confession was 
obtained, not whether it may have been true or not. If the confession was obtained by 
oppression, the judge is bound to exclude the admissions. His decision is mandatory 
rather than discretionary. Section 78(1) provides that: “the court may refuse to allow 
evidence … if it appears … that … the admission of the evidence would have such 
an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit 
it.”81 In addition, Section 82(3) saves “pre-existing common law powers … to 
exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.”82 
For the first time in the history of British criminal justice, the judiciary were 
given statutory power to exclude improperly obtained non-confessional evidence.83 
Judges do not need to consider whether they have discretion to exclude relevant 
evidence. 
In the United States, since 1970s, the Supreme Court has gradually moved in a 
conservative direction, limited the scope and application of the rule and has 
repeatedly created exceptions. Presently, there exist the following exceptions: 
independent source, 84  good faith, 85  inevitable discovery, 86  purged taint, 87 
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impeachment,88 harmless error exception89 and rule of attenuation.90 The Court 
backed away from a very strict application of the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule. 
    The exclusionary rule is very controversial. Some judges, including the Chief 
Justice Burger, opposed the rule. For example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,91 F.B.I. agents raided a suspect’s home, 
handcuffed him in front of his family, and searched for drugs. Finding none, they 
took him to the station house where he was strip searched, interrogated, and 
eventually released. The suspect, Bivens, then brought a civil action against the 
federal government. 
Although the Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover money 
damages for any injuries he had suffered as a result of the agents’ violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, in Chief Justice Burger’s dissent, he characterized the 
exclusionary rule as “an unworkable and irrational concept of law”, totally rejected 
the rule and attacked the rule for inadequately protecting the rights of suspects and 
wrongfully punishing prosecutors, who are powerless to correct police misconduct.92 
In 1995, the Senate was considering completely eliminating the exclusionary 
rule in the proposed Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Improvement Act 
of 1995, although it didn’t succeed, which stated that: 
 
Evidence which is obtained as a result of a search or seize shall not be 
excluded in a proceeding in a court of the United States, on the ground that 
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the search or seizure was in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the 
constitution of the United States, if the search or seizure was carried out in 
circumstances justifying an objectively reasonable belief that it was in 
conformity with the Fourth Amendment.93 
 
Additionally, there are still many profound, crucial and difficult questions 
unanswered. Many of these important issues have been simply ignored. These 
questions are full of conflicts and dilemmas. For example: 
(1) Does and should the exclusionary rule not only just apply to ordinary 
criminals, but also to terrorists,94 murderers and rapists? Should we carve out 
categories of people for whom the full force of the rule does not apply? I will argue 
strongly that the rule must apply to everyone. 
(2) How to bridge the gap between confessional and non-confessional evidence? 
There is a huge gap between them. As a matter of law, the general rule about 
non-confessional evidence is that “the test to be applied in considering whether 
evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters in issue. If it is, it is 
admissible, and the court is not concerned with how the evidence was obtained.”95 If 
reliable evidence exists, it would be regrettable not to use it, and to risk the acquittal 
of a guilty person; why cannot we apply this approach to confessional evidence to 
obtain more evidence and apprehend more criminals? If an involuntary confession is 
corroborated and there is no doubt about its trustworthiness, can the criminal justice 
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system make use of it? In general, if a confession had been obtained by police 
methods that rendered it involuntary or coerced – and thus violated due process law – 
it had to be excluded, however verifiable. It was so clear and simple. But why is it 
not that simple when non-confessional evidence is obtained in violation of due 
process, when the police have violated a constitutional protection that is basic to a 
free society?96 Lord Devlin has aptly observed that “[i]f the court is prepared to 
exclude admissions given in answer to improper questioning, however potent 
evidence they may be of the commission of a crime, and if it does so because the 
benefit to the law of fair interrogation outweighs the justice of the individual case, 
ought it not to follow the same principle where documents are unlawfully seized?”97 
(3) Why do some of the police prefer using illegal or unfair methods to procure 
evidence? Should the police be permitted to use deception to extract confessions 
from suspects? If it is not a judge’s function to discipline the police, who should take 
responsibility for regulating police misconduct? According to my research and over 
ten years’ prosecutor and criminal judge experience, I firmly argue that the police 
system will not seriously discipline their “brothers” who go beyond permissible 
limits in their eagerness to secure valuable evidence against the “bad guys”.98 Some 
high-ranking police officers who ordered that pain be inflicted on the suspect even 
considered themselves crime fighters.99 It is rather a naïve view of depending on the 
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police to safeguard civil rights. 
(4) The exclusionary rule reveals the fundamental tension between the social 
need for order and individuals’ desire for privacy and liberty. Can both ideologies be 
pursued simultaneously without compromise? In the leading case of Lawrie v. Muir 
in Scotland, Lord Justice-General Cooper highlighted that: 
 
The law must strive to reconcile two highly important interests which are 
liable to come into conflict – (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected 
from illegal or irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) 
the interest of the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the 
commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not 
be withheld from Courts of law on any merely formal or technical 
ground.100 
 
The crucial question is, “How to balance the two conflicting interests?” The 
dilemma is the gravity of serious crimes always will by definition exceed the gravity 
of almost any illegal or irregular invasions of citizens’ liberties. 
(5) What is the admissibility of evidence obtained in breach of Article 8 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights 
(ECHR)? 
The British Parliament incorporated the ECHR in its domestic law by the 
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Human Rights Act 1998, which became effective in 2000. The Act requires British 
courts to act in accordance with rights protected by the Convention. For example, 
Article 3, which guarantees freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment, is relevant to the possible exclusion of a confession. Article 6, the most 
litigated provision of the ECHR in the ECtHR,101 offers sophisticated protections for 
the right to a fair trial. 
Many of the covert and intrusive methods used by police violated the suspect’s 
right to respect for a private life, in breach of Article 8. In Khan v. United 
Kingdom,102 Khan visited a friend in Sheffield in 1993 who was under investigation 
for dealing in heroin. The police placed an aural surveillance device on his friend’s 
house. Khan was arrested subsequently because the police obtained recordings of a 
conversation in the course of which Khan admitted that he had been involved in 
another importation of drugs case. The issue is whether the evidence was admissible. 
The House of Lords held that the trial judge had been justified in not excluding the 
evidence.103 
Khan pursued his case to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
alleged that his right of privacy under Article 8 had been violated. In addition, as the 
only evidence in the case had been obtained in breach of the Convention, it should 
follow that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 had also been violated. The ECtHR 
held that the admission of evidence obtained by means of a listening device in breach 
of Article 8 did not automatically render the proceedings unfair. 
The question, however, raises two separate issues: firstly, does it make a fair 
                                                 
101 Paul Roberts, ‘Does Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights Require Reasoned 
Verdicts in Criminal Trials?’ (2011) Human Rights Law Review 213, 214. 
102 (App. 35394/97), Judgement of 4 Oct. 2001. 
103 R v. Khan (Sultan), [1997] AC 558, 582. 
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trial where evidence is relied on which was obtained in breach of the human rights 
guaranteed by the Convention; secondly, is such evidence admissible. I argue that the 
security of one’s privacy against intrusion by the government is inextricable from the 
conception of fair trial. 
Some decisions of the ECtHR have generated a power controversy; since 
Articles 3, 6 and 8 cover some of the most crucial areas of criminal procedure the 
issues bring into sharp focus the classic dilemma of order versus liberty in the civil 
societies. 
By comparing the criminal procedure of other countries, we might find good 
reasons to maintain or change the Anglo-American approach towards the 
exclusionary rule. In order to predict more accurately in which direction we may go, 
it is important for us to be aware of other countries’ situation. 
(6) Does China desire to solve the problem of police torture? Why is this 
problem still so serious? Why cannot current mechanisms play their roles? What are 
the attitudes of Chinese criminal judges towards illegally obtained evidence? Which 
is the appropriate application of the exclusionary rule for China? 
All of these questions have not been thought through, while some important 
issues have been simply ignored. Finding answers to these questions is very critical. 
It will help China to prevent police torture and police malfeasance leading to 
imprisonment or even execution of innocent persons. 
Referring to the original contribution in this thesis, I will address two points. 
The first point, quite simply, is that this research is the first systematic investigation 
of the exclusionary rule of evidence in the United Kingdom,104 United States105 and 
                                                 
104 It mainly refers to English law. In addition, there has been little analysis of the exclusionary rule 
and its related issues in Scotland. The Scottish decisions perceive themselves to be steering somewhat 
of a middle course between the automatic exclusion and the unquestioned admissibility. It seems that 
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China. 106  It will explore the interesting similarities and differences about the 
exclusionary rule issues in the United Kingdom and the United States. Although the 
judicial attitudes on indictment in the United Kingdom, United States and China 
provide the basis for much of the discussion in the thesis, the position in a variety of 
other jurisdictions is analysed where it is felt that such analyses throw light on the 
particular issue under discussion. The exclusionary rule remains an unexplored issue 
before Chinese courts107 and, hence, is not a subject of much contention. In the past, 
the Chinese legal community who cared about their personal safety avoided 
publishing on human rights and torture issues. The political climate produced a 
chilling effect upon the quality of scholarship. 
Although the corpus of writing on the Chinese criminal justice system has 
slightly expanded in recent years, significant gaps in our knowledge of the origin, 
development, and potential impact of the exclusionary rule remain. It is easy to 
criticize the Chinese criminal justice system. However, unlike commentators who 
contentedly note the broad short-comings of Chinese criminal process but stop there, 
I propose reforms, using the experiences in the United Kingdom and the United 
States as a model. Comparative criminal procedure law is particularly germane in 
exclusionary rule cases because it can help us to develop a sounder approach to some 
                                                                                                                                          
the Scottish judges have taken a more robust protection of the exclusionary rule than their English 
counterparts. It is a topic that requires further examination. See Peter Duff, ‘Admissibility of 
Improperly Obtained Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Search for Principle’ (2004) 
8 Edinburgh Law Review 152, 152-3 (analyzing the exclusionary rule in Scotland). 
105 It mainly refers to the federal / constitutional law. 
106 To date, there is completely no analysis of court cases about the exclusionary rule in China. This 
research will explore the judicial attitudes towards illegally obtained evidence. In addition, from Qin 
dynasty (221-207 B.C.), torture was part of the ordinary criminal procedure. Not only the suspects, 
but also the informant and witness may be suffered from torture. This research will explore the 
relationship between the traditional legal culture and Chinese criminal procedure law in practice. 
107 In this thesis, I have selected these Chinese cases among a great many cases with great effort and 
energy, and I have selected them largely because they are of interest to me. Many of them have also 
received a great deal of attention in China. In addition, it is extremely difficult to collect complete 
criminal judgments in China, especially if the cases involve police torture or police misconduct. 
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structural issues. 
This thesis will combine diagnosis and prescription – the problem of police 
torture and the solution of the exclusionary rule. I challenge the widespread idea that 
the Chinese government has no desire to solve the problem of police torture and 
establish the exclusionary rule. The crucial question is which type of exclusionary 
rule is suitable for China. This Part explores the importance of the rule in the quest 
for abolishing police torture. This research will begin a conversation between the 
Chinese criminal justice system and the Anglo-American criminal justice system. I 
will provide the most suitable approach for the exclusionary rule in China. 
The second point is this research will make a timely contribution. 
The timing is perfect. I predict China will adopt the exclusionary rule within a 
few years. Over ten cities and provinces108 have already adopted the confession 
exclusionary rule according to judicial interpretations. Some scholars started to 
notice the importance of the rule, although they have focused on the confession 
exclusionary rule. Now is the perfect time to introduce the rule to China for a 
solution to police torture. It is becoming increasingly clear that a series of chilling 






Three underlying themes in the thesis are, first, the rationales on which the 
                                                 
108 See 7.3. 
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exclusionary rule in criminal trials is premised; secondly, the theoretical 
constitutional foundation of the rule, and, thirdly, reform of the rule. Attention will 
have been drawn to the following interrelated issues: 
(1) What are the rationales of the exclusionary rule? 
(2) We will elevate the exclusionary rule to a new level of constitutional 
status. This is not merely a matter of evidence law. But what on earth is 
the theoretical constitutional foundation of the rule? 
(3) Should police torture be subject to a blanket prohibition? Should the 
exclusionary rule not apply to suspects who committed some serious 
cases, for example, murderer, career armed robber and rapist? 
(4) Are there alternatives to the exclusionary rule in practice? 
(5) Why the problem of police torture is still so serious in China? Should 
China adopt the exclusionary rule? If the answer is yes, which 
approach is suitable for China? 
The arrangement of this study is as follows: this chapter is the introduction to 
the study, which concerns the problematic trends of the research, and the key issues 
in this area. The opportunity is taken here for extended discussion and comparison of 
a variety of work which is much cited, but rarely analysed in depth. In this chapter, I 
have also elaborated on the way in which this project will be carried out. 
The first part of this research (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) discusses lessons from the 
past – the Anglo-American exclusionary rule. Chapter 2 addresses the evolution of 
the exclusionary rule (both the confession exclusionary rule, and the search and 
seizure exclusionary rule) in the United Kingdom and the United States. It will 
mainly examine the leading cases concerning the rule addressed by the courts in the 
House of Lords and United States Supreme Court and refer to decisions of lower 
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courts in the same jurisdiction as well. This thesis will evaluate different approaches 
found in the case law of these courts. Further, the rationales for the exclusionary rule 
are still unclear. In England there are two completely different perspectives regarding 
the rule. To utilitarians, to exclude evidence is to exclude the root of justice; the rule 
is the obstacle to truth-finding. To libertarians, the rule is to prevent abuse of power 
and to protect the liberty of the individual. In the United States, by contrast, no other 
doctrine in criminal procedure and evidence jurisprudence has possessed such loyal 
supporters and opponents. This chapter then examines rationales for the rule in 
criminal trials. 
Chapter 3 continues by exploring various issues of the acrimonious debates for 
the exclusionary rule. The chapter is a contribution to the debates on the exclusionary 
rule. This chapter will examine the supporting and opposing opinions on the rule. It 
delves into the question: whether there exists an alternative plan to the exclusionary 
rule. Next, it analyzes the cost-benefit balancing of the exclusionary rule. This 
chapter also examines the myths of the exclusionary rule. 
The next chapter, Chapter 4 canvasses the theoretical constitutional foundation 
of the exclusionary rule. The separation of powers doctrine is a major principle of the 
United States Constitution. This chapter will explore the relationship between the 
separation of powers doctrine and the rule. This chapter next turns to the analysis of 
the interactions of the court, exclusionary rule and police. To date, no substantial 
literature addresses the relationship between the three. 
The second part (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) of this study concentrates on the 
exclusionary rule in China. Part II is the heart of this thesis. Chapter 5 argues that the 
current Chinese legal structure for combating police torture is not adequately armed 
with the possibility, and that the fight against police torture has been plagued by 
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many legal loopholes. The first section of this chapter describes the nature and 
magnitude of the problem of police torture in China. It considers the reasons why the 
police make use of torture to obtain evidence. This chapter next turns to the wide 
powers of Chinese police. This chapter then challenges the proposal that the ban on 
police torture should be lifted. I argue that prohibition on police torture is absolute 
and the confessions obtained by torture cannot be justified under any circumstances. 
Chapter 6 explores the operation of the exclusionary rule in China. First of all, 
the major purpose of this section is to canvass the attitude of Chinese criminal judges 
towards illegally obtained evidence. This chapter then deals with whether, where 
torture is alleged, the burden of proof should fall on the suspect or prosecution. 
Finally, it turns to an analysis of evidence obtained by searches and seizures. 
The seventh chapter turns to the most pressing concern for exploring the 
appropriate approach of exclusionary rule for China. It begins with the threshold 
question: what is the appropriate approach for China to establish the exclusionary 
rule? In the first place, I will examine why we need to establish the exclusionary rule 
in China. In the second place, it then turns to address the admissibility of illegally 
obtained physical evidence. Lastly, it depicts several regional rules of criminal 
evidence and analyzes the possible effects of each regional rule that can occur when 
the court dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. I show how 
some exceptions are dangerous because they will replace the exclusionary rule per 
se. 
Chapter 8, the concluding chapter, as well as drawing together and synthesizing 
a number of themes which have been explored in, and which have underlain, the 




Lessons from the Past – 






The thesis will first consider the approaches to illegally obtained evidence employed 
by England and the United States. The first part of the thesis reflects upon the 
development of the Anglo-American exclusionary rule, with separate chapters 
covering (1) evolution and rationales, (2) the exclusionary rule debates and (3) 
theoretical constitutional foundation. 
I focus on the origins of the exclusionary rule in England and the United States, 
including its evolution since the beginning of the eighteenth century. I begin my 
work by examining evolution of the exclusionary rule going all the way back to 
1740s in England.1 Since 1886, the United States Supreme Court has required that 
evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment be excluded.2 I will trace the history 
of the exclusionary rule to show that the rule is about controlling executive power. 
Then I will examine the varying justifications for the exclusionary rule. As regards 
rationales, although the United States Supreme Court recognizes the deterrence 
rationale as the exclusionary rule’s primary purpose, this thesis asserts that the effect 
                                                 
1 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 
218-33. 
2 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 618 (1886). 
 35
of the exclusionary rule is much greater than mere deterrence. 
Further, the exclusionary rule has attracted much controversy and debate. After 
exploring the history of the exclusionary rule,3 the work then moves to the ongoing 
debates of the exclusionary rule.4 No single principle of criminal procedure and 
evidence has generated more debate than the exclusionary rule. Opponents of the 
exclusionary rule claim that the rule causes criminals to go free, without textual basis, 
the rule is not an effective deterrent, and the rule is limited to the United States and 
common law countries;5 therefore, it is invariably argued, the exclusionary rule 
should be abolished. Unfortunately, however, these claims cannot be substantiated. In 
addition, commentators have also been engaged in a long and lively debate as to 
whether there exist alternatives to the exclusionary rule.6 In theory, there are three 
types of alternative remedies: the criminal remedy, the civil remedy and the 
administrative remedy. However, upon closer consideration, no workable alternative 
to the exclusionary rule exists. 
Next, according to the cost-benefit balancing approach in the context of the 
exclusionary rule, in the view of the United States Supreme Court, if the costs of 
excluding valuable illegally obtained evidence outweigh the deterrent benefits gained, 
the rule will not be permitted.7 In addition, Richard Posner takes the position that all 
Fourth Amendment issues should be resolved through cost-benefit balancing.8 I wish 
I could believe that this were the case, but after close attention to the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment cases, I cannot bring myself to that conclusion. As we will see, the 
cost-benefit balancing approach was not used properly to decide whether or not to 
                                                 
3 See 2.1. 
4 See Chapter 3. 
5 See 3.1.1-3.1.5. 
6 See 3.2. 
7 See 3.3.1. 
8 Richard Posner, ‘Rethinking the Fourth Amendment’ (1981) The Supreme Court Review 49, 74. 
 36
exclude evidence obtained through illegal methods. 9  Quite the contrary, the 
deterrence-oriented cost-benefit balancing approach leads to a distortion of 
substantive exclusionary rule protection.10 
An overarching theme in Chapter 4 is to lay the thorough theoretical foundation 
for analyzing issues around the exclusionary rule, by identifying the theoretical 
constitutional foundation for the rule (i.e., the separation of powers), analyzing the 
interrelationship between the court, exclusionary rule and police, and showing the 
result of lacking checks and balances in the criminal process. This thesis challenges 
the traditional perception of the exclusionary rule by developing it in the 
constitutional law context. The key question, the focus of the present thesis, is what 
the theoretical constitutional foundation of the exclusionary rule is. Critical 
examination of this question goes to the very roots of the exclusionary rule. 
 
                                                 
9 See 3.3.2. 
10 See 3.3. 
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2 






A lawyer without history or literature is a mechanic, a mere working 
mason; if he possesses some knowledge of these, he may venture to call 
himself an architect. 
                                               Sir Walter Scott1 
 
The history of the exclusionary rule is about controlling executive power. Some of 
the lawyer’s histories of the rule are incorrect because they only take a narrow 
perspective of history. It is important to identify the virtues and limitations of the rule 
from the history, which helps us to evaluate the subsequent development and solve 
some difficult problems in contemporary exclusionary rule theory. The exclusionary 
rule opinions of both the House of Lords and United States Supreme Court 
frequently invoke history as a foundation for decision. In this thesis, I will use 
historical evidence to support my arguments. 
    Broadly speaking the exclusionary rule was born as early as the eighteenth 
century (between the 1740s and the 1770s), grew up in the nineteenth century, and 
matured in the twentieth century. 
 
                                                 
1 Walter Scott, Guy Mannering (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1999) 213. 
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2.1.1 English law 
 
2.1.1.1 Confession exclusionary rule 
The starting point is confession evidence. The confession exclusionary rule refers to 
the rule that excludes confessions obtained by illegal or unfair methods, for example, 
fear of prejudice, hope of advantage, or oppression of any sort. The fundamental 
condition of the admissibility of confession evidence is that they must be voluntary. 
If the confession was voluntarily offered, it is admissible. 
Peter Mirfield claimed that “in Warickshall itself we find that the first judicial 
statement of what is, without doubt, an exclusionary rule.” 2  The confession 
exclusionary rule, however, long predated Warickshall in 1783. Langbein’s 
examination of the Old Bailey Sessions Papers describes the criminal trials 
conducted in the Old Bailey from the 1670s until the eve of World War І provides 
insights into the way in which the exclusionary rule solidified at the court. 
The exclusionary rule goes back some two hundred and seventy years. At the 
trial of Tobias and Rachel Issacs in 1740, after the prosecutor promised Rachel to be 
her friend and that she would not hurt her, she confessed. The report noted that “[t]he 
prosecutor was not allowed to proceed; and another witness afterwards offering to 
give an account of what she had confessed to him, was likewise stopped; because a 
confession obtained on a prosecutor of friendship or by false insinuations ought not 
to be given in evidence against a prisoner.” The confession exclusionary rule was 
thereby applied at the Old Bailey in 1740.3 In 1741, involuntary confessions were 
                                                 
2 Peter Mirfield, Confessions (Sweet and Maxwell, London 1985) 47, citing The King v. Warickshall, 
1 Leach 263 (1783). 
3 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 
218-33. 
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regarded as inadmissible because of the exclusionary rule in the trial of Charles 
White.4 
Up to 1775, however, the authorities often extracted confessions from suspects 
by threats or promises and most of such extorted confessions were admissible. In R v. 
Margaret Caroline Rudd,5 on application for release, the accused had been induced 
by promises. Lord Mansfield referred to the fact that: 
 
The instance has frequently happened of persons having made confessions 
under threats or promises: the consequence as frequently has been that 
such examinations and confessions have not been made use of against 
them on their trials.6 
 
The court barred involuntary confessions which were obtained by threats or 
promises and established important precedents on the confession exclusionary rule in 
1775. However, the judge did not state why involuntary confessions are inadmissible. 
Subsequently, R v. Warickshall 7  is an important case on the confession 
exclusionary rule. Warickshall was indicted for receiving stolen goods. After the 
police made promises of favour, she confessed and property was found in her bed. 
The court held that the confession should be excluded because the positive 
inducements rendered the confession involuntary. 
The Court of King’s Bench said that “a confession forced from the mind by the 
flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is 
to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and 
                                                 
4 17 Howell’s State Trials 1079. 
5 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775). 
6 1 Leach 115, 168 Eng. Rep.160 (K.B. 1775) (emphasis added). 
7 1 Leach 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep.234 (K.B. 1783). 
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therefore it is rejected.”8 
Next, in Ibrahim v. The King,9 Ibrahim, a private in the Indian Army, was 
charged with murdering his officer. After the officer in command asked why he had 
done such a senseless act, he confessed. Lord Sumner confirmed the general 
principle and noted: 
 
It has long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law, that 
no statement by an accused is admissible in evidence against him unless it 
is shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the 
sense that it has not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or 
hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority.10 
 
In 1963, Lord Parker asserted that confessions obtained “in an oppressive manner” 
were inadmissible in Callis v. Gunn.11 
    Between 1972 to 1993, the admissibility of confession evidence was considered 
by two commissions (or committees). The first was by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee of 1972. 
In 1959, the Conservative Home Secretary created the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee (CLRC) which later submitted its Eleventh Report in 1972. It was the 
first committee to suggest several recommendations for reform of the confession 
exclusionary rule. The Criminal Law Revision Committee provided some changes to 
the confession law.12 The Criminal Law Revision Committee preferred the crime 
control model13 and argued that “all available and relevant evidence should be 
before the court. We have throughout aimed at reducing the exceptions to 
                                                 
8 1 Leach 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783). 
9 [1914] AC 599. 
10 [1914] AC 599. 
11 [1964] 1 QB 495. 
12 [1914] AC 599, 609. 
13 See 1.3. 
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admissibility under the present law.”14 It believed that “strict and formal” evidence 
rules for the protection of accused persons no longer serve a useful purpose but 
become a hindrance to justice.15 Its basic ground was that the traditional evidence 
rule unduly favoured the guilty. 
   The second was the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981. The 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (the Philips Commission), under the 
chairmanship of Sir Cyril Philips, was triggered by the Confait16 case in 1979 and 
issued its report (the Philips Report) in 1981.17 
In 1972, Maxwell Confait was found dead in his blazing room in London. 
Leighton (aged 15), Lattimore (aged 18 and mentally retarded) and Salih (aged 14) 
were interviewed by police neither in the presence of a solicitor nor the boy’s parents. 
All boys said they were assaulted by the police during their interviews and then 
confessed to serious crimes they did not commit.18 Leighton was convicted of 
murder, Lattimore of manslaughter and all three were convicted of arson. It was later 
established that their confessions had been false. In 1975, the Court of Appeal ruled 
that the convictions were unsafe.19 
    Ironically, the basic ground of the recommendations put forward by the 
Commission was that the present law improperly favoured the guilty. The framework 
of the Commission’s approach can be outlined as follows. 
First, the primary purpose of the Code of Practice for interviewing suspects is to 
obtain reliable confessions. The reliability of confessions obtained in its breach must 
                                                 
14 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, ‘Eleventh Report, Evidence (General)’ (Cm 4991, 1972) 
[20]. 
15 Ibid., [21]. 
16 [1975] 62 Crim. App. 53. 
17 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981). 
18 J.J. Eddleston, Blind Justice: Miscarriages of Justice in Twentieth-Century Britain? (ABC-CLIO, 
Oxford 2000) 358. 
19 R. v. Lattimore, 62 Crim. App. 53 (1975). 
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be open to question.20 
    Secondly, the Commission, referring to the United States, argued that the 
obvious defect of using an automatic exclusionary rule is that it can only apply to a 
small portion of cases and this caused doubt about its effectiveness as a deterrent of 
police conduct.21 The Commission observed that the reason why the United States 
Supreme Court developed the exclusionary rule was to protect the citizen’s 
constitutional rights. In addition, there are a bewildering complexity and amount of 
law enforcement agencies. Few are under any federal government supervision or 
control.22 
Thirdly, the members of the Commission had different opinions in relation to 
the exclusion of confession evidence issues. One wished to maintain the existing law 
on the exclusion of involuntary statements and hoped judges would exercise a wider 
discretion to exclude more evidence obscured in breach of other aspects of the rules. 
Another preferred a wider application of automatic exclusion, so that any evidence in 
violation of the rules would be inadmissible. The rest considered that Parliament 
should take the responsibility for deciding what the rules should be. The existing 
voluntariness rule should be abolished. If there was non-compliance by the police, 
the consequences should be known to them. Those consequences should depend on 
the purpose of the rule that has been breached. Confessions should continue to be 
automatically excluded if obtained as a result of violence, threats of violence, torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment and by methods which society would regard as 
abhorrent.23 
                                                 
20 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.133]. 
21 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.125]. 
22 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.126]. 
23 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.131], [4.132]. 
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Generally speaking, the Commission considered that the exclusion of evidence 
is not a satisfactory way of enforcing compliance with rules.24 The effective methods 
to ensure that suspects are treated in a humane and civilized manner would be 
contemporaneous controls and good supervision.25 Although the report was widely 
criticized by commentators,26 it gave rise to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
1984. 
Taken overall, both the Criminal Law Revision Committee and Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure are all in fact consistent with the crime control 
model.27 Finally, PACE stipulates that a confession obtained by oppression must be 
excluded by the judge.28 
 
2.1.1.2 Search and seizure exclusionary rule 
I now turn to consider the search and seizure exclusionary rule which refers to the 
rule that excludes real evidence secured by illegal search and seizure in England. 
From the mid-nineteenth century to today, English courts regarded the method of 
obtaining evidence and its admissibility as two different things. The traditional 
English approach on illegally obtained physical evidence after 1861 could be 
summarized by the dictum of Crompton J. in R v. Leatham29 as follows: “it matters 
not how you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence.”30 
In the important 1955 decision of the Privy Council in Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. 
R, the accused was subjected to an illegal search in what was the British colony of 
                                                 
24 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.132]. 
25 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.117], [4.118]. 
26 Marquita Inman, ‘The Admissibility of Confessions’ (1981) Criminal Law Review. 469, 469-82. 
27 See 1.3. 
28 PACE s 76 (2) a. 
29 (1861) 8 Cox CC 498. 
30 (1861) 8 Cox CC 498, 501. 
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Kenya. The Judicial Committee upheld the conviction of a Kenyan for unlawful 
possession of two rounds of ammunition even though the evidence had been obtained 
by two police officers of a lower rank than those permitted to conduct searches. He 
was sentenced to death. Kuruma established the test of admissibility of 
non-confessional evidence that once the evidence is deemed relevant to the matters 
in issue, it is admissible. The court argued that it was not concerned with how the 
evidence was obtained. Lord Goddard made the following finding: “[T]he test to be 
applied in considering whether evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the 
matters in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned with how the 
evidence was obtained.”31 
In 1978 in Jeffrey v. Black32 Lord Widgery CJ admitted that the judge has a 
discretion to exclude evidence, reasoning as follows: 
 
[T]he magistrates … have a general discretion to decline to allow any 
evidence to be called by the prosecution if they think that it would be 
unfair or oppressive to allow that to be done. … It is a discretion which 
every criminal judge has all the time in respect of all the evidence which is 
tendered by the prosecution.33 
 
In the leading case of R v. Sang34 decided in 1980, the House of Lords 
abolished the discretion and claimed that there is no discretion for trial judge to 
exclude real evidence which had been obtained irregularly.35 
Before PACE, England had no legislated rule of evidence concerning illegally 
obtained physical evidence. In sum, the judicially developed law was that such 
                                                 
31 Kuruma, Son of Kaniu v. R, [1955] 1 All ER 236 (appeal taken from E. Afi.). 
32 [1978] 1 All ER 555. 
33 [1978] 1 All ER 555, 559 (emphasis added). 
34 [1980] AC 402. 
35 [1980] AC 402, 436. 
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evidence was admissible if it was relevant, although the courts had very limited 
discretion to exclude evidence when “the strict rules of admissibility would operate 
unfairly against the accused.”36 The method by which evidence has been obtained is 
irrelevant. 
 
2.1.2 United States law 
 
2.1.2.1 Confession exclusionary rule 
No confession is admissible unless made freely and voluntarily and not under the 
influence of promises or threats. In United States criminal trials, coerced and 
involuntary confessions are inadmissible. The confession exclusionary rule is an 
important part of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment 
states that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.”37 The Supreme Court had long since adopted a confession exclusionary 
rule, which stands as a bar against the conviction of any accused in court by means of 
coerced confessions.38 
The roots of police torture can be traced to lynching in the early 1890s in the 
United States.39 There were at least 4,000 public torture lynchings between 1882 and 
1940. David Garland defines public torture lynchings as “lynchings that were highly 
publicized, took place before a large crowd, were staged with a degree of ritual, and 
                                                 
36 Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. R, [1955] 1 All ER 236, 239. 
37 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself … .” 
38 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287. 
39 J.H. Skolnick, ‘American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery’ in Sanford Levinson (ed.), 
Torture: A Collection (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 105, 106. 
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involved elements of torture, mutilation, or unusual cruelty.” 40  Public torture 
lynchings led directly to police whippings of black suspects to obtain a confession.41 
As early as 1935, in the United States Supreme Court case Brown v. 
Mississippi, 42  the defendants were suspected of murder based solely on their 
confessions. Over the course of several days, one defendant was brutally whipped 
until he confessed. All defendants were severely whipped. The police declared that 
they would continue the whipping until the suspect confessed. Defendants then 
agreed to confess to such statements as the deputy would dictate. The confessions 
had been obtained in the exact contents as desired by the police. The police also 
warned defendants that if they changed their story at any time in any respect from the 
confessions, the perpetrators would administer the same torture again. The Court 
held the confessions extorted by torture were inadmissible and violated the due 
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.43 
In White v. State of Texas,44 the defendant, an illiterate farmhand in Texas, was 
arrested without warrants and put in custody without the filing of charges. During the 
seven days of his arrest, armed police on several successive nights took him 
handcuffed from the jail up in the woods, whipped him, asked him each time about a 
confession. He was repeatedly asked whether he was ready to confess; then began to 
cry and “confessed”. Because of the alleged confession, the defendant was convicted 
of rape and sentenced to death. The Court excluded the confessions in 1940.45 
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44 310 U.S. 530 (1940). 
45 310 U.S. 530, 532 (1940). 
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2.1.2.2 Search and seizure exclusionary rule 
The origin of the search and seizure exclusionary rule can be traced in the 1886 civil 
case of Boyd v. United States. In 1884, the government initiated a forfeiture 
proceeding against two businessmen for importing plate glass in violation of revenue 
law, demanded and obtained the invoice of the goods. Justice Bradley linked the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment and reasoned that the use of illegally obtained evidence 
did not differ from compelling a man to give evidence against himself.46 
The 1914 decision of the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States47 is a 
landmark case which has had an important and great influence on the subsequent 
course of search and seizure law. Weeks imposed the exclusionary rule upon federal 
law enforcement. The Fourth Amendment forbids the admission of evidence secured 
through an illegal search and seizure in a federal criminal trial. 
Local police searched defendant Weeks’ home and seized personal items and 
papers without a warrant. Later in the same day, a United States marshal, also 
without a search warrant, searched the defendant’s room and seized additional 
property. Weeks was arrested, charged and convicted of illegally using the mails and 
maintaining a lottery. 
The Court, standing squarely on the Fourth Amendment grounds, unanimously 
held that “[i]f letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in 
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of 
no value.”48 
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In the 1949 case in Wolf v. Colorado,49 the police suspected Dr. Wolf was 
dispensing abortions, went to his office without a warrant, seized his appointment 
books and searched through it to learn the names of his patients. The police thus 
obtained leads to some patients who were questioned, with the result that the 
abortion business came to light. An information was filed against the doctor. The 
books also were introduced in evidence against Wolf. 
The Court had a chance to abolish the “silver platter” doctrine, which allowed 
the use of evidence obtained by illegal search conducted by state officers in federal 
criminal trials as long as federal officers were not involved in the constitution 
violation, i.e., the local officers turn such evidence over to federal officials on a 
“silver platter” to assist in the federal prosecution of a suspect. 
However, the Court held that evidence secured in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, although inadmissible in federal courts, could be used in state courts. 
The Fourth Amendment was deemed applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment but permitted the states to select their own method for enforcing it. The 
exclusionary rule was not extended to the state law enforcement.50 
In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio,51 the Court overruled Wolf and extended the rule to 
state criminal justice systems. The Court ruled that state courts have to exclude 
illegally obtained evidence in criminal proceedings in the same way as federal courts. 
Cleveland police received information that a bomber was hiding in Miss Mapp’s 
home and demanded entrance. Mapp refused to admit them without a search warrant 
after telephoning her attorney. The police twisted her hand, handcuffed her very 
forcefully and then ransacked her house without a warrant. Mapp was convicted of 
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51 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 49
possession of obscene materials and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The 
issue in this case is whether the exclusionary rule applies to the states. The Court 
held that: 
 
Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared 
enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is enforceable against them by the same 
sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government.52 
 
United States v. Leon 53 created the significant good faith exception in 1984. 
The Court held that the exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admission 
of evidence when the police obtained a search warrant from a magistrate and relied 
on it in good faith – even though it turned out that the search was illegal because the 
warrant was ultimately found to be lacking probable cause. 
Justice White, writing for the majority, explained that “when an officer acting 
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from the judge or magistrate 
and acted within its scope … there is no police illegality and thus nothing to deter.”54 
The Court concluded that the rule cannot be expected to deter objectively reasonable 
police activity. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police 
conduct and, when the official action was pursued in complete good faith, excluding 
that evidence does not prevent future police misconduct.55 
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[T]here are two distinct issues (i) one concerns rules about the probative 
value of evidence; (ii) the other concerns rules about the exclusion of 
evidence for reasons other than reasons of evidentiary value. The question 
in (i) is how to deal with evidence the probative value of which is in 
doubt … Evidence gained from an involuntary confession … and it is 
difficult to know in any event how much weight it should be given. … These 
are issues internal to proof. In (ii) the issue is whether certain kinds of 
evidence … should be excluded, in order to advance other values or 
policies, such as … the protection of an accused against the police. These 
are issues external to proof. … The exclusion of evidence in order to 
uphold those values may mean the loss of probative evidence and thus a 
lower level of accuracy. 
 
                                                D.J. Galligan56 
 
Identifying the source and basis of the exclusionary rule is of more than academic 
significance. The question of the rationales for the exclusionary rule determines 
whether the rule survives. At the outset, the fundamental question was stated to be: 
Why should courts exclude illegally or unfairly obtained evidence? This section 
examines the rationales behind the exclusionary rule. The courts have been reluctant 
to provide insight and guidance into the constitutional underpinnings for the 
exclusionary rule when justifying their admissibility decisions. 
Additionally, no decision by the court has ever fully explored and established 
consistently the justifications behind the exclusionary rule. The jurisprudence on the 
principles behind the rule is unconvincing and inconsistent. To date, the rationales of 
the rule are still unclear. Some rationales failed to adapt to changing social and 
                                                 




Traditionally, in common law the exclusionary rule has only been concerned by 
reference to the internal rationale. The internal consideration is to ensure the 
reliability of evidence. However, lacking the trustworthiness of evidence is not the 
only basis for excluding them. 
This section will have two primary considerations: the internal rationale, i.e., 
the reliability rationale which is more relevant to the confession exclusionary rule; 
the external rationale, the dominant consideration, which is relevant to both the 
confession exclusionary rule, and search and seizure exclusionary rule. The full 
importance of the rationales of the exclusionary rule cannot come into sight if one 
sticks to an internal viewpoint. I argue that no specific rationale is perfect, absolutely 
better than the others; furthermore there is a trend to combine both internal and 
external rationale. 
 
2.2.1 The reliability rationale 
 
An important aim of the criminal justice is to ensure the accuracy of criminal 
proceedings. “Reliability” refers to the propensity of the criminal justice system to 
produce a factually correct verdict. At first, the confession exclusionary rule was 
designed primarily to guard against the introduction of unreliable evidence. Society’s 
abhorrence at the use of confessions extracted under questionable means and 
circumstances is mainly based on its unreliability. Such unreliable information may 
                                                 
57  How should we apply constitutional protections from the eighteenth century to today’s 
computerized world? For instance, can the police use an infrared thermal imaging device at a suspect’s 
home? Searching and seizing computers are common during criminal investigation nowadays. How 
does the exclusionary rule govern the steps that an investigator takes when retrieving evidence from a 
personal computer? 
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even lead to false convictions. The first principle, the consideration of intrinsic policy, 
is concerned with the promotion of reliability of confessions and the outcome of the 
decisions that are made. 
    The confession exclusionary rule is linked to the belief that certain types of 
evidence, such as confessions obtained through torture, are intrinsically unreliable 
and therefore unsuitable for the discovery of truth. The use of torture in an 
interrogation presupposes the “efficacy” of torture to produce “reliable” information. 
Conversely, it is cleared that the illegally secured confessions are inherently 
unreliable as under sufficient duress the victim, whether guilty or innocent, will 
admit to anything or say anything to avoid the pain and save himself from further 
torture. These statements are not trustworthy. The classic example is confessions 
gained through torture. Torture is unacceptable. Psychological pressure will be 
coupled with torture. “Confessions” may stop the physical pain and psychological 
pressure. In addition, vulnerable defendants, for example, juveniles and the mentally 
ill or handicapped, may confess falsely. Pressed by police, even the innocent 
confess. 58  The goal of this rationale is to avoid unreliable confessions. The 
confession exclusionary rule is an important means to weed out unreliable statements 
at trial. 
In 1783, the first clear enunciation of the rationale appeared in Warickshall. 
Nares J. established a theory which based on the reliability of the confession in 
question and articulated the reason for rejecting the confession: 
 
Confession are received in evidence, or rejected as inadmissible, under a 
consideration whether they are or are not entitled credit. A free and 
voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, because it is 
                                                 
58 See Chapter 5. 
 53
presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is 
admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but confessions forced 
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by torture of fear, comes in so 
questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, 
that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.59 
 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1972, the Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure of 1981 and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993 
followed this rationale. The Criminal Law Revision Committee noted that one of the 
reasons for the exclusionary rule is the reliability principle which says that 
confession obtained involuntarily may not be reliable.60 The Royal Commission on 
Criminal Procedure stated that the principle behind the rule is the reliability rationale 
because evidence of certain kinds is or may be so unreliable as to preclude its being 
heard by the jury.61 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice noted that a 
confession may be excluded because of unreliability where there has been no 
impropriety on the police.62 
This is important because unreliable confessions may lead to the miscarriages of 
justice. Torture and interrogation process have a long association that continues to 
the present day. Judicial torture (i.e., torture by officials authorized by the law) can 
be traced back in England in the 16th and early 17th centuries. The investigative 
process is the first and extremely important stage in the criminal process. These 
incriminating confessions cast a long shadow over the suspects’ future in the criminal 
justice system and may keep them behind bars for decades. 
Many police officers are under tremendous pressure to find “facts” and are only 
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concerned with securing a statement from the defendant on which they could convict 
him. Zeal in finding the truth and tracking down crime is not in itself an assurance of 
fairness of trial. Accordingly, many innocent suspects falsely confess to crimes they 
did not commit and be wrongfully convicted.63  It produced tragedies – false 
confessions carrying life imprisonment or death. The common feature of these 
miscarriages of justice was that the police used illegal or unfair physical and 
psychological pressure to secure confessions. Here are some small samples from 
twentieth-century Britain. 
    From 1970 to 1990, a series of notorious wrongful convictions occurred such as 
that of Judith Ward, Cardiff Three, Bridgewater Four, Guildford Four, Birmingham 
Six and Maguire Seven. Some prompted the government to appoint official 
commissions. 
In October 1974, bombings had taken place at public houses in Guildford, 
England. The police abused and threatened four suspects, known as the Guildford 
Four, and obtained confessions for acts of terror. The defendants, alleged Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) terrorists, were convicted of murders and conspiracy to 
murder and all four were sentenced to life sentences based completely on false 
confessions. One of the defendants died in prison in 1980. After fifteen years of 
wrongful imprisonment, in 1989, the Court of Appeal quashed their convictions on 
the basis of new evidence showing that the defendants’ confessions had been 
unreliable and their written statements included fabrications by the police.64 
In November 1974, explosions occurred at two public houses in Birmingham, 
England. The six appellants, known as the Birmingham Six, alleged IRA terrorists, 
                                                 
63 See Chapter 5. 
64 R v. Richardson; R v. Conlon; R v. Armstrong; R v. Hill, The Times 20 October 1989. 
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were convicted on 21 counts of murder because the police fabricated confessions and 
relied on faulty forensic tests. After they had served almost two decades in prison, in 
1991, the Court of Appeal finally quashed their unsafe and unsatisfactory convictions 
on the basis of new evidence showing that the prosecution evidence at the trial was 
very unreliable.65 
In 1978, four defendants, known as the Bridgewater Four, were convicted of the 
murder of Carl Bridgewater. All four were subjected to torture by the police, 
confessions were fabricated and interview evidence was forged against them. One 
defendant died in prison. The Court of Appeal overturned their convictions in 1997. 
The others served seventeen years in prison for crimes they had not committed.66 
In 1990, three defendants, known as the Cardiff Three, were convicted of the 
murder of a prostitute. One defendant, Miller, on the borderline of mental handicap 
with an IQ of 75 and a mental age of 11, was interviewed for some 13 hours over 
five days. Having denied involvement over three hundred times, Miller was finally 
persuaded to make “confessions”. The Court of Appeal excluded their “confessions” 
as oppressive and quashed their convictions in 1992. The Lord Chief Justice Taylor 
was appalled by the bullying and hectoring to which Miller was subjected: “[t]he 
officers … were not questioning him so much as shouting at him what they wanted 
him to say. Short of physical violence, it is hard to conceive of a more hostile and 
intimidating approach by officers to a suspect.”67 All in all, until today, the House of 
Lords took the view that one of the reasons that the common law against involuntary 
confessions is their inherent unreliability.68 
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Although originally exclusion of involuntary confessions depended primarily on 
the reliability of the evidence and the reliability rationale is one of the justifications 
for the confession exclusionary rule, it is tremendously important to note that the 
question of admissibility is distinct from the weight attached to a confession. These 
are two quite distinct issues. The exclusionary rule is not solely based on concerns 
about the value of the impugned evidence. That is the reason why the reliability 
rationale is no longer the principal and only test of admissibility in this context after 
the 1940s in the United States and 1980s in the United Kingdom. I argue that the 
reliability rationale only played a subordinate role. 
Inherent untrustworthiness is not the question in the United States anymore. In 
the 1944 case of Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee,69 for example, the police kept the 
defendant under continuous cross examination for thirty-six hours without rest in an 
effort to extract a “voluntary” confession. The Court held that even completely 
reliable evidence will be excluded if the method in which it was obtained is 
considered to be in violation of due process guarantees.”70 Justice Frankfurter, for 
the Court in Rochin v. California,71 also declared that “[u]se of involuntary verbal 
confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of 
their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though 
statements contained in them may be independently established as true.”72 
    A similar analysis was employed in Spano v. New York.73 The Court reversed 
the defendant’s conviction because the trial court’s admission of his involuntary 
confession was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment in 1959. The Court 
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69 332 U.S. 143 (1944). 
70 332 U.S. 143, 161 (1944). 
71 342 U.S. 165 (1951). 
72 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1951). 
73 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
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concluded that the defendant’s will was overcome by official pressure, fatigue, and 
sympathy falsely aroused in a post-indictment setting. Chief Justice Warren pointed 
out that “[t]he abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not 
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling 
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law.”74 
Two years later, once again, Justice Frankfurter delivered the opinion of the 
Court in Rogers v. Richmond 75  and explained the reason why even reliable 
involuntary confessions should be excluded. The Court expressly rejected the notion 
that reliability per se was at the heart of the confession exclusionary rule and held 
“[t]his is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the 
methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of 
our criminal law.”76 This means that whether or not the defendant in fact spoke the 
truth is not the key point; there is no question of weight and truth in this case. The 
aim of the Court is of due process and fairness, regardless whether the evidence is 
trustworthy or not. 
In the United Kingdom,77 Lord Hailsham stated, in Wong Kam-Ming v. The 
Queen,78 that “[t]his is not only because of the potential unreliability of such 
statements, but also, and perhaps mainly, because in a civilised society it is vital that 
persons in custody or charged with offences should not be subjected to ill treatment 
or improper pressure in order to extract confessions.”79 
The Privy Council reaffirmed its position that the potential unreliability of 
illegally obtained statements is not the only concern and also held in Lam Chi-ming v. 
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R80 that “some means of excluding confessions … obtained by improper methods … 
is not only because of the potential unreliability of such statements, but also … 
because in a civilised society it is vital that persons in custody or charged with 
offences should not be subjected to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to 
extract confessions.”81  All these decisions mentioned above herald the court’s 
concern for the methods by which evidence obtained – a concern that is independent 
of the desire to prevent the admission of untrustworthy confessions. 
 
2.2.2 The self-incrimination rationale 
 
The Latin maxim “nemo debet prodere se ipsum” means no one is obliged to accuse 
himself. The establishment of the privilege against self-incrimination can be traced to 
the early seventeenth European canon law.82 From the nineteenth century, the 
privilege started to insulate suspects from being compelled to speak in criminal trials. 
The privilege was historically closely linked with the abolition of judicial torture83 
and developed from the struggle to “eliminate torture as a government practice.”84 
The inclusion of the privilege was expected to prevent the state from imposing 
judicial torture. In Sang both Lord Diplock and Lord Scarman gave as the 
justification for refusing to admit improperly obtained confessions the principle that 
no man is to be compelled to incriminate himself. Lord Diplock commented: 
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The underlying rationale of this branch of the criminal law, though it may 
originally have been based on ensuring the reliability of confessions is … 
now to be found in the maxim, nemo debet prodere se ipsum, no one can be 
required to be his own betrayer, or in its popular English misinterpretation 
“the right to silence”.85 
 
In Lam Chi-ming,86 Lord Griffiths again endorsed the rationale and stated that: 
 
English cases established that the rejection of an improperly obtained 
confession is not dependent only upon possible unreliability but also upon 
the principle that a man cannot be compelled to incriminate himself and 
upon the importance that attaches in a civilised society to proper behaviour 
by the police towards those in their custody.87 
 
The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause of the United States 
Constitution also prohibits the police from compelling any person in a criminal case 
to incriminate himself. The privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental right 
of criminal suspects and protects them from being forced to “testify” against 
themselves. 
 
2.2.3 The deterrence rationale 
 
The principle that the police should obey the law while enforcing it is a deep-rooted 
feeling. The third rationale, which has been coined “the disciplinary theory” or “the 
deterrent theory,” attempts to justify the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence on 
the basis that the courts should remove the inducements by the exclusion in order to 
prevent abusive interrogation practices, and deter due process violation and police 
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misconduct. 
Only by the exclusionary rule can we impress upon overzealous or ruthless 
officers that violation of the law will lose the very thing they retained from illegal 
searches and do them no good at the end. The exclusionary rule deters other law 
enforcement officers who may contemplate similar police misconduct. If the police 
know that evidence secured by their unlawful act will be inadmissible in the courts, 
police officers may minimize or put an end to this kind of malpractice. The rationale 
focuses on the future, i.e., present exclusion by court will defer future wrongdoing by 
police. As long as courts allow the evidence, police will investigate lawlessly. The 
goal of this rationale is to deter police misconduct. 
Almost four decades ago, the Criminal Law Revision Committee of 1972 drew 
attention to the deterrence rationale. According to the Committee, one of the reasons 
for excluding involuntary confession is the disciplinary principle which means that 
the police must be discouraged from using illegal means to secure a confession. This 
discouragement takes place by depriving the police of the advantage of the 
confession for the purpose of obtaining a conviction. If the principle were applied, 
one could have expected the evidence to be excluded to prevent the prosecution from 
taking advantage of the impropriety. A majority of the Committee accepted the 
disciplinary principle. The Committee stated: 
 
Two reasons have been given for this rule. The first is that a confession not 
made voluntarily may not be reliable. … The second reason is that the 
police must be discouraged from using improper methods to obtain a 
confession. This discouragement takes place by depriving them of the 
advantage of the confession for the purpose of obtaining a conviction.88… 
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As to the discouragement of improper methods of interrogation, the 
majority think that to remove all restrictions on admissibility of 
confessions on account of the use of improper methods to obtain them 
could not but operate, human nature being what it is, to encourage the 
police to resort on occasions to at least small improprieties.89 
 
The disciplinary principle proposed by the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
would have been very unique in the United Kingdom (except Scotland). The House 
of Lords, as well as the Court of Appeal, have rejected this kind of principle to be a 
goal of the country’s limited exclusionary rule. 
Here are a collection of obiter dicta in the House of Lords and the Court of 
Appeal: 
In Sang,90 Lord Diplock observed that “[i]t is no part of a judge’s function to 
exercise disciplinary powers over the police or prosecution as respects the way in 
which evidence to be used at the trial is obtained by them.”91 Lord Scarman pointed 
out that “[t]he role of the judge is confined to the forensic process. He controls 
neither the police nor the prosecuting authority. 92  Likewise, in Fox v. Chief 
Constable of Gwent,93 Lord Fraser endorsed that “[t]he duty of the court is to decide 
whether the appellant has committed the offence with which he is charged, and not to 
discipline the police for exceeding their powers.”94 
In the later case of R v. Mason,95 Mason was arrested and questioned regarding 
an offence of arson. The police hoodwinked both him and his solicitor that they had 
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found a fragment of a bottle which had contained inflammable liquid and that his 
fingerprint was on the fragment. Although the Court of Appeal noted that a deceit 
practiced by the police was a most reprehensible thing to do, quashed the conviction 
and hoped never again to hear of deceit such as this being practiced, Lord Justice 
Watkins also mentioned the court is “not the place to discipline the police. That has 
been make clear here on a number of previous occasions.”96 
   In R v. Oliphant, Lord Justice Woolf approved this concept and said that “[i]t is 
not my job or the function of the court to educate and discipline police officers.”97 In 
R v. Hughes, Lord Taylor emphasized that “[i]t has been said more than once in this 
court that the object of a judge in considering the application of section 78 is not to 
discipline or punish police officers or customs officers for breaches of the code.”98 
As Dawson observed that “[t]he English judiciary are to exercise no control 
over the police and the ability of the alternative remedies to deter in fact is not ever 
discussed.”99 There is no denying that “policing” the police is a tremendous difficult 
task. However, something had to be done; if not by the judge, then by whom? It is 
impossible for the legislature to control police conduct directly. In the United 
Kingdom, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981 envisaged that the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) would supervise the work of the police but this 
does not happen in practice.100 In the United States, it is impractical to expect the 
Department of Justice to supervise local police activity and prosecute police 
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officers.101 The same reason in both countries is simply the lack of resources. 
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its disregard of the 
constitution of its own existence for the purpose of getting ignoble convictions of its 
people. I argue that it is the duty and obligation of the judicial branch to uphold the 
constitutional guarantees. The courts exist to see that these principles are faithfully 
enforced. Whether illegally obtained evidence is admissible in court will definitely 
have a huge impact on the manner in which investigations are conducted by the 
police. The heavy burden falls right upon the shoulders of judges and from which 
judges should not shrink. 
In the United States, the deterrence principle, adopted by the Supreme Court in 
1914, has emerged and stood as the prime, if not the sole, rationale for exclusion 
since 1961. Over the next several decades until now, the Court has clearly recognized 
that the exclusionary rule’s prime purpose is to deter future lawless enforcement of 
the law by the police. The Court has gradually assigned increasing significance to 
deterrence. The express purpose of the rule is deterrence. The focus on the 
exclusionary rule’s deterrent effects first surfaced in Wolf v. Colorado,102 in which 
the court stated that “in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way 
of deterring unreasonable searches.”103 
    Eleven years later, as the Court explained in a series of cases, for example, in 
Elkins v. United Staes:104 “The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to 
repair. Its purpose is to deter – to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in 
the only effectively available way – by removing the incentive to disregard it.”105 
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104 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
105 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). 
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The deterrence rationale was also explained in Linkletter v. Walker,106 Justice Clark 
stated that: 
 
[The exclusionary rule], it was found, was the only effective deterrent to 
lawless police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf requiring the 
exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the necessity for an 
effective deterrent to illegal police action.107 
 
    Shortly thereafter, in Terry v. Ohio,108 Chief Justice Warren Burger also stated 
that “its major thrust is a deterrent one … and experience has taught that it is the only 
effective deterrent to police misconduct in the criminal context.”109 There followed 
Alderman v. United States,110 in which Justice White asserted: 
 
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose rights 
the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify the 
suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed.111 
 
The prime purpose of the exclusionary rule, therefore, is to deter future 
unlawful police conduct.112 Once again in United States v. Calandra,113 Chief 
Justice Warren Burger wrote: 
 
[T]he exclusionary rule has rested on the deterrent rationale – the hope that 
law enforcement officials would be deterred from unlawful searches and 
                                                 
106 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
107 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965). 
108 392 U.S. 1 (1967). 
109 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added). 
110 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
111 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969). 
112 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
113 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
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seizures if the illegally seized, albeit trustworthy, evidence was suppressed 
often enough and the courts persistently enough deprived them of any 
benefits they might have gained from their illegal conduct … [T]he rule’s 
prime purpose is to deter future police conduct … .114 
 
The Leon 115 Court relied on the deterrence rationale explained: “The 
exclusionary rule … operates as a ‘judicially created remedy’ designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” 116  The 
exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct”117 rather than punish the 
errors of judges and legislators. An echo of this principle was played out in the recent 
Herring118 case. The Court declared that: 
 
[T]he exclusionary rule … applies only where it results in appreciable 
deterrence… we have focused on the efficacy of the [exclusionary] rule in 
deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future … To trigger the 
exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such 
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.119 
 
The exclusionary rule was historically intended to deter police misconduct.120 It 
would be unrealistic to believe that the exclusionary rule has had no deterrent effect 
on police conduct. The American exclusionary rule is perceived as necessary to deter 
police from excesses. The search and seizure exclusionary rule is “a judicially 
created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures,”121 designed to protect 
                                                 
114 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
115 United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984). 
116 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). 
117 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). 
118 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 702 (2009). 
119 129 S. Ct. 695, 700, 702 (2009). 
120 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995). 
121 Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998). 
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Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
2.2.4 The protective rationale 
 
It is the function of the court to uphold the propriety of the criminal process in order 
to protect the suspect dealt with by that process. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. 
Ping Ling,122 the protective rationale compensates the defendant for detriment he 
suffered as a result of police conduct by excluding the use of what was obtained as a 
result of the conduct. Lord Hailsham stated that: 
 
[W]hen the savage code of the eighteenth century was in full force. … 
There was no legal aid. There was no system of appeal. To crown it all the 
accused was unable to give evidence on his own behalf and was therefore 
largely at the mercy of any evidence, either perjured or oppressively 
obtained, that might be brought against him. The judiciary were therefore 
compelled to devise artificial rules designed to protect him against dangers 
now avoided by other and more rational means.123 
 
The protective rationale was also adopted by the Criminal Law Revision Committee. 
The Committee admitted that the strict rules of evidence may have been necessary to 
give the accused some protection against injustice.124 
More specifically, the impetus for this rationale explicitly came in the form of 
an article by Andrew Ashworth in 1977.125  The principle argues that certain 
standards are set for the conduct of criminal investigation. Citizens are expected to 
                                                 
122 Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Ling, [1976] AC 574. 
123 [1976] AC 574, 600 (emphasis added). 
124 The Criminal Law Revision Committee, ‘Eleventh Report, Evidence (General)’ (Cm 4991, 1972) 
[21] 
125 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Criminal Law Review 723, 
725. 
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be treated in accordance with these standards and not to be treated in certain ways. 
Courts have the responsibility for protecting the citizen’s rights from disadvantages, 
which means illegally secured evidence should not be used against them, resulting 
from infringement of his rights. It argues that the violation of citizen’s rights supplies 
“a prima facie justification for the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of that 
infringement.”126 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981 followed this rationale 
and abandoned the disciplinary principle adopted in 1972 by the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee. The Committee argues that the courts have the responsibility 
for protecting the citizen’s rights. The best way to do so in these circumstances is to 
remove from the investigator his source of advantage which is to exclude the 
evidence. If the principle is applied, exclusion of good evidence irregularly obtained 
is the price to be paid for securing confidence in the rules of criminal procedure and 
ensuring that the public sees the system as fair.127 
In 1977, Ashworth argued that both the reliability and disciplinary principle are 
not based on sound premises. However, the protective rationale provides a stronger 
justification for the exclusionary rule.128 It seems that protective rationale is better 
than the reliability and disciplinary principles according to Ashworth. Almost three 
decades later, however, he changed his mind and said “[i]t is probably a mistake to 
think that one is necessarily better, more logical, than the others.”129 
It is important to remember that the protective rationale is rather different from 
                                                 
126 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Criminal Law Review 723, 
725. 
127 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.130]. 
128 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’ [1977] Criminal Law Review 723, 
723. 
129 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2005) 328. In addition, Ashworth’s whole emphasis now is               
on human rights. 
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the disciplinary rationale because (a) it is backward looking and (b) focuses on the 
person wronged while the disciplinary rationale is (a) forward looking and (b) 
focuses on the wrongdoer. The protective rationale is a remedy for the victim of 
someone wronged by the police or other state agencies and is not principally 





The object of the exclusionary rule is to protect the individual against arbitrary public 
authorities’ interference. The history shows that when governments trade defendants’ 
rights with “truth-finding”, most often they get neither. It has been demonstrated in 
this chapter that the exclusionary rule can be justified by internal and external 
rationales. The reliability rationale is neither the central nor the exclusive concern of 
the rule. Reliability has not been treated as the sole test of admissibility in this 
context. Although one important purpose of the rule is to prevent future police 
misconduct, the deterrence alone is not the sole justification for the exclusionary 
rule’s existence. The role of the exclusionary rule is much greater than mere 
deterrence. In addition to deterrence, the exclusionary rule may limit governmental 
power, protect individual privacy, “enables the judiciary to avoid the taint of 
partnership in official lawlessness”, 130  and minimize[s] the risk of seriously 
undermining popular trust in government.” 131  The court should not limit the 
exclusionary rule only to deterrent purposes. 
                                                 
130 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
131 Ibid. 
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The failure of courts to scrutinize the precise rationales underlying the 
exclusionary rule is the significant factor for the unsatisfactory state of the 
substantive law on the topic. It is therefore of very great importance that the courts 
should explicitly explain the principles behind the rule. To deter violation of the right 
to be free from illegal searches and seizures is only one goal of the exclusionary rule. 
The rule should have a broader purpose, for example, promoting judicial integrity. 
Every court has an inherent power and duty to sustain constitutional principles 
against lawless government intrusions and a recurrence of highhanded investigation 
measures. In order to maintain the vitality of the constitutional process, both the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and United States Supreme Court must 
shoulder their responsibilities. By recourse to the exclusionary rule, courts ensure 
that executive agents do not misuse their powers. The exclusionary rule is a construct 
based on common law and constitutions. The primary rationale of the rule is to 
protect the constitutional right of the suspects. The rejection of torture and illegal 
search is characterized as a constitutional principle and not merely a criminal 









Alternatives are deceptive … For there is but one alternative to the rule of 
exclusion. That is no sanction at all … Self-scrutiny is a lofty ideal, but its 
exaltation reaches new heights if we expect a District Attorney to prosecute 
himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the search and 
seizure clause during a raid the District Attorney or his associates have 
ordered. 
 
                                               Justice Murphy1 
 
The acrimonious debate between supporters and critics of the exclusionary rule 
indicates that the rule is still the vexing question even today. The exclusionary rule 
remains one of the most controversial rules in evidence law of this era. In the 
succeeding sections of this chapter, I attempt to address the debates on the 
exclusionary rule. The chapter begins with the controversy over whether the 
exclusionary rule causes criminals to go free. I then turn to argue that although the 
exclusionary rule is not explicitly mentioned in the constitution, the need to enforce 
the constitution’s limits on the executive requires the rule. I next examine the question 
of should the exclusionary rule not apply to suspects who committed some serious 
offences, for example, murderer, career armed robber, rapist and terrorist? The second 
section analyzes the “alternatives” to the exclusionary rule, and explains how they do 
not function in practice. Ample intrinsic and extrinsic evidence supports the 
conclusion that the exclusionary rule is the most effective means to enforce the 
                                                 
1 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 (1949) (Murphy, J, dissenting). 
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prohibition against illegal police conduct. The exclusionary rule works better than any 
other alternatives that have been tried. Further, the third section offers critical analysis 
of the cost-benefit balancing of the exclusionary rule. Finally, the fourth section 




3.1 Arguments against and for the exclusionary rule 
 
The intense debate of the exclusionary rule has been lasted for almost one century. 
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Henry Wigmore (1863-1943) were two 
prominent early critics. Both were committed to the view that the pursuit of truth is 
the overriding objective in trial.2 In 1922, Dean Wigmore, the authority on the law of 
evidence for the first half of the twentieth century, best known for his Treatise on the 
Law of Evidence, criticized bluntly: 
 
[The exclusionary rule] puts [courts] in the position of assisting to 
undermine the foundations of the very institutions they are set there to 
protect. It regards the over-zealous officer of the law as a greater danger to 
the community than the unpunished murderer or embezzler or panderer.3 
 
The search and seizure exclusionary rule, according to Wigmore, may lead to an 
“unnatural type of justice”.4 
Although evidence law is not the subject for which Bentham is best known, he 
                                                 
2 William Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore (Weidenfeld ＆ Nicolson, London 
1985) 117. 
3 J.H. Wigmore, ‘Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure’ (1922) 8 The American Bar 
Association Journal 479, 482. 
4 Ibid., 484. 
 72
wrote on the use of torture and the law of evidence in two manuscripts.5 He defined 
torture as instances “where a person is made to suffer any violent pain of body in 
order to compel him to do something or to desist from doing something which done or 
desisted from the penal application is made to cease.”6 Under two circumstances, 
according to Bentham, torture may be allowed: (1) if a person is required to do 
something that the public has an interest in his doing, and which is without doubt in 
his power to do; and (2) where that which the person is required to do is not as a 
certainty within his power “but which the public has so great an interest in his doing 
that the danger of what may ensure from his not doing it is a greater danger than even 
that of an innocent person’s suffering the greatest degree of pain that can be suffered 
by torture, of the kind and in the quantity permitted to be employed.”7 
He wrote that “[e]vidence is the basis of justice: exclude evidence, you exclude 
justice”8 in his writings some two centuries ago.9 He believed that accuracy (his term 
was “rectitude”) is the primary objective of criminal procedure. It was critical of 
technical systems of proof and recognized that all evidence should be included unless 
it is “irrelevant or superfluous or its production would involve preponderant vexation, 
expense or delay.”10 Therefore, excluding relevant evidence is unnecessary as a 
safeguard and is likely to result in the loss of useful information. He believed that one 
of the major obstacles to the discovery of truth in the courtroom was the exclusionary 
rule.11 
                                                 
5 “Of Torture” and “Of Compulsion and herein of Torture” See W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining, 
‘Bentham on Torture’ (1973) 24 The Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 305, 308, 320. 
6 W.L. Twining and P.E. Twining, ‘Bentham on Torture’ (1973) 24 The Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 305, 309. 
7 Ibid., 312-13. 
8 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice (Hunt ＆ 
Clarke, London 1827) 3. 
9 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence: Specially Applied to English Practice (Hunt ＆ 
Clarke, London 1827). 
10 Ibid., 42. 
11 James Oldham, ‘Truth-telling in the Eighteenth-century English Courtroom’ (1994) 12 Law and 
History Review 95, 97. 
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It is clear that the assertion of Bentham was much too simple and imprecise since 
the pursuit of truth is by no means the sole task of adjudication. The achievement of 
accurate outcomes should not be the primary aim of criminal procedure and the laws 
of evidence. It seems axiomatic that there are other values in play. The criminal 
justice system should not value truth above all other considerations, otherwise the 
system will eventually collapse. In addition, the exclusionary rule will not hinder the 
search for truth. This is a completely irrelevant criticism. 
There are at least two important goals of the criminal process: the first is to bring 
suspected offenders to trial so as to produce accurate determinations through 
establishing the truth; the second is to ensure that fundamental rights are protected in 
those processes.12 Langbein, an eminent leading Anglo-American legal historian at 
Yale University, reminded us that “too much truth meant too much death.”13 That is 
the reason why there are some obvious restrictions on the methods by which the truth 
is to be pursued. 
There are at least five common objections to the exclusionary rule. Some of the 
arguments have superficial appeal and attractions, but close scrutiny and analysis will 
reveal weaknesses and something unsatisfactory. The disadvantages of the rule are 
worth the price which must be paid. Some of the criticisms are oblivious to law 
enforcement practices in the real world. Some suggested alternatives from the ivory 
tower are unrealistic and impractical. If one wants to advocate reforms to specific 
police practice one would have to understand how they act in reality, the police 
culture in their community and then consider how that can be done. 
                                                 
12 Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2005) 55. 
13 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 6. 
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3.1.1 The exclusionary rule causes criminals to go free? 
 
The primary concern of the anti-exclusionary rule camp is that the exclusionary rule 
exacts a huge toll in lost convictions. Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of 
Appeals criticized that “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered.”14 Chief Justice Burger argued that “[s]ome clear demonstration of the 
benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is required to justify it in view of 
the high price it exacts from society – the release of countless guilty criminals.”15 In 
2009, the United States Supreme Court argued that “the principal cost of applying any 
exclusionary rule is, of course, letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go 
free.”16 
    This critique is mistaken and has two fundamental flaws. Furthermore, by 
accepting their illegally obtained evidence, we may condone a steady course of illegal 
police practice that deliberately and flagrantly violated the constitution so that the 
guilty would not go free. 
First, empirical evidence demonstrates that few convictions are lost. 
From the 1980s, almost all empirical research in the United States confirmed that 
the exclusionary rule has had a very limited impact in freeing the guilty. In other 
words, few suspects are acquitted in court because of the exclusionary rule. The 
exclusionary rule rarely changes the outcome of a criminal trial. Here are some 
examples. A five-year study of California data by Thomas Davis in 1983 found that 
illegal search problems were given as the reason for the rejection of only thirteen of 
more than 14,000 forcible rape arrests (0.09%), and eight of approximately 12,000 
                                                 
14 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (NY App. Ct. 1926). 
15  Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
16 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009). 
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homicide arrests (0.06%) where evidence was excluded because of Fourth 
Amendment problems.17 The study indicated that the cumulative loss in felony cases 
due to prosecutor screening, police releases and court dismissals because evidence 
had been illegally seized is between 0.6% and 0.8% to 2.35%.18  In addition, 
defendants do not receive lesser sentences as a result of plea bargaining because of the 
exclusionary rule.19 Further, according to Charles Silberman, except for “victimless 
crimes” few convictions are lost due to the exclusionary rule.20 
Second, the exclusionary rule should not be blamed for losing convictions. 
The criminal is to go free, but it is the constitution or law that sets him free, not 
the exclusionary rule per se. If the police possess an unrestrained power to search 
without suspicion anywhere they desire to look, they ensure that many more criminals 
will be caught. Instead, if the police apply the constitution at all, then, they ensure that 
they will discover fewer crimes and some criminals could not be convicted, including 
murderers and rapists. This is undesirable; however what matters here is that the 
Fourth Amendment was set down by the legislature. Framers of the United States 
Constitution presumably thought it an appropriate price to pay for maintaining 
fundamental rights, which is the very thing the Fourth Amendment was designed to 
prevent. It is the necessary price we have to pay for compliance with the constitution. 
 
3.1.2 Without textual basis 
 
One argument that might be advanced by the anti-exclusionary rule camp is that the 
exclusionary rule is not legitimate because it is nowhere explicitly authorized in the 
                                                 
17 Thomas Davies, ‘A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) about the “Costs” of the 
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests’ (1983) 8 American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal 611, 640, 645. 
18 Ibid., 680. 
19 Ibid., 668. 
20 Charles Silberman, Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, (Random House, New York 1978) 263-65. 
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United States Constitution and ECHR. My response is that this critique is far from 
accurate. 
First, true, the Constitution and Convention do not contain a proviso stating the 
confession exclusionary rule, or search and seizure exclusionary rule. There was no 
provision in the Constitution and Convention precluding the use of evidence obtained 
in violation of its commands. The exclusionary rule is not mandated by the 
Constitution and Convention. They do not explicitly state: No confessions obtained by 
torture, violent, coercive, threat, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct shall be 
admissible (the confession exclusionary rule). No evidence obtained in violation of 
one’s right to be free from illegal searches and seizures shall be admissible (the search 
and seizure exclusionary rule). But neither does the Constitution and ECHR add: 
evidence obtained by torture or by illegal searches is admissible. 
Second, decisions of the United States Supreme Court and ECtHR constitute an 
important part of the living constitution and ECHR. Both the Constitution and 
Convention, for instance, the Bill of Rights, do not provide solutions to the violation 
of constitutional principles. They list certain rights guaranteed to the people. Most 
guarantees themselves offer little guidance as to how these rights should be preserved 
and do not provide for explicit remedies. For example, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits illegal searches and seizures, and provides that the right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures “shall not be violated”, but the text is silent with 
respect to the consequences of a violation of this constitutional command. Thus, 
except in the rarest of circumstances, the framers meant the Constitution to mean 
more than they say. The judges should take their responsibilities to protect our 
fundamental rights by filling the empty crevices of the constitution. Perhaps Justice 
Brennan said it best that “many of the Constitution’s most vital imperatives are stated 
in general terms and the task or giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to 
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subsequent judicial decision-making in the context of concrete cases.”21 
Article 3 of the ECHR, the first example, provides that “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” It says 
nothing about what should happen how this guarantee will be enforced. The 
admissibility of evidence obtained by torture is not mentioned in ECHR. 
I argue that the Convention’s prohibition on torture could be interpreted as 
implicitly prohibiting the use of evidence secured under torture. The House of Lords 
has also held that “[t]he exclusionary rule is inherent in the prohibition of torture and 
other ill-treatment.”22 The second example is the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution which mandates that “[n]o person … shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself … .” It does not mention the 
admissibility of the compelled confessional statements. As noted earlier, involuntary 
confessions will be excluded. Similarly, the exclusionary rule, even though not 
mentioned in the Constitution and Convention provisions, is the appropriate way to 
protect against abuse of power, according to the United States Supreme Court and 
ECtHR. 
In sum, although the Constitution and Convention does not explicitly provide for 
exclusion, the need to enforce the Constitution’s and Convention’s limits on the 
executive requires the exclusionary rule. 
 
3.1.3 Serious crimes exception? 
 
In this section, I examine the question of whether we should establish a serious crime 
                                                 
21 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
22 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), [2005] UKHL 71, 2 AC 221, 
239. 
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exception to the exclusionary rule in the criminal justice process. John Kaplan 
believed that the exclusionary rule should not apply in most serious cases unless the 
police conduct shocked the conscience. Kaplan carved out an exception for “treason, 
espionage, murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping by organized groups.”23 Cameron 
and Lustiger also argued that the exclusionary rule should not apply in most serious 
cases or where the reprehensible nature of the crime is greater than seriousness of the 
police malfeasance.24 On the question of whether we should establish a serious crime 
exception to the exclusionary rule, I find as follows: there could be nothing worse 
than a serious crimes exception to the exclusionary rule. The government owes the 
same respect to every citizen whether suspected or accused of a crime or not. Judge 
Tymkovich emphasized that, “The purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the 
associated exclusionary rule is not to grant certain guilty defendants a windfall by 
letting them go free … The objective is rather to protect all citizens, particularly the 
innocent, by deterring overzealous police behavior.”25 It would be inconsistent with 
the constitution to permit confession extracted by torture, regardless of whether the 
suspect was involved in serious cases or non-serious cases. The objection includes 
three flaws. I have never been convinced by that argument because of three reasons. 
First, an obvious one is that a court may never exclude illegally obtained 
evidence in some categories of cases. 
The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect both the guilty and the innocent 
from illegal searches and seizures.26 Likewise, it is fair to say that the exclusionary 
rule protect both the serious cases and non-serious cases. In applying the “serious 
                                                 
23 John Kaplan, ‘The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule’ (1974) 26 Stanford Law Review 1027, 1046. 
24 James Cameron and Richard Lustiger, ‘The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost Benefit Analysis’ (1984) 101 
Federal Rules Decisions 109, 110. 
25 United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
26 Amy Codagnone, ‘Good-Faith Exception to Exclusionary Rule Extends to Illegal Searches Based on 
Police Recordkeeping Errors – Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009)’ (2009) 43 Suffolk 
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crime” test, a court might never exclude illegally obtained (confessions and physical) 
evidence in the “serious” crimes cases. If we limit the exclusion of evidence to only 
those non-serious cases or allow the accused to invoke the exclusionary rule only 
where the illegality committed against him is graver than the crime he has committed 
against others, the efficacy of the exclusionary rule will diminish for three reasons: (1) 
the gravity of these “serious” crime cases always will by definition exceed the gravity 
of any constitutional violation. As Cameron claimed: “it is worse to be murdered or 
raped than to have one’s house searched without a warrant, no matter how aggravated 
the latter violation”27; (2) the defendant’s conduct in such cases will always be more 
reprehensible than the police officer’s; (3) many law enforcement officers often use 
illegal methods to get evidence in serious crime cases as they might be under 
tremendous pressure from the public.28 The serious crime exception will create the 
vicious circle in the criminal process. In a sensitive and sometimes high profile case, a 
more serious crime has been committed; the law enforcement officer’s pressure to 
find the “truth” is greater. Hence, the result could be more and more police 
misconduct in serious crime cases. This exemption will be wholly independent of any 
police misconduct, no matter how serious they are. 
Secondly, limited categories of serious offenses may expand to unlimited. 
Suppose, for example, that homicide was one of the specified serious crimes 
exempted from the exclusionary rule and that the police obtained evidence of the 
homicide by violating the right to be free from torture, or the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures. Why should illegally obtained evidence of a rape, a 
robbery, or a burglary not be inadmissible? Should the exclusionary rule apply in 
murders, armed robber, or terrorists? In addition, the United States Supreme Court has 
                                                 
27 State v. Bolt, 689 P. 2d, 530 (Ariz. 1984) (Cameron, J.) 
28 See Chapter 5. 
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never adopted this exception, presumably because this approach would raise grave 
problems of admissibility. Limited categories of serious offenses may expand to 
unlimited. For example, in 1974, for Kaplan, the short list of serious crimes that 
should be free from the exclusionary rule is “treason, espionage, murder, armed 
robbery, and kidnapping by organized groups.”29 One decade later, Arizona Supreme 
Court expanded upon Kaplan’s short list, adding rape and arson to the list.30 
Thirdly, the serious crime exception sends the wrong message to law 
enforcement officers. 
Governments should send a clear signal to law enforcement agencies that police 
torture will not be tolerated. Establishing the exclusionary rule is powerful in that this 
sends a clear message to law enforcement officers that courts will not condone the use 
of illegal investigatory methods that ride roughshod over constitutional rights. The 
serious crime exception, however, sends the wrong message to law enforcement 
officers that breaching constitutionally protected rights is acceptable as long as the 
ends justify the means in a serious case. To my mind, the constitution violation is the 
constitution violation. There is no distinction between the slight and substantial 
constitution violations. We should not give judicial imprimatur to constitutional 
violations whatsoever. It cannot be compatible with the spirit of the constitution that 
varying degrees of fairness apply to different categories of accused in criminal trials. 
The right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, contained in the guarantees of 
the Fourth Amendment, must apply so equally to those accused of other types of rape, 
murder or terrorist offences. 
                                                 
29 John Kaplan, ‘The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule’ (1974) 26 Stanford Law Review 1027, 1046. 
30 State v. Bolt, 689 P. 2d 519, 530 (Ariz. 1984) (Cameron, J.) 
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3.1.4 The exclusionary rule deters police misconduct 
 
There are two kinds of deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule: (1) general deterrent, 
which discourages a class of enforcement officers from illegal police conducts; and (2) 
specific deterrent, which discourages individual enforcement officers from illegal 
police conducts. 
There is debate over whether the exclusionary rule deters the police from 
wrongdoing, especially from committing future illegal searches and seizures. Critics 
claim that the exclusionary rule is not an effective deterrent. For example, Chief 
Justice Burger argued that there is no reliable evidence that the exclusionary rule 
deters unlawful police behavior.31 A number of empirical studies in the United States, 
however, indicated that the exclusionary rule deters illegal law enforcement conduct, 
serves as an effective deterrent, and encourages compliance with constitutional 
requirements. These studies concluded that the exclusionary rule has had a deterrent 
effect upon the police.32  In addition, the rule continues to deter illegal police 
wrongdoing. 
After conducting 90 interviews with New York City police commanders on all 
levels, according to Loewenthal’s 1980 study, the exclusionary rule works as a 
significant deterrent.33 In 1987, Orfield interviewed police officers in the Narcotics 
Section of the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department; the 
officers reported that the exclusionary rule has significant deterrent effects.34 In 
addition, in the empirical study of the Chicago criminal court system, including police, 
                                                 
31  Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
32 Michael Katz, ‘The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v Ohio in North Carolina: 
The Model, the Study, and the Implication’ (1966) 45 North Carolina Law Review 119, 134. 
33 M.A. Loewenthal, ‘Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure’ (1980) 49 University of 
Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 29, 35. 
34 Myron Orfield, Jr., ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago 
Narcotics Officers’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1016, 1019-22. 
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prosecutors, public defenders and judges, Orfield concludes that the exclusionary rule 
does deter abuse, particularly in important cases.35 
In a separate 1997 study, the empirical study in California sought to determine 
whether the exclusionary rule deters individual police officers from violating the 
Fourth Amendment. 36  Significantly, the study further reported that most law 
enforcement officers considered the potential exclusion of evidence to be an important 
concern. Furthermore, about 20% indicated that it was a primary concern in their 
investigative work.37 
 
3.1.5 Limited to the United States and common law countries? 
 
The views that the exclusionary rule is only limited to the United States38 and 
common law countries, and the rule does not exist in continental European countries 
are far from accurate. Chief Justice Burger’s observation that the exclusionary rule is 
unique to American jurisprudence in 197139 is a misconception. The French courts, 
for instance, as early as 1672, excluded evidence obtained by means of an illegal 
search. In the twentieth century, the first French exclusionary rule case occurred in 
1910, four years before Weeks in the United States.40 In Germany, evidence obtained 
from an illegal search and seizure was excluded in 1889, 41  although it was 
sporadically applied in practice. Obviously, the exclusionary rule is not unique to the 
United States. 
                                                 
35 Myron Orfield, Jr., ‘Deterrence, Perjury and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in Chicago 
Criminal Courts’ (1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 75, 85-94. 
36 L.T. Perrin and others, ‘If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule’ (1998) 83 
Iowa Law Review 669, 670. 
37 Ibid., 678. 
38 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
39 Ibid. 
40 Walter Pakter, ‘Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany, and Italy’ (1985), 9 Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review 1, 4-5. 
41 Ibid., 5, 17. 
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There has been a remarkable increasing trend toward convergence in the 
development of the exclusionary rule since the twentieth century. A number of 
countries have some form of an exclusionary rule. One of the important global legal 
developments is the growing recognition that the suspect will be given the 
exclusionary rule in both domestic and international law. In the last several decades, 
the exclusionary rule is not only found within Anglo-American jurisprudence, but also 
is found in many domestic and international systems. It is truly an inspiration to the 
rest of the world.42 
At national level, in Europe, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, Russia, 
Hungary and Turkey, among other countries, have adopted a version of the 
exclusionary rule. These countries had begun to accept the exclusionary rule as the 
proper response to violations of the right to be free from torture, and the right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures. In Ireland, the judgment in Kenny43 is of 
interest because, for the first time, a supreme court anywhere in the world considered 
the exclusionary rule in its own country as stricter than its United States counterpart, 
which is well known for its relative strictness. The Supreme Court of Ireland made it 
clear that the rule differs from that in the United States. The latter is subjected to a 
range of exceptions and founded on a desire to deter unlawful police conduct. But the 
Irish rule is “the absolute protection test”.44 
Italy has developed the exclusionary rule to implement provisions in its 1948 
Constitution protecting the civil rights of citizens against unlawful police activity. In 
1988, Article 191(1) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure declares that 
“[e]vidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by the law may not be 
                                                 
42 The Chinese regime should bring its criminal justice system into line with international human 
rights standards. 




In Germany, according to Para. 136a Section 3 of the CCP, when police or other 
interrogators have used prohibited means any ensuing statement is inadmissible, and 
information from protected private conversations obtained through hidden 
microphones must not be used as evidence.46 Next, in Greece, according to Article 
179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, evidence obtained unlawfully must not be 
taken into account in deciding on the defendant’s guilt.47 Also, in Spain, Article 11 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the principle that “evidence obtained either 
directly or indirectly in contravention of fundamental rights and liberties will be of no 
effect.”48 
Furthermore, in 2002, the new Russian Code of Criminal Procedure became 
effective. Article 7(3) declares that “a violation of the rules of this Code by a court, 
procurator, investigator, inquiry agency, or inquiring officer in the course of criminal 
proceedings shall cause the evidence thus obtained to be inadmissible,” while Article 
75(1) reinforces the rule that “evidence obtained in violation of the requirements of 
this Code shall be inadmissible.”49 
Turning to the international arena, in international criminal proceedings, 
although more flexible with regard to the introduction of evidence, tribunals also 
exclude evidence gathered in breach of fundamental human rights standards. 
In Nuremberg trial, for example, Sauckel claimed that his interrogations had 
been taken under duress and the International Military Tribunal for the Major War 
                                                 
45 Codice Di Procedura Penale, Article 191(1). 
46 §100c § 5, 3rd sent. CCP. 
47 Ed Cape and others (eds), Suspects in Europe: Procedural Rights at the Investigative Stage of the 
Criminal Process in the European Union (Intersentia Antwerpen, Oxford 2007) 122-4. 
48 Article 11 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure 
49 Leonard Orland, ‘A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code’, (2002) 18 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 133, 150. 
 85
Criminals, Nuremberg (IMT) excluded it.50 In Greifelt and others,51 allegations of 
misconduct by the interrogator against defendants, including threats and coercion, the 
United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg excluded the affidavits. 52  The 
exclusionary rule is laid down in Rule 95 of the 1996 Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence (RPE) and in Article 69(7) of the 1998 Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC Statute). Rule 95 of the ICTY RPE states: No evidence should 
be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or 
if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the 
proceedings. According to Ho, in the spirit of Article 19 of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the evidence must be excluded if its admission 
undermines the fairness of the trial.53 
Article 69(7) of the ICC Statute provides that evidence obtained by means of a 
violation of the Statute or internationally recognized human rights shall not be 
admissible if: (a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the 
evidence; or (b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would 
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings. 
Moreover, similar provisions are also in international human rights treaty 
agreements which impose an obligation on states to ensure that an effective procedure 
exists in national law for the exclusion of evidence obtained by torture. For example, 
Article 15 of the 1984 United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) states: Each State Party 
                                                 
50 XV IMT Proceedings, 64-8. 
51 United States of America v. Ulrich Greifelt and Others (RuSHA), United States Military Tribunal I, 
Judgment of March 10, 1948, in 5 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals 
under Control Council Law No. 1088 (U.S. 1951). 
52 XV NMT, 879. 
53 H.L. Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law – Justice in the Search of Evidence Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2008) 313. 
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shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a result of 
torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings. It requires the exclusion 
of statements made as a result of torture as evidence in any proceedings. Further, 
Article 10 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 
provides that no statement that is verified as having been obtained through torture 
shall be admissible as evidence in a legal proceeding. 
 
 
3.2 Are there alternatives to exclusion? 
 
Some commentators may maintain that any remedy other than the rule is equally 
effective, i.e., the alternatives are as capable of ensuring that suspects are not tortured, 
and deterring illegal searches and seizures. Others may paint a misleading picture by 
intimating that there are sensible methods better than exclusion. If a more appropriate 
remedy can amend or replace the rule then the dilemmas of the rule can be solved. 
At first glance, some jurists’ opinions regarding the remedies of the rule seem 
attractive, so that many might accept these remedies as the replacement. This would 
unfortunate. Neither theory and practice nor perception and reality always match, and 
the general conception of “alternative remedies” is exaggerated. In theory there are at 
least three “alternative remedies” available of enforcing the deterrent of due process 
violations during police interrogation and investigation. In practice, however, these 
alternatives afford very limited protection against promiscuous intrusion and sadly 
cannot adequately achieve these goals. We should not work in an intellectual vacuum. 
The usual theoretical alternatives can be grouped under three heads: 
(1) The criminal remedy: criminal prosecution; 
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(2) The civil remedy: tort suits; 
(3) The administrative remedy: disciplinary measures. 
Unfortunately, there are significant flaws in all three types of remedies. In real 
life there is often a disparity between theory and practice. The rich potential of 
criminal, civil and administrative responses to police misconduct has never been fully 
exploited. In addition, an available remedy does not necessarily make an effective 
remedy. These alternatives are unrealistic, impractical and not much of a deterrent. 
Each of these alternatives will now be considered. 
 
3.2.1 Criminal prosecution 
 
Any public official or agent who uses torture to extract evidence from an accused 
commits a crime. Penal sanctions may also apply to officers who have illegally 
searched private dwellings in most countries and the misbehaving police can therefore 
be punished. Most states have penal provisions which are applicable to cases of 
torture or illegal search practices. In the United Kingdom, under Sections 90-104 of 
PACE, an offending police officer may face criminal sanction. In the United States, 18 
U.S.C. § 2236 holds that officers involved in illegal searches shall be fined or guilty 
of a misdemeanor, or both.54 Justice Cardozo said that “[t]he [offending] officer 
might be… prosecuted for oppression.”55 
However, it is far from sufficient for the implementation of the exclusionary rule 
to prohibit torture and illegal search or to make it a crime. Penal sanctions only play a 
                                                 
54 18 U.S.C. § 2236 provides that: 
Whoever, being an officer, agent, or employee of the United States or any department or 
agency thereof, engaged in the enforcement of any law of the United States, searches any 
private dwelling used and occupied as such dwelling without a warrant directing such 
search, or maliciously and without reasonable cause searches any other building or 
property without a search warrant, shall be fined under this title for a first offense; and, for 
a subsequent offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, 
or both. 
55 People v. Defore 150 NE 585, 586-87 (NY App. Ct. 1926). 
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marginal role in preventing police misconduct because there are many profound 
impediments for those wishing to pursue charges against the police. Almost no 
criminal prosecutions of illegal search and seizure can be found in the reported cases. 
Sanders and Young expressed the same sentiment that “there have been no reported 
cases of this.”56 Chief Justice Roger Traynor, the most respected state judge in the 
United States, explained why the California Supreme Court had overruled its 
precedent and adopted the exclusionary rule in People v. Cahan:57 “without fear of 
criminal punishment or other discipline, law enforcement officers … casually regard 
[illegal searches and seizures] as nothing more than the performance of their ordinary 
duties for which the city employs and pays them.”58 There are four reasons why so 
few prosecutions are brought against police officers and why most of the law 
enforcement officers do not worry about criminal punishment. 
First, prosecutors are reluctant to indict police. 
Prosecutors have an extensive liaison with the police because of the nature of 
their duties. In situations where the officers become the accused, some prosecutors are 
disinclined to prosecute the front line police who are in daily co-operation, and endure 
the hostility of the law enforcement personnel. It may generate tensions between the 
two agencies. Prosecutors hope to maintain good working relationships with police in 
the future. Nevertheless prosecution of police will not be vigorously pursued. We may 
share the opinion of Justice Carter in White v. Towers59 that: 
 
I should like to have brought to my attention any such case where a plaintiff 
has been successful, or even where a prosecution has been instituted. It is 
absurd to suggest that any district attorney, or superior officer, is going to 
                                                 
56 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice, (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) 94. 
57 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
58 282 P.2d 905, 907 (Cal. 1955). 
59 37 Cal. 2d 727 (1951). 
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take criminal action against one of his subordinates at the request of one 
injured by an unwarranted prosecution, especially where the prosecutor has 
relied upon the testimony of the subordinate as a basis for the prosecution.60 
 
Even if prosecutors wanted to investigate such cases; investigation with limited police 
assistance can be difficult. 
    Secondly, police may cover up their colleagues’ wrongdoing.61 
In most of the cases the only witnesses will be the victim and the police. Police 
officers are often the most important witnesses called in the presentation of illegal 
search and torture cases. If there are other witnesses, they may be reluctant to testify, 
fearing retaliation and trouble. Many police officers usually follow their abuse of 
power with the charge that the citizen was assaulting an officer and resisting arrest.62 
Thirdly, the code of silence prevents police from telling the truth. 
The police community is a closed society similar to the military. The police code 
of silence is part of the police culture. The members of community are required to be 
loyal to the group. Once someone betrays the group, he betrays himself, destroys his 
identity and may change his career forever. In order to maintain the honor of the 
police community, those who do not want to perjure themselves but are eyewitness 
will choose keep silent in the court instead of testifying what is actually happening, 
against their comrades. Sanders and Young found that in the United Kingdom “the 
‘code of silence’ operated by senior as well as junior officers to cover it up; and the 
failure to discipline adequately most of those few officers who are found to have 
broken the rules.”63 
                                                 
60 37 Cal. 2d 727, 23 (1951). 
61 Joycelyn Pollock, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice (6th edn., Cengage Learning, 
Australia 2008) 288. 
62  Monroe Freedman, ‘The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting Attorney’ (1967) 55 
Georgetown Law Journal 1030, 1037-38. 
63 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, Criminal Justice (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) 643. 
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 In the United States, for example, in 1991, the Christopher Commission 
identified a pervasive officer code of silence.64 Its investigation into the Los Angeles 
Police Department noted that “the greatest single barrier to the effective investigation 
and adjudication of complaints is the officers’ unwritten ‘code of silence’ … [which] 
consists of one simple rule: an officer does not provide adverse information against a 
fellow officer.”65 
Lastly, jurors are reluctant to convict officers. 
Because an officer’s job is dangerous and difficult, the juries usually see the 
police sympathetically and may intentionally ignore the facts and law. After all, they 
became involved in the incident as part of their duties, i.e., combating crime. It is very 
doubtful whether many juries will convict a law enforcement officer who has violated 
the civil rights of “bad guys”. 
For a variety of psychological reasons, juries prefer to believe that their police 
officers are not liars and would not perjure themselves. Instead, criminal records may 
destroy victims’ credibility. Most jurors are more likely to believe the officer’s version 
of the “facts” than the victim’s. I do not think many jurors will convict policemen who 
illegally searched the gangsters. It seems that penal sanctions will never have 
significance as a deterrent. These seemingly lenient treatments by the jurors would 
undermine faith in the criminal justice system. 
 
3.2.2 Civil damage actions 
 
At common law, when a police officer uses excessive force against an individual, that 
individual can bring tort suits and need not await the government’s decision to go 
                                                 
64 Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (1991). 
65 Ibid., 168-71. 
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forward for trespassing66 or maliciously procuring a search warrant against the 
offending party. 
In the United Kingdom, under the Police Act 1996, people can sue a police 
officer and the chief officer of the department for damages. The Royal Commission 
on Criminal Procedure of 1981 recommended that “the civil courts may therefore 
prove to have a useful role to play in the application of the statutory rules.”67 Lord 
Diplock maintained that “[i]f it was obtained illegally there will be a remedy in civil 
law.”68 
In the United States, tort suits were the remedy of choice from the middle of the 
eighteen century for official wrongdoing such as unlawful searches.69 Victims of 
police misbehavior can sue the officer for violating their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 
1983.70 The plaintiff in a 1983 case may sue the police officer individually for 
unconstitutional searches. Judge Cardozo said that “[t]he [offending] officer might 
have … sued for damages.”71 Amar has argued that civil damage can handle law 
enforcement abuses.72 He hopes to replace the exclusionary rule with tort actions. 
However, very few civil actions are pursued in the area of illegal search and 
seizure. Furthermore, rare tort actions against the police have succeeded, except in 
clear cases of physical coercion and brutality. Research by the United States 
                                                 
66 Commonwealth v. Elisha W. Dana, 43 Mass. 329 (1841). 
67 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report, (Cmnd. 8092) (1981) [4.122] 
68 R v. Sang, [1980] AC 402, 436. 
69 Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB 1765). 
70 This provision provides that: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, 
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in 
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. … 
71 People v. Defore, 150 NE 585, 586-87 (NY App. Ct. 1926). 
72 A.R. Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principle, (Yale University Press, New 
Haven 1997) 40-5. 
 92
Department of Justice73 discovered that plaintiffs filed 12,000 actions related the 
Fourth Amendment between 1971 and 1986. Only in five cases have the defendants 
actually paid damages. With regard to 42 U.S.C. 1983, there were fewer than three 
dozen reported Fourth Amendment cases between 1966 and 1986.74 
Civil litigations cannot fulfill their potential as deterrents to police illegality. 
Instead, civil processes per se are full of deterrents to suit. In the past, tort systems 
provided legal impediments to shield officers from suit. In the 1700s, under the 
Collection Act of 1789 in the United States, which discouraged lawsuits against 
custom collectors, if plaintiffs sued for wrongful seizures, they would forfeit twice the 
amount for which they sued.75 Because of four formidable obstacles, their paucity 
and low likelihood of success, it is not surprising to find that victims are deferred 
from filing civil suits against police. 
First, the cost of litigation may deter victims from bringing suit. 
These actions are difficult, costly and time consuming to pursue. The great 
majority of those aggrieved come from the lowest economic levels of society, for 
example, minorities, and may be least able to bear the burden. Victims of tortuous 
conduct may probably be unable to afford the expense of litigation. Legal aid may not 
be available because of eligibility requirements. If victims are fortunate enough to be 
able to afford attorneys, because of the small chances to win and limited profit, 
solicitors may be reluctant to take their cases. 
Secondly, proving malice is too onerous a hurdle for victims. 
In civil litigation, the plaintiff bears the legal burden of proof in relation to the 
issue. Unless the victim can demonstrate and prove the real ill will or malice by the 
                                                 
73 Office of Legal Policy, the United States Department of Justice, Truth in Criminal Justice (Report 
No.2) (1986) reprinted in (1989) 22 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 437, 573-660. 
74 Ibid., 626, 630. 
75 Collection Act of 1789, ch. 5, § 27, 1 Stat. 29. 
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officer, the claim of maliciously procuring a search warrant and trespass will fail; 
negligence of this kind76 does not qualify.77 It seems reasonable to presume that the 
responsible law enforcement officers’ pursuit of crime bears no ill will towards the 
suspect. The onerous hurdle is set in favour of protection of the police in such cases. 
Thirdly, the jury may think criminals deserved what they got. 
Some of the plaintiffs have criminal records, or are suspected of criminality. In 
most of the cases, jurors are naturally unsympathetic to victims of unlawful searches 
and prefer to trust policemen instead of civil plaintiffs with criminal records. 
The pervasive attitude among jurors is that even if these people have not 
committed a crime, they are suspected criminals. The jurors do not want to reward 
criminals or suspected criminals by giving damages award in tort actions. Even if the 
victims are not criminals, unsympathetic juries have been reluctant to grant damages 
awards.78 
Fourthly, actual reparation may be an insignificant amount. 
Even if the victims hurdle all the above impediments, then after enduring a long 
and arduous litigation process, compensatory damages will be an insignificant 
amount – inadequate to encourage the plaintiffs to bring tort suits. It is hard to 
quantify the value of awards in these cases. It is likely to be limited to the injuries to 
property and to be very small even in the serious cases. Punitive damages are very 
hard to recover. In order to obtain punitive damages the plaintiff in Pennsylvania, for 
instance, must (1) prove real malice,79 (2) establishes actual physical damage,80 and 
(3) show that the chain bears a reasonable proportion to the actual damages.81 
                                                 
76 Maliciously procuring a search warrant and trespass. 
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Moreover, the individual officer will not suffer direct financial loss. In the United 
States, the police officer rarely pays any damages awarded. Cities usually indemnify 
law enforcement officers in § 1983 cases.82 In England, the practice was established 
by section 48 of the Police Act 1964. Money will not be taken from officers’ pockets 
and the taxpayer will pay the bill. At the De Menezes case,83 for instance, English 
taxpayers had to pay £560,000 (fining the force £175,000 and ordering it to pay 
£385,000 in costs).84 It is hard to deter officers’ illegality because of the financial 
irresponsibility of them. Under this circumstance, civil damage action itself may 
provide very little deterrent effect to the law enforcement officer who will not actually 
have pay damages. 
Prior 1961, as Powe, a leading historian of the United States Supreme Court, has 
aptly pointed out that “[n]either criminal nor civil sanctions were ever brought against 
police who did not get warrants, and there was ample reason to believe that the 
practice of illegal searches was widespread.” 85  Tort suits cannot prevent the 
misconduct of the police. 
 
3.2.3 Complaints and disciplinary procedures 
 
Internal disciplinary machinery, in both the United Kingdom and United States, exists 
within police forces for disciplining a law enforcement officer who engages in illegal 
or improper conduct. The internal discipline is a less severe sanction than criminal 
sanctions. These measures include fines, pay cuts, undesirable transfers, and removal 
                                                 
82 M.A. Schwartz, ‘Should Juries be Informed that Municipality Will Indemnify Officer’s § 1983 
Liability for Constitutional Wrongdoing’ (2001) 86 Iowa Law Review 1209, 1211. 
83 After Jean Charles De Menezes was mistaken by the London Metropolitan police for a possible 
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84 Vikram Dodd, ‘Guilty, but Blair Refuses to Go’, The Guardian (London, 2 Nov. 2007) 1. 
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from the force. Lord Diplock has suggested that “[i]f it was obtained illegally but in 
breach of the rules of conduct for the police, it is a matter for the appropriate 
disciplinary authority to deal with.”86 However, there are long-standing problems 
with this approach. An interior administrative investigation of a complaint may have 
form, but lack substance. On the one hand, the lack of independent mechanism of 
citizen complaints against police has long been a significant deficit. On the other hand, 
police superiors may have a hard time punishing hard-working cops for minor 
mistakes. 
In Britain, the Home Secretary set up a committee to consider whether the 
application of five techniques in Northern Ireland require amendment. Lord Gardiner 
published the Northern Ireland Interrogation Methods Minority Report in 1972 as part 
of the Parker Report (Report of the Committee of Privy Counselors appointed to 
consider authorized procedures for the interrogations of persons suspected of 
terrorism).87 Between 1971 and 1974, there were 2,615 complaints against the police; 
only 6 were fined.88 The minority report by Lord Gardiner found a widespread belief 
that complaints against members of the security forces were not taken seriously. It 
then recommended the establishment of an independent means of investigating 
complaints.89 
Three decades ago Lord Scarman already acknowledged that the impartial and 
unfair complaints process does not command the confidence of the public and 
complaints would risk being subjected to intimidation by the police as a result.90 He 
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also warned that unless a system of independent investigation was available for all 
complaints to be introduced the complaints procedure would fall into disrepute.91 
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), established under the statutory 
authority of Section 83 of PACE in 1985, is empowered to supervise the investigation 
of complaints against the police. Although the PCA is obligated, under the Police Act 
1996, Section 70 (1)(a), to review any cases in which there has been a death or serious 
injury to a civilian, very limited complaints are substantiated. In 2000/1, only 903 
complaints were substantiated – 9.1 % of the complaints which were investigated, but 
only 2.9 % of those initially made.92 The Police Reform Act 2002 established the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission to investigate complaints against the 
police. 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice of 1993 pointed out the failings with 
police disciplinary measures: “They appear to be both lengthy and uncertain and 
frequently result, when they lead to a finding against the officer concerned, in the 
imposition of penalties less than the offence would seem to require.”93 
In Scotland in 2000 a report by the HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for 
Scotland revealed that the police do not count all of their complaints as statistics. 
There are many more complaints than those in the official statistics.94 
At the same time, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), an international treaty body falling under 
the auspices of the Council of Europe,95 commented in the report96 on its visit to the 
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United Kingdom and the Isle of Man that: 
 
[S]tatistically few criminal prosecutions and disciplinary proceedings which 
were brought, and identified certain aspects of the procedures which cast 
doubt on their effectiveness: The chief officers appointed officers from the 
same force to conduct the investigations … the majority of investigations 
were unsupervised by the Police Complaints Authority.97 
 
In Hugh Jordan v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR determined that the officers 
investigating the incident were insufficiently independent from the officers implicated 
in the incident.98 
Despite the Police Complaints Authority having power to refer charges of 
criminal offences to the Director of Public Prosecutions and itself to bring disciplinary 
charges, it is insufficiently independent from the police and does not provide an 
effective remedy to police misconduct as required under Article 13 of the ECHR.99 
    In the United States, although most large police department had procedures for 
dealing with charges of misconduct by their members from the 1960s, too few forces 
had adequate procedures for dealing with complaints. In Philadelphia, in 1952 for 
example, it was said that the machinery “has not been used in the case of an illegal 
search or arrest.”100 The United States Department of Justice Report discovered only 
seven investigations into Fourth Amendment violations between 1981 and 1986. No 
police officer was internally sanctioned and two defendants were pardoned by the 
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President.101 
Before 1961, state courts were free to adopt or reject the exclusionary rule. In 
1955, Roger Traynor, then Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, the most 
respected mid-century state court jurist, adopted the exclusionary rule and eloquently 
asserted that: 
 
[O]ther remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the 
constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant 
result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to 
participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law 
enforcement officers.102 
 
The Court’s analysis in Mapp reflects the same concern. The Mapp Court found 
that “[t]he experience of California that such other remedies have been worthless and 
futile is buttressed by the experience of other States.”103 Until the Court created the 
exclusionary rule, there was simply no institutional brake on illegal searches. As 
Jerome Skolnick puts it, “[s]uperiors within the police organization will … be in 
sympathy with an officer, provided the search was administratively reasonable, even 
if the officer did not have legal ‘reasonable’ cause to make an arrest.”104 When the 
illegality is not egregious, police chiefs are more likely to protect the police as 
protecting the police means protecting themselves; instead of sanctioning the police. 
As Chambliss and Seidman pointed out in 1971, there are two reasons why 
internal control by the police has not achieved the desired results.105 First, there are 
inherent obstacles to a useful complaint procedure. Secondly, there are insufficiently 
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independent inherent contradictions in the position of the police force as an institution 
when presented by a complaint against an individual officer. In 1968 the National 
Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders (The Kerner Commission) reported: 
 
In Milwaukee, Wisconsin and Plainfield, New Jersey, … ghetto residents 
complained that police chiefs reject all complaints out of hand. In New 
Haven, a Negro citizens’ group characterized a police review board as 
“worthless”. In Detroit, the Michigan Civil Rights Commission found that, 
despite well-intentioned leadership, no real sanctions are imposed on 
offending officers. In Newark, the Mayor referred complaints to the FBI, 
which had limited jurisdiction over them … .106 
 
Overall, for lessons set out above it is easy to envision that there are substantial 
institutional difficulties in using these so-called alternative remedies as methods for 
achieving the ends for which we strive. The obstacles to achieving such a result are 
far too great through these remedies. The remedies to the exclusionary rule are mainly 
illusory and of no practical avail. The truth is that no other remedy can adequately 
achieve these goals. 
People adopting actions mentioned above encounter numerous legal hurdles that 
prevented these alternatives from becoming effective methods to illegal intrusions. 
The Irvine107 Court also took the view that other remedies for Fourth Amendment 
violations are “of no practical avail”, since “the police are unlikely to inform on 
themselves or each other”108 and hence any claim against the police will likely to be 
brought by convicted criminals.109 Thus, I argue that the exclusionary rule has the 
most powerful influence on police investigation practices and can reduce police 
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misconduct at least in some situations. Absent the rule, I profound believe that there is 
no other effective method to stop the police from invading fundamental rights. 
 
 
3.3 Cost-benefit balancing of the exclusionary rule 
 
The purpose of the Bill of Rights … was to place certain subjects beyond the 
reach of cost-benefit analysis. 
                                               Yale Kamisar110 
 
Balancing is a process of measuring competing interests to determine which is 
“weightier”. By a “balancing opinion”, I mean a judicial opinion that analyzes a 
criminal procedure question by identifying interests implicated by the case, and 
measuring competing interests. Sometimes the United States Supreme Court talks 
about one interest outweighing another. In Payton v. New York,111 for instance, Justice 
Blackmun declared that “a suspect’s interest in the sanctity of his home … outweighs 
the governmental interests” so as to require a warrant.112 Further, decisions whether 
to exclude illegally obtained evidence may involve an economic calculation of costs 
against benefits.113 
    More specifically, in the context of the search and seizure exclusionary rule, after 
considering the costs and benefits of the application of the rule, and measuring 
competing interests to determine which is “weightier”, judges decide whether or not 
to exclude evidence obtained through illegal methods. The inquiry goes something 
like this: Are the costs of excluding valuable illegally obtained evidence outweighed 
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by the deterrent benefits gained? Under such a balancing test, the exclusionary rule 
will not be permitted where the costs outweighed the benefits. No one, however, 
seems to pause and ask, in the context of the exclusionary rule, whether every 
problem can and should be solved through balancing conflicting considerations. 
Does this balancing approach matter? Some might argue that balancing may 
make the exclusionary rule more flexible. According to Richard Posner, for example, 
all Fourth Amendment issues should be resolved through cost-benefit balancing.114 
However, this thesis asserts that there is danger in applying the narrow 
deterrence-oriented cost-benefit balancing approach in the context of the exclusionary 
rule. I will develop the proposition that the cost-benefit balancing approach is not 
doable and even threatens the very life of the exclusionary rule itself. Not every 
exclusionary rule decision can be solved through cost-benefit balancing. In cases 
involving the confession exclusionary rule, for example, torture, the court does not, 
and moreover should not, engage in balancing at all. Instead, it should utilize a 
stringent form of the exclusionary rule. The right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures should receive the more certain protection from categorical rules, rather than 
the less certain protection resulting from the cost-benefit balancing. 
This section is divided into two parts. By using the cost-benefit balancing 
approach, the most notable limitation created is the good faith exception announced in 
United States v. Leon.115 To begin with, I will explore the Leon decision and critically 
examine Leon’s good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and explore Leon’s 
flawed reasoning. There is a startling disjunction between the cost-benefit balancing 
and “factors” imposed by the Court in the name of the cost-benefit balancing. 
Second, while balancing has emerged in criminal justice,116 few commentators 
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have analyzed what goes on within the “black box” in the context of the exclusionary 
rule. I reject to the balancing approach adopted by the United States Supreme Court as 
this abstract balancing metaphor is not helpful in understanding which interests get 
weighed, how weights are assigned, how judges decide which interest should prevail, 
or how balance was struck. The courts simply employed the rhetorical device (the 
weighing and balancing) and arguments to justify their conclusions. The current 
cost-benefit analysis of the exclusionary rule tends to focus on the “cost” and 
minimize the “benefit”. The Court did not fully analyze, for balancing, what the 
objective methodology is. Instead the balancing approach has hindered the 
development of the exclusionary rule. I contend that cost-benefit balancing in the 
context of the exclusionary rule is an illusion. In addition, the courts have taken an 
unnecessarily narrow view of one or more aspects of the exclusionary rule. 
 
3.3.1 The cost-benefit approach: United States v. Leon 
 
Cost-benefit balancing has governed search and seizure exclusionary rule analysis. In 
United States v. Leon,117 for instance, the Court created the “good faith” exception, 
which allows unconstitutionally seized evidence to be admitted in a trial when the 
police officer act in good-faith reliance on a facially valid warrant later found to be 
invalid. Leon involved an anonymous informant of unproven reliability who told the 
police that two suspects were selling narcotics from their residence, and a motion was 
raised to exclude evidence seized pursuant to a warrant-authorized search of several 
residences. The Court held that evidence obtained by police officers acting in 
reasonable reliance on a search warrant later found to be illegal is admissible.118 
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To assess the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule, the majority opinion, 
written by Justice White,119 held that there exists a three-part argument analysis for 
establishing the Leon good faith exception. First, the exclusionary rule is designed to 
deter only police conduct and not that of nonpolice government actors. Second, there 
is no evidence which suggests that judges are inclined to ignore the Fourth 
Amendment. Third, the exclusion would not have serve as a deterrent effect on court 
officials.120 
Applying the cost-benefit approach, the Court went on to argue that the issue of 
whether to exclude illegally obtained evidence would be resolved “by weighing the 
costs and benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution’s case in chief of inherently 
trustworthy tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search warrant issued by a 
detached and neutral magistrate that ultimately is found to be defective.”121 The 
Court concluded that since the officer relying in good faith on a facially valid warrant 
could not be deterred by exclusion, the benefits of exclusion are marginal or 
nonexistent while the costs to society remain unbearably high.122 
The reasoning in Leon is vulnerable on several different perspectives. Close 
analysis of the cost-benefit approach and the assumptions apparently underlying it 
serves to demonstrate further what is wrong with the Leon rationale. 
First, the Court exaggerated the costs of the exclusionary rule. 
The Court did not accurately identify the relevant “cost” and “benefit” of the 
exclusionary rule. Referring to the costs occurred in the application of the 
exclusionary rule, the Court exaggerated the costs of the rule. Writing for the Court in 
Leon, Justice White has characterized them as “substantial”.123 Considering the costs 
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of the rule, the Court noted that the costs were two-sided because by excluding certain 
evidence, first, the Court suggested that the exclusion impedes the “truth-finding” 
process of the criminal justice system.124 Second, some guilty defendants may go free 
and thus indiscriminate application of the rule generates disrespect for the law and the 
justice system.125 However, there exists inconsistency between the “substantial” costs 
and the “insubstantial” benefit of the rule. As noted in 3.1.1 above, empirical evidence 
demonstrates that few convictions are lost. Only about one percent of felony 
prosecutions were “lost” due to suppression of physical evidence.126 In Davies’s 
study, he concluded that “the general level of the rule’s effects on criminal 
prosecutions is marginal at most.”127 
Moreover, balance has not really existed the way it ought to. There is too much 
weight on the side of the “cost”. The Leon holding itself is an example of such 
misdirection. The Court has never offered any systematic explanation of the principles 
that guide its assessment of “costs”. 
Secondly, the Court undervalued the benefits of the exclusionary rule. 
The Leon Court not only exaggerated the costs of the exclusionary rule but also 
underestimated the benefits of the rule. The Court commonly bypasses the “benefit” 
of the rule and proceeds directly to the “cost” of the rule. In fact, there exists no 
assessment of the “benefit” of the rule at all. As Justice Brennan observed in his Leon 
dissent, a group of magicians (i.e., the Leon majority) made the benefits of the 
exclusionary rule disappear “with a mere wave of the hand.”128 
The exclusionary rule is a forward-looking device for discouraging government 
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actors from engaging in torture, illegal searches or seizures by removing the 
evidentiary profits. Therefore, a major benefit of the exclusionary rule is the 
deterrence of future crime. In addition, society may have a general interest in 
preventing illegal governmental intrusions and it is difficult to measure the deterrent 
effect of the rule. 
Finally, the exclusionary rule deters the government’s misconduct. 
Leon stands for the proposition that the exclusionary rule is designed to act as a 
deterrent against future violations of the Fourth Amendment. By distinguishing the 
two types of government officials – those in law enforcement and those in the 
judiciary, Leon merely focuses on the identity of the wrongdoer. Under the narrow 
Leon approach, the identity of the offending actor is the dominant factor. The Court 
pondered the impact of deterrence on two separate groups in the criminal justice 
system: the police and nonpolice government actors. The Court relied heavily on this 
“police officer versus nonpolice government actor” distinction.129 The application of 
the exclusionary rule is measured mainly according to whether the offending actor is a 
law enforcement officer or a judicial officer. 
If the mistake was made by nonpolice government actors, the exclusionary rule 
would not apply and the evidence would be allowed. In the Court’s assumption, the 
exclusionary rule is designed only to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the 
errors of judges.130 However, the Court provided no answer as to why the rule should 
target only law enforcement instead of the judiciary or any other nonpolice 
government actors. As a matter of fact, it is evident that the true purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter the government’s misconduct, including the courts. The 
Constitution’s framers were not merely concerned with unreasonable searches and 
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seizures by police, but by the government as a whole.131 The prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure is directed at the government as a whole. As Justice 
Brennan noted in his Leon dissent: 
 
The [Fourth] Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
restrains the power of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a 
particular agency and exempt all others. The judiciary is responsible, no less 
than the executive, for ensuring that constitutional rights are respected.132 
 
This artificial distinction should be abolished. All government actors, both the 
police and nonpolice government actors, are obliged to honor the constitution. People 
should obey its constitution. By the same token, officers of that government were 
bound by the same constitution. Officers of the government, not limited to law 
enforcement officers, were restrained by the same constitution. The deterrent function 
of the exclusionary rule is its tendency to promote institutional compliance with 
constitutional requirements. Within the “one-government” conception, there should be 
no distinction between government actions, whether it happens to be police mistake or 
nonpolice government actors’ mistake under the exclusionary rule. Therefore, the 
Court should not exempt nonpolice government actors, including judges, magistrates 
and court personnel, from the exclusionary rule. 
Leon’s flawed foundation poses a triple threat: it undermines the cost-benefit 
approach, calls into question the current structure of the Fourth Amendment itself, 
gutting the Fourth Amendment’s substantial protections. The majority’s use of the 
cost-benefit balancing test disregards Court’s responsibilities to enforce constitutional 
guarantees. The exclusionary rule is inseparable from the underlying substantive 
guarantee. As will be discussed in more detail in 3.3.2, however, it indicates that the 
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scales of the cost-benefit balancing test are initially tilted against the constitutional 
substantive guarantee. 
 
3.3.2 The metaphor of balancing: Rhetorical device 
 
The United States judiciary is familiar with using balancing tests and balancing seems 
become the metaphor for procedural due process analysis. In Lopez-Mendoza,133 for 
example, the Court found that the government’s interest in preserving probative 
evidence under current procedure outweigh the benefit of applying the procedure.134 
Balancing was again adopted in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. 
Scott;135 the Court held the application of the exclusionary rule in parole revocation 
hearings would impair the functioning of state parole systems.136 Against this cost, 
the Court held no deterrence could be gained through the application of the 
exclusionary rule.137 However, the Court has examined “cost-benefit balancing test” 
from a somewhat skewed and unrealistic perspective. This metaphor is potentially 
problematic in three major ways. 
    First, the approach lacks an objective methodology. 
According to the Court, there are at least two competing interests: the cost of 
exclusion (the fact that probative evidence cannot be considered by the trier of fact, 
impediment of the truth-finding process in court proceedings,138 the guilty go free139 
and community safety cannot be enhanced) and the deterrent benefit (i.e., the 
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deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule). Accordingly, the exclusionary rule will not 
apply when the cost to society of losing probative evidence outweighs the deterrent 
effect of the rule. 
The exercise of judgment, however, pervades the creation and application of 
legal rules and standards in a way that is not true of economics. There are indisputably 
correct answers in economics, but not in law. The concept of “balancing” is itself a 
metaphor and this metaphor is abstract and ambiguous. The trouble with the current 
balancing approach is that this approach is a vague method of measuring 
imponderable interests against each other. 
While the Court has increasingly relied on a cost-benefit balancing approach, 
under such approach, judges often fail to employ an objective standard and thus create 
the danger of arbitrary or biased results. This cost-benefit balancing is meaningless 
without some preexisting objective criteria for valuing or comparing the interest at 
stake. Justice Brennan stressed that “placing the burden of proof on the proponents of 
the exclusionary rule’s effectiveness becomes outcome determinative because 
measurement of costs and benefits is impossible.”140 
Furthermore, perhaps most problematic is the difficulty of comparing 
incommensurables in law. It is impossible for us to shut our eyes to the fact that some 
interests are simply incommensurable with others. How does one balance the 
“competing interests” and weigh incommensurable values without objective 
methodology? How does one balance a suspect’s “right to be free from torture” 
against the state’s interest in securing confessions through police investigation? How 
does one balance a suspect’s “right to be free from illegal searches and seizures” 
against the state’s interest in securing physical evidence through police searches? It is 
very difficult for a judge to compare apples with oranges. Listen once more to a 
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sentence from Justice Scalia: “The scale analogy is not really appropriate, since the 
interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a 
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”141 Since the court cannot 
compare them, as a consequence, they just simply choose between them. 
For the reasons mentioned above, the deterrence and balancing approaches 
appear to be constitutionally irrelevant factors in determining the scope of the 
exclusionary rule; I instead deem the illegality of the means used to obtain the 
evidence to be constitutionally sufficient, by itself, to require exclusion. 
Secondly, the outcome is predictable. 
I am distrustful of the cost-benefit balancing approach in the Criminal Procedure 
Law. When the question of whether to admit or exclude illegally seized evidence is 
considered, a balancing test is employed in many cases.142 Although I have no doubt 
that the Court has tried to balance conflicting interests in the criminal process, I am 
also disappointed to find that the cost-benefit balancing approach as it stands contains 
no such balance. It seems make no sense to apply the “cost-benefit balancing 
approach”; so long as the Court adopted the approach, the outcome is predictable: 
costs will outweigh benefits. In other words, in the calculus employed by the Court, 
the highly emotional and nebulous “cost” of enforcing the Fourth Amendment always 
exceeds the “benefit” of vindicating the exclusionary rule. Since 1974, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly employed the “cost-benefit balancing test” to determine 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule143 and decide the scope of exclusionary rule. 
The Court, under the balancing test, held the exclusionary rule inapplicable in: 
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(1) grand jury proceedings;144 
(2) tax assessment proceedings;145 
(3) habeas corpus proceedings;146 
(4) where the evidence is offered against a person who had no expectation of privacy 
in the place things seized;147 
(5) deportation proceedings;148 
(6) where officers conducted the search based on a warrant that a reasonable officer 
could have believed to be valid;149 
(7) parole revocation proceedings;150 and 
(8) sentencing hearings.151 
In all these cases mentioned above,152 without exception, once the Court applies 
the cost-benefit “balancing” approach, the evidence would be admissible. The courts 
have thought that because exclusion would not provide a significant deterrent effect in 
these circumstances, the rule should not be applied. The narrow cost-benefit balancing 
approach almost always concludes that the exclusionary rule’s costs outweigh its 
benefits, especially considering that the perceived costs of undermining the 
truth-finding goal of the criminal trial are great. Under these circumstances, there 
exists no so-called balance at all. 
The results have been predictable. The biased result is the costs of exclusion 
always outweigh the deterrent and the Court has routinely opted for admission rather 
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than exclusion – as correctly noted by Kamisar: “perhaps even more so than in the 
First Amendment area, because the crime may be so heinous and the relevance of the 
evidence so overwhelming.”153 As a result, the cost-benefit balancing approach 
undermines the checking function of constitutional law. 
Thirdly, the Court has taken a narrow view of the exclusionary rule. 
The Court has taken an unnecessarily narrow view of the rule. As discussed 
below, it is illogical and unreasonable to limit the exclusionary rule to cases involving 
the police, criminal cases and intentional misconduct. 
(1) The exclusionary rule is limited in the police. Under the narrow 
deterrence-oriented cost-benefit balancing, the identity of the offending actor 
(whether he is a police officer or a nonpolice government actor) becomes the 
dominant factor because of the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule if offending 
actors are “not adjuncts to the law enforcement team.”154 The Court generally 
suspends its operation of the exclusionary rule against nonpolice government actors. 
The Court’s reasoning appears to include the notion that exclusion is not necessary to 
deter judicial officers, for example, judges, magistrates,155 and clerks,156 because 
they have “no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions,”157 and there 
is nothing to deter. (2) The exclusionary rule is limited to criminal cases. The Court 
has consistently applied the exclusionary rule in criminal trials and has refused to 
extend it to civil proceedings and administrative contexts.158 (3) The exclusionary 
rule is limited in intentional misconduct. Leon refused to apply the exclusionary rule 
where the purpose of the rule (i.e., where police officers act in good faith) would not 
                                                 
153 Yale Kamisar, ‘Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a “Principled Basis” Rather 
than an “Empirical Proposition”?’ (1983) 16 Creighton Law Review 565, 649. 
154 Arizona v. Evans., 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995). 
155 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
156 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995). 
157 Ibid. 
158 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349-50 (1974); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 
(1976); Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984). 
 112
be served. 
But the identity of the offending actor is too limited. The Leon Court mistakenly 
assumed that the deterrence function can operate only when the offending actor is a 
law enforcement officer. Historical evidence shows that the exclusionary rule was not 
designed merely to deter police misconduct.159 Although, one of the rationales behind 
the exclusionary rule is intended to deter police misconduct, it is not necessarily 
meant that the rule cannot deter nonpolice government actors in the future. Compared 
to the police, although nonpolice government actors do not have much stake in the 
outcome of searches and seizures, it is not necessarily meant that the exclusion of the 
evidence would not have any deterrent effect on them. It is still necessary for courts to 
deter judicial misconduct by applying the rule. The point is simply this: under the 
exclusionary rule, the judiciary may learn that it was not enough that they serve as 
“rubber stamp”, and then devote greater care and attention during the warrant-issuing 
process. Because that warrant was subject to challenge at the later motion to exclude, 
it was important to the magistrates that the warrant be properly and carefully issued. If 
the overall educational effect of the exclusionary rule is considered, application of the 
rule to nonpolice government actors can still be expected to deter future nonpolice 
government actors’ misconduct and have a considerable long-term deterrent effect. 
To take another example, court clerks are responsible for inputting warrant 
information in the database and are essential actors in the criminal justice system in 
spite of whether their position is characterized as being part of law enforcement. It is 
reasonable to believe that court clerks responsible for updating information into the 
criminal justice system have an interest in its functioning, and the exclusionary rule 
would have a deterrent effect on them whose mistakes might result in evidence being 
excluded. It is also reasonable to presume that the judiciary are in the best position to 
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monitor such errors and to apply the exclusionary rule to prevent their occurrence. 
In addition, the job realities of the judiciary and the law enforcement are 
different. The Leon Court simply ignored the job realities of the former. Operation of 
the exclusionary rule would create deterrence to the judiciary, including judges, from 
improperly issuing warrants. I am skeptical that exclusion would not affect judicial 
behavior at all. In terms of systematic deterrence there is good reason to exclude 
evidence. The exclusionary rule can affect both intentional misconduct and 
carelessness as the rule may create an incentive for both law enforcement officers and 
judicial officers to act with greater care. Thus the exclusionary rule can be an 
appropriate tool for preventing carelessness by nonpolice government actors. 
The problem with cost-benefit balancing is illustrated by United States v. Leon. 
160 Leon is unnecessary and confusing. Severe problems beset the deterrence-oriented 
cost-benefit balancing approach to the exclusionary rule. The basic error in this 
approach is that the United States Supreme Court has taken an unnecessarily narrow 
view of the exclusionary rule’s deterrence function. The exclusionary rule may shape 
the behavior of government institutions, not just police departments. The Court failed 
to appreciate that the exclusionary rule is necessary to remove effectively the 
incentive for all officers violating the Fourth Amendment rather than focusing on 
specific deterrence of the individual law enforcement officer who conducted the 
illegal searches and seizures. By applying the exclusionary rule to government 
officials, including both police and judicial, the court would afford more protection to 
its citizens. Neither the judges nor court personnel should be exempt from the 
exclusionary rule. From the foregoing it is clear that the narrow balancing approach 
could transform the exclusionary rule by making the exclusion of evidence the 
exception rather than the rule. 
                                                 
160 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
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3.4 Ending the myths of the exclusionary rule 
 
There are at least three myths and misconceptions about the exclusionary rule.161 
These key myths of the rule are producing many problematic and sometimes 
controversial laws, policies and decisions. 
Myth one: The exclusionary rule is the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine. 
It is a misunderstanding of the concepts of the exclusionary rule and the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine. The exclusionary rule deals with the evidence which is 
the direct or primary result of a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. For 
example, confession obtained by torture. Or a murder weapon found during the illegal 
search of a suspect’s house. 
By contrast, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine copes with the evidence 
which is derivative, or secondary in character.162 For instance, a tortured confession 
may reveal the location where the suspect hid a gun used in a murder. Or an illegal 
search may turn up a key to an airport locker where stolen diamond rings are being 
kept. The poisonous tree doctrine deals with whether the gun and stolen diamond 
rings mentioned above are admissible.163 
Myth two: The exclusionary rule excludes every single piece of evidence 
obtained, directly and indirectly, by any illegal method. 
The important core of this myth about the rule holds that the exclusionary rule 
suppresses every single piece of illegally obtained evidence. Let me be clear that I am 
not saying the exclusionary rule should apply to all kinds of police misconduct and 
thus every single piece of illegally obtained evidence should be excluded. I do not 
                                                 
161 These myths were believed by some lawyers, judges and scholars I discussed the exclusionary rule 
with, especially in China. 
162 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (discussing the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine). 
163 China does not establish an explicit exclusionary rule, let alone follow the poisonous tree doctrine, 
such that courts may use evidence obtained as a result of excluded statements or physical evidence. 
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mean to suggest that we exclude evidence every time the police err. Nor do I argue 
that any other evidence derived from police wrongdoing will be excluded. But I do 
contend that courts generally should exclude evidence obtained through illegal means 
from consideration at trial. 
In addition, not every Fourth Amendment violation resulting in discovery of 
evidence mandates use of the search and seizure exclusionary rule. This has been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in its decision in United States v. 
Calandra 164 and Herring v. United States.165 The Calandra Court argued that “the 
exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized 
evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.”166 The Herring Court explained: 
“We have never suggested that the exclusionary rule must apply in every 
circumstance in which it might provide marginal deterrence.”167 
Myth three: The exclusionary rule is the “monster”. 
Some people might think that the exclusionary rule is “flood and the monster”. 
The consequence of establishing the exclusionary rule is like letting the monster out 
of the cage. The costs of the exclusionary rule are usually overstated.168 When the 
judge actually possesses the illegally obtained evidence and cannot use it to support 
its decision, this appears to be a cost of the rule. It must be remembered, however, that 
the police obtained the evidence in the first place only because they violated the 
Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Hence, loss of “evidence” is often a 
cost of the Constitution (in the United States, the Fourth Amendment) or the Code of 
Criminal Procedure (in China, Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) itself 
rather than of the means of enforcement – the exclusionary rule. Limited judicial 
                                                 
164 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). 
165 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
166 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). 
167 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009). 
168 See 3.3. 
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resources and the nation’s high crime rate situation should not be excuses not to 
establish the exclusionary rule in China. It is clear that the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence does affect some police some of the time. To protect freedom from 
torture and advance the administration of the criminal justice system, I call upon 
China to maintain the exclusionary rule immediately and to ensure that the right to be 
free from torture is safeguarded. 
The exclusionary rule is not monstrous. According to an empirical study in the 
United States, all of the narcotics officers interviewed opposed elimination of the 
exclusionary rule.169 In another study, 90 % of the respondents in the survey which 
interviewed judges, prosecutors, and public defenders from Cook County, Illinois 






No one wants criminals to go unpunished, but this was in fact an inevitable 
consequence the executive branch anticipated when enforcing the constitution and law. 
Everyone prefers more law and order, but this goal must be pursed with constitutional 
and legal limits. Indeed, the exclusionary rule is a construct based on common law, 
constitutions and human rights law. The rejection of torture and illegal search is 
characterized as a constitutional principle and not merely a criminal procedure or 
                                                 
169 Myron Orfield, Jr., ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago 
Narcotics Officers’ (1987) 54 University of Chicago Law Review 1016, 1051. 
170 Myron Orfield, Jr., ‘Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the 
Chicago Criminal Courts’ (1992) 63 University of Colorado Law Review 75, 126. 
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evidence rule.171 In addition, there is reliable evidence that the exclusionary rule 
deters unlawful behavior. In brief, these empirical studies172 support the conclusion 
that the exclusionary rule is an effective means of deterring police misconduct. The 
rule works better than any other alternatives that have been tried. Application of the 
exclusionary rule would deter the occurrence of future mistakes. 
The deterrence-oriented cost-benefit balancing approach created in the Court 
represents a limitation on the exclusionary rule. This approach is an attractive but 
unworkable idea. The search and seizure exclusionary rule read, essentially, “if real 
evidence is obtained by illegal search, then exclude it.” With the cost-benefit 
balancing approach, according to the Court, the rule should be, “if real evidence is 
obtained by illegal search, then exclude it if doing so will deter police misconduct.” In 
practice, however, the exclusionary rule became “once the Court applies the 
cost-benefit balancing approach, costs will always outweigh benefits. Therefore, real 
evidence obtained by illegal search would be admissible.” It introduces uncertainty 
about when the exclusionary rule will apply. The exclusionary rule is suffering in the 
age of deterrence-oriented cost-benefit balancing. Given the importance of the right to 
be free from torture, and the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, the 
potential erosion through this balancing approach is particularly problematic. 
But surely the search and seizure exclusionary rule should not be so limited, as 
many more violations of the Fourth Amendment are the result of carelessness than of 
deliberate misconduct. To further the purpose of the exclusionary rule (deterring the 
government’s misconduct), the court needs to take a stand that will force government 
officials, both police and nonpolice government actors, to act in a way which more 
carefully safeguards the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
171 We will explore much of the detail of this theme in the succeeding chapters. 
172 See 3.1.4. 
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4 




The innovation – truly startling in a world of monarchy and empire – thrust 
the judiciary into an unaccustomed role as a co-equal branch of 
government, with the ultimate authority to interpret the Constitution’s 
limitations on the powers claimed by the national government itself. The 
doctrine of the separation of powers, the heart of our constitutional scheme, 
enables the judiciary to perform this role fearlessly, effectively, and 
independently. 
                                               Judge Kaufman1 
 
The main focus of this chapter is to explore the theoretical constitutional foundation 
of the exclusionary rule. This is not merely a matter of the law of evidence. I argue 
that the existing functional approach to the exclusionary rule cannot be squared with 
constitutional theory. The exclusionary rule is one of the most crucial principles in 
constitutional criminal procedure which is an area long neglected in evidence law in 
England. Books on criminal procedure and evidence law in the United Kingdom find 
almost nothing to say about the rule from a constitutional perspective. 
I propose to develop the rule in the context of constitutional law. I will introduce 
the cornerstone of the exclusionary rule at a constitutional level: the separation of 
powers. The rule is fundamentally based on the separation of powers, and it is not a 
castle in the air. It is particularly appropriate to rely upon the separation of powers 
doctrine to develop an understanding of the theoretical foundations of the rule. This 
                                                 
1 I.R. Kaufman, ‘The Essence of Judicial Independence’ (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review 671, 671. 
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is a central part of this thesis. 
My discussion is divided into three parts. To set the stage for advancing this 
claim, it is necessary to understand how the separation of powers doctrine works. 
The first section introduces the crucial building block of the exclusionary rule – the 
separation of powers doctrine and then analyses how the doctrine works in the 
criminal justice system and identifies its key aspects. 
Another issue in this section is whether policing the police should be the 
responsibility of the judiciary or another branch of government. It is necessary for 
the judiciary to exercise supervision to preserve legality. The exclusionary rule will 
exercise its indirect control over police behaviour in the field and exercise its indirect 
disciplinary authority over the police. Additionally, it is important to add that the 
right to a fair trial is directly connected to the exclusionary rule at the constitutional 
level. 
The second section offers a basis for rethinking the relationship between the 
courts, the exclusionary rule and the police, and that it explains that this relationship 
is triadic and multi-directional. The primary idea behind this approach involves the 
recognition of the dynamic relationship among these three spheres. 
The third section deals with the question of what will happen to investigative 
powers with no checks and balances. I argue that a right without checks and balances 
is no right at all. This section argues that the ECtHR’s rejection of exclusion of 
evidence obtained by interception represents a step in its limitation of the Article 6 of 
the ECHR. 
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 4.1 The crucial building block: separation of powers 
 
As early as 1748, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), a French judge, and one of the 
most influential political thinkers, noted that “constant experience shows us that 
every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it 
will go. … To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that 
power should be a check to powers.”2 According to Montesquieu, political power 
should be divided among legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government 
so as to ensure the people’s liberty. He had shown the necessity of separating the 
three branches. The French Declaration of 1789 also stated that “any society in which 
the guarantee of rights is not assured or the separation of powers not settled has no 
constitution.”3 Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers had tremendous 
influence on the framers of the United States Constitution. 
In determining the shape of a new government, the framers believed that three 
coordinate branches should strike a balance between a workable government and the 
protection of individual liberty. James Madison, the leading theoretician among the 
framers on the subject of separation of powers, explained that: 
 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of 
                                                 
2 B.D. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (Hafner Publishing, New York 1975) 150. 




The framers’ intent was to establish a system whereby the necessary separation 
of powers could be accomplished through a system of checks and balances. The 
Constitution provides the structure and functions of government as well as protecting 
individual rights. As Henry Scheiber has pointed out: “The first structural element 
that the framers regarded … as the more fundamental with regard to the defense of 
rights and liberties was the separation of powers.”5 The most pointed declaration of 
the separation of powers was drafted by John Adams, the American Founding’s most 
sophisticated political theorist, in the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. Adams’ 
Article reads: 
 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative department shall 
never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the 
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either 
of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive 
powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and 
not of men.6 
 
The United States Constitution is a written constitution based on the separation 
of powers. Federalism divides power vertically between the government and the 
states. The Constitution divides separate primary powers and functions of the 
government horizontally into three separate and distinct branches – legislative, 
executive, and judicial. The doctrine is grounded in the notion that all government 
                                                 
4 J.E. Cooke (ed.), The Federalist (Wesleyan University Press, Middletown 1961) 349. 
5 Harry Scheiber, ‘Constitutional Structure and the Protection of Rights’ in A.E. Howard (ed.), The 
United States Constitution: Roots, Rights, and Responsibilities (Smithsonian Institution Press, 
Washington and London 1992) 183, 184. 
6 Massachusetts Constitution Article XXX cited in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) 
(Scalia J., dissenting). 
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powers should not rest in one branch. The accumulation of whole power in the hand 
of a single branch was something the framers feared would lead to tyranny. 
The doctrine is expressed in the constitution in the first three Articles. Article I, 
§ 1, provides that “[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.” Art. II, § 1, provides that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States of America.” Article III, § 1, provides that “[t]he 
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in 
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
The separation of powers doctrine is the absolutely structural safeguard centered 
on the constitution. The major objective of the doctrine is to prevent governmental 
tyranny and protect liberty. In order to preclude a liberty-endangering concentration 
of power in one hand, the government decided to disperse power among three 
branches and preserve a balance among the branches. The president has a veto over 
congressional bills and the power to nominate federal judges. Congress has the 
power to override presidential vetoes and control over the size of the federal courts, 
as well as the power to impeach the federal officials. As Chief Justice Burger pointed 
out in Nixon v. Fitzgerald:7 
 
The essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for 
independent functioning of each coequal branch of government within its 
assigned sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or 
intimidation by other branches.8 
 
    In the United Kingdom, we may argue that the British constitution consists of 
                                                 
7 457 U.S. 731 (1983). 
8 457 U.S. 731, 760-61(1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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limited checks and balances and a partial separation of powers, but we cannot deny 
that the concept of separation of powers underlies the United Kingdom constitution.9 
There is a long history of checks and balances in the British constitution, although 
close ties exist between the executive and the legislative. 
The separation of powers doctrine underlies the English constitution and plays 
an important part in British law. In Entick v. Carrington,10 the Court of Common 
Pleas held that the executive could not seize books and papers without clear statutory 
authority. In Duport Steels v. Sirs, 11  Lord Diplock asserted that the British 
Constitution is firmly based upon the separation of powers. 
Again, in Regina v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, Ex parte Smedley,12 Sir John 
Donaldson M.R. emphasized that “[a]lthough the United Kingdom has no written 
constitution, it is a constitutional convention of the highest importance that the 
legislature and the judicature are separate and independent of one another, subject to 
certain ultimate rights of Parliament over the judicature.”13 
 
4.1.1 The separation of powers in the criminal context 
 
Constitutional law and criminal procedure law have a long association that continues 
to the present day. The separation of powers doctrine is the most important element 
in the constitution’s structural provision. At the level of theory, my exclusionary rule 
framework is grounded in the separation of powers. 
Previous research about the separation of powers doctrine has focused almost 
                                                 
9 It mainly refers to England and Wales. 
10 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). 
11 [1980] 1 WLR 142, 157. 
12 [1985] 2 QB 657. 
13 Ibid., 666. 
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entirely on constitutional law14 and political theory.15 They completely ignored the 
special role that the doctrine plays in the criminal justice system, a role consisting of 
the exercise of a reviewing function to ensure executive compliance with the 
criminal law. The doctrine in the context of criminal justice system is not some 
abstract political science theory. The Anglo-American separation of powers in this 
context was designed to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the 
executive or legislative, especially the executive.16 
In the United Kingdom, the Human Rights Act 1998 gives a legal force and 
recognition to most of the fundamental rights for suspects and defendants in the 
criminal process of the ECHR. In the United States, there is plentiful constitutional 
regulation of many aspects of the criminal process, and in a similar vein, the 
exclusionary rule occurs in the arena of constitutional criminal procedure. For 
example, the Fourth Amendment acts as a check on police powers by prohibiting 
illegal searches and seizures.17 The exclusionary rule forbids the introduction at 
criminal trials of evidence seized by an illegal search and seizure.18 The Fifth 
Amendment regulates executive power by prohibiting prosecuting individuals twice 
for the same offense.19 The exclusionary rule excluded statements elicited by means 
                                                 
14 See Burt Neuborne, ‘Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States’ 
(1982) 57 New York University Law Review 363; R.A. Schapiro, ‘Contingency and Universalism in 
State Separation of Powers Discourse’ (1998) 4 Roger Williams University Law Review 79, and B.G. 
Peabody and J.D. Nugent, ‘Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers’ (2003) 53 The 
American University Law Review 1. 
15 See M.H. Redish and E.J. Cisar, ‘ “If Angels were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism 
in Separation of Powers Theory’ (1991) 41 Duke Law Journal 449; M.S. Paulsen, ‘The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law is’ (1994) 83 Georgetown Law Journal 217 
and James Hyre, ‘The United Kingdom’s Declaration of Judicial Independence: Creating a Supreme 
Court to Secure Individual Rights under the Human Rights Act of 1998’ (2004) 73 Fordham Law 
Review 423. 
16 See 2.1. 
17 United States Constitution the Fourth Amendment. 
18 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
19 United States Constitution the Fifth Amendment. 
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violating this amendment.20 The Six Amendment provides the right to a speedy and 
public trial, the right to notice of criminal charges, the right to confrontation, and the 
right to assistance of counsel.21 These powers are strictly defined. The exclusionary 
rule excluded statements elicited in violation of this amendment at criminal trials.22 
There is a distinction between legislative, executive and judicial functions. In 
the realm of criminal process, the legislature is responsible for creating criminal law 
and criminal procedure law; the executive is limited to administering and enforcing 
these laws; the judiciary is to interpret the laws. Under the separation of powers 
scheme, each segment of the criminal justice system (for example, the legislature, 
police and court) is given both its own authority and the means to check the potential 
excess of other units. The criminal justice system of separate branches with 
independent powers that check and balance each other imposes on each branch 
specific structural responsibilities. If any branch fails to fulfill its responsibility, the 
function of the criminal justice system cannot exert. Each branch, especially the 
executive, cannot reach beyond the limits of the constitution that created it. When 
controversy arises, the judiciary should enforce adherence to legislative standards by 
policing enforcement agents’ obedience to legislative commands. 
The reasons for the separation of powers between the judge (the judiciary) and 
police (the executive) go to the foundation of the exclusionary rule. As Justice 
Jackson so well stated in Johnson v. United States:23 
 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual 
                                                 
20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
21 United States Constitution the Sixth Amendment. 
22 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
23 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
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inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection 
consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and 
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.24 
 
It is decisive that the exclusionary rule is consistent with separation of powers in the 
criminal justice system. In this respect, the separation of powers principle is the 
foundation of the exclusionary rule. 
 
4.1.2 Checks and balances: Search warrants 
 
The whole point of the separation of powers is to ensure the checks and balances of 
each branch. The three separate branches of government need a system of checks 
over each other to keep them in their proper places. Because no branch possesses all 
of the powers of government, the actions of each are checked by the others. The 
Fourth Amendment gives the guarantee that a man’s home is his castle beyond 
invasion by the government. The phrase “a man’s home is his castle” originated from 
Justinian’s Code.25 The framers of American constitution constitutionalized the 
search and seizure principles of the English common law. 
Unreasonable searches and seizures are constitutionally prohibited. As I will 
discuss below, the criminal procedure law originally was designed to prevent any 
single branch in the criminal justice system from dominating the criminal process by 
dividing authority among three offices. The Anglo-American legal system has 
developed a procedure that is dependent on the issue of judicial warrant prior to 
                                                 
24 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
25 Robert McWhirter, ‘Molasses and the Sticky Origins of the Fourth Amendment’ (2007) 43 Arizona 
Attorney 16, 18. 
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execution of the search. The normal procedure should require a judicial warrant and 
only in exceptional circumstances should prior judicial authorization be 
unnecessary.26 In addition, only the judiciary is constitutionally empowered to issue 
search warrants. 
The warrant is the best way to ensure that privacy is not arbitrarily invaded. The 
search warrant is a method of checks and balances for the judiciary to oversee the 
executive. The legislative establish a procedure by which the police seek a neutral’s 
determination as to whether probable cause for a search or seizure exists. As Justice 
William Douglas noted, the Fourth Amendment requires a neutral fact-finder to issue 
search warrants.27 The clear purpose of a warrant is to allow a neutral judge to assess 
whether the police have probable cause to conduct a search. 
In order to discover physical evidence, the police may wish to search the 
suspect’s premises. A police officer searching a dwelling house should have some 
valid basis in law for the intrusion. In the United Kingdom, for example, Section 8 of 
PACE requires an individual judicial authorization for entry into private premises 
and empowers a justice of the peace to issue a search warrant. It provides: 
 
If on an application made by a constable a justice of the peace is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing – (a) that [an indictable 
offence] has been committed; and (b) that there is material on premises 
[mentioned in subsection (1A) below] which is likely to be of substantial 
value (whether by itself or together with other material) to the investigation 
of the offence; and (c) that the material is likely to be relevant evidence; 
and (d) that it does not consist of or include items subject to legal privilege, 
excluded material or special procedure material; and (e) that any of the 
                                                 
26 In Canada, for instance, the lack of a search warrant makes a search prima facie unreasonable and 
the onus is the prosecution to establish that it is reasonable. See R v. Collins, (1987) 33 CCC (3d)1, 38 
DLR (4th) 508. 
27 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-59 (1967). 
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conditions specified in subsection (3) below applies [in relation to each set 
of premises specified in the application], he may issue a warrant 
authorizing a constable to enter and search the premises.28 
 
Furthermore, in connection with firearms, theft and drugs cases, there are 
several statutes under which search warrants may be issued. Section 46(1) of the 
Firearms Act 1968 empowers a magistrate to issue a search warrant where he is 
satisfied by information provided on oath that there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that a offence under the Act has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed.29 
Under Section 26(1) of the Theft Act 1968, a search warrant may be issued by a 
justice of the peace in respect of premises where he is satisfied by information that 
there are reasonable causes for suspecting that stolen goods are on the premises.30 
Moreover, under Section 23(3) of the Misuse of the Drugs Act 1971, a search warrant 
may be issued by a magistrate in respect of premises where he is satisfied by 
information by the police that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
                                                 
28 Section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. 
29 Section 46 (1) of the Firearms Act 1968 provides: 
If a justice of the peace or, in Scotland, the sheriff, is satisfied by information on oath that 
there is reasonable ground for suspecting – (a) that an offence relevant for the purposes of 
this section has been, is being, or is about to be committed; or (b) that, in connection with 
a firearm or ammunition, there is a danger to the public safety or to the peace, he may 
grant a warrant for any of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2) below. 
30 Section 23 (3) of the Misuse of the Drugs Act 1971 provides: 
If a justice of the peace (or in Scotland a justice of the peace, a magistrate or a sheriff) is 
satisfied by information on oath that there is reasonable ground for suspecting – (a)  that 
any controlled drugs are, in contravention of this Act or of any regulations made 
thereunder, in the possession of a person on any premises; or (b) that a document directly 
or indirectly relating to, or connected with, a transaction or dealing which was, or an 
intended transaction or dealing which would if carried out be, an offence under this Act, or 
in the case of a transaction or dealing carried out or intended to be carried out in a place 
outside the United Kingdom, an offence against the provisions of a corresponding law in 
force in that place, is in the possession of a person on any premises, he may grant a 
warrant authorising any constable acting for the police area in which the premises are 
situated at any time or times within one month from the date of the warrant, to enter, if 
need be by force, the premises named in the warrant, and to search the premises … . 
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controlled drugs are on the premises. 31  Of course, in some situations, the 
requirement of a judicial warrant may be dispensed with, for example, “emergency 
searches” or “searches by consent”. 
In the United States, the Fourth Amendment requires the courts to issue 
warrants32 and protects people from illegal searches and seizures. The amendment 
commands that a warrant should issue not only upon probable cause supported by 
oath, but also specify the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Searches and seizures must be grounded in probable cause; police officers should 
have probable cause before acting and they should obtain a warrant before acting or 
run the risk of suppression of evidence obtained thereby. This requirement repudiates 
general warrants and makes general searches impossible and prevents the search of 
one place under a warrant describing another. The purpose of this amendment is to 
let a neutral judge decide whether a search or seizure is appropriate and necessary as 
opposed to a potentially biased police officer engaged in the enterprise of ferreting 
out crime. 
Obtaining a warrant requires the police officer to justify the arrest or the search 
before it is made. When the police would like to search a place, they must present 
materials to apply search warrants to support their application. The affidavit, for 
instance, might allege that “[a]ffiants have received reliable information from a 
credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other 
narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises 
                                                 
31 Section 26(1) of the Theft Act 1968 provides: “(1) If it is made to appear by information on oath 
before a justice of the peace that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody 
or possession or on his premises any stolen goods, the justice may grant a warrant to search for and 
seize the same … .” 
32 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.”33 
Magistrates or judges are empowered to issue warrants. The Fourth Amendment 
allows only the judiciary to issue warrants, and that illegal searches emanating from 
the executive are a violation of its legal territory. The judiciary will screen warrant 
requests and decide whether the materials presented establish probable cause to 
believe that specific items related to the crime will be found at the designated 
location. 
The police have to provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause; 
otherwise, the search warrant will not be issued and that the evidence obtained as a 
result of the warrant will be inadmissible. The purpose served by this mechanism of 
checks and balances for obtaining a judicial warrant is that it provides the detached 
scrutiny of a neutral judge, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper 
searches. If the executive branch fails to respect the Fourth Amendment or law, then 
the most effective remedy at the court’s disposal is to exclude the evidence 
uncovered by those illegal investigative methods. 
The right to privacy is attached to prohibitions on illegal searches and illegal 
interception. 34  The exclusionary rule safeguards privacy and protection from 
government intrusion and manifests a preference for privacy over the level of law 
enforcement efficiency which could be achieved if police were permitted to search 
without probable cause or to intercept private conversation without judicial 
authorization. 
                                                 
33 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). 
34 See 4.3.3. 
 131
4.1.3 The enforcement of constitutional rights 
 
The people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses and other possessions 
against illegal searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of 
communications by eavesdropping devices or other methods. The mere existence of 
these rights is insufficient to ensure realization. These rights should be constitutional 
rights, which the sole question on the table is how these rights should be enforced. 
The primary means of enforcing these rights is the exclusionary rule. The rule 
serves as the critical safety valve against malpractice by the executive branch. The 
separation of powers requires an independent judiciary armed with judicial review. 
The judiciary should have independent power to oversee the executive’s adherence to 
constitutional and statutory standards. Judicial review of the police investigation 
methods is necessary to maintain proper checks and balances. Courts should concern 
themselves with how evidence is obtained. Some responsibility for control over 
police misconduct must rest with on the court. 
The role of the judiciary is to ensure that government is conducted according to 
the law. The judiciary should strike down the unconstitutional actions of the other 
two branches. Judges should not act as “rubber stamps” in the review of warrant 
applications as the judiciary is not as part of the executive. Judge Kaufman 
accurately argued that: 
 
Judicial independence is not a cliché conjured up by those who seek to 
prevent encroachments by the other branches of government. The term is 
one of art, defined to achieve the essential objective of the separation of 
powers that justice be rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice.35 
                                                 
35 I.R. Kaufman, ‘The Essence of Judicial Independence’ (1980) 80 Columbia Law Review 671, 701. 
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The courts, when a case arises, can always step in when officers violate the law. 
Brock CJ explained that: 
 
Enforcement of the [exclusionary] rule places the parties in the position 
they would have been in had there been … no violation of the defendant’s 
constitutional right to be free of searches made pursuant to warrants issued 
without probable cause. In so doing, the rule also preserves the integrity of 
the judiciary and the warrant issuing process.36 
 
The exclusionary rule is an effective judicial response to illegal investigative 
methods used by the executive branch. Once the police have got used to unchecked 
authority, limits on their powers are unlikely to be respected. 
As regards the United Kingdom, it is quite easy for the ECtHR to argue that 
“[i]t is not the role of the Court to determine … whether unlawfully obtained 
evidence … may be admissible”37 and that its admissibility is a matter for regulation 
under national law. In a similar vein, the House of Lords can also argue that 
supervision of the police is not its judicial function.38 
 However, interposing the judge between the police and the individual strikes 
the right balance between the constitutional rights of the defendant and the powers of 
the government. Enforcement of the right to be free from torture, and the right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures will encourage fair police practices. It would 
be wrong for the courts to rely on illegally obtained evidence. 
                                                 
36 The State of New Hampshire v. Rafael Canelo a/k/a Rafael Canelo Valdez, 139 NH 376, 1105 
(1995). 
37 Khan v. United Kingdom (App no 35394/97) (2001) 31 EHRR 45 [34]. 
38 R v. Sang, [1980] AC 402, 436. 
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4.1.4 The fair trial doctrine 
 
There are two goals of regulating the criminal process: first is to bring suspected 
offenders to trial so as to produce accurate determinations, and to ensure that 
fundamental rights are protected in those processes.39 Justice is often perceived as 
procedural fairness.40 Fairness is absolutely essential in order to produce an accurate 
verdict. The court’s main duty is to hold a fair trial. One of the most important global 
legal developments is the growing recognition that the suspect will be given a right 
to a fair trial in both international and domestic law. For example, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Articles 10 and 11,41 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 1442 and the Police and 
                                                 
39 Andrew Ashworth, and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (3rd edn., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2005) 55. 
40 Cf. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996). 
41 Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of 
his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.” 
  Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: “Everyone charged with a penal 
offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.” 
42 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall 
be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law… 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to the law. 
3. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he under stands of the 
nature and cause of the charge against him; 
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to 
communicate with counsel of his own choosing; 
(c) To be tried without undue delay; 
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance 
of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and 
to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so 
require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means 
to pay for it; 
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance 
and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him; 
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Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 Section 78(1).43 In the criminal justice context 
the most important articles of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Rights (ECHR) are Articles 5, 6 and 7. Article 6 guarantees 
the right to a fair trial.44 The essence of Articles 6 is the right to a fair trial. 
The right to a fair trial applies in civil and criminal proceedings. This study 
                                                                                                                                          
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court; 
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 
4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their 
age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation. 
5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being 
reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law. 
6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when 
subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that 
a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of 
justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be 
compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown 
fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him. 
7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has 
already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of each country. 
43 Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act the provides: 
In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely to be given if it appears to be the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the 
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
44 Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights 
provides: 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he 
has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests 
of justice so require; 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witness on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. 
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concentrates on the latter. It refers to the right to be free from arbitrary arrest and 
coerced confessions, the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to be tried within a reasonable time and the right 
to an independent and impartial tribunal. The guarantee of fairness under the ECHR 
is not limited to the trial, but underpins the whole criminal process including “the 
way in which evidence was taken.”45 
It is important to add that the right to fair trial is directly connected to the 
exclusionary rule at the constitutional level. The connection between the right to fair 
trial and the exclusionary rule is that the use of illegally obtained evidence against 
defendants is intrinsically antithetical to the concept of fundamental fairness. Take 
for example, the confession exclusionary rule; tortured confessions generate 
unfairness in three basic senses. First, the unreliable statements result from illegal 
methods that civilized society abhors. These methods threaten the dignity and 
autonomy of the individual. Secondly, the unreliable statements threaten to produce 
unreliable outcomes and thus the conviction of innocents. Thirdly, the right to a fair 
trial encompasses the entitlement to fair play to established rules and procedures in 
criminal process. Even though these products of such “unfair play” by law 
enforcement officials are “reliable”, once the criminal justice system relies on these 
products, the resulting convictions are inevitably infected with unfairness. The 
concept of “fairness” influences the criminal justice system from the start of the 
investigation to the release of the offender. These illegally obtained evidence are 
naturally inconsistent with a criminal justice system devoted to due process. That is 
why, in England, for example, if any question of the exclusion of physical evidence 
on the ground that the circumstances in which it has been obtained would make it 
                                                 
45 Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (App no 25829/94) (1998) 28 EHRR 110 [34]. 
 136
unfair to admit it, then the judge should exercise his discretion under Section 78 of 
PACE to exclude it. The criterion under Section 78 is the effect which the admission 
of the evidence would have on the fairness of the proceedings. 
 
 
4.2 The Court, exclusionary rule and police 
 
The exclusionary rule has three essential characteristics: the first, for the court, is the 
protection of constitutional rights; the second, for the rule per se, is preventing 
arbitrary governmental invasion and the third, for the police, is adherence to the 
constitution law and criminal procedure law. Without these, courts and the police 
may readily become engines and tools of tyranny. I will offer a fresh perspective on 
this argument from the perspective of comparative criminal procedure. 
In this section I am going to explore the complicated and constantly shifting 
interplay between the court (the judiciary branch), exclusionary rule and police (the 
executive branch) in the criminal justice system. The basic objective is to provide a 
broader way of thinking about the role of the exclusionary rule in the context of the 
criminal process. The role of the rule in the criminal justice system is a difficult issue. 
The rule is not an independent variable in the system. The criminal justice system is 
not static. The relationship is dynamic and interactive. Therefore, legal reasoning 
should respond to a variety of interrelated concerns. 
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4.2.1 The court and exclusionary rule: Judicial discretion? 
 
The most significant role for judges is to protect the individual criminal 
defendant against the occasional excesses of the popular will, and to 
preserve the checks and balances within our constitutional system that are 
precisely designed to inhibit swift and complete accomplishment of popular 
will. 
 
                                                Justice Scalia46 
 
The first matter to be examined here is whether an English trial judge should have 
the discretion to exclude physical evidence discovered as a result of an illegal search. 
I will use the House of Lords’ landmark decision in R v. Sang 47 as a basis for 
discussion of this issue. The House of Lords’ puzzling and opaque decision is not 
satisfying from the practical point of view, especially in the twenty-first century. 
Sang is a confusing case; deeper consideration of this issue reveals the fallacy of the 
reasoning employed in Sang. Although the House of Lords tried to clarify the 
position concerning the exclusionary rule, I argue that it leaves many questions 
unanswered. 
The House of Lords failed to reach a consensus as to whether the court has the 
discretion to exclude illegally obtained real evidence. The Court split 3:2 on the issue 
of whether discretion to exclude evidence existed as a consequence of “fairness” to 
the defendant. Two of their Lordships, Lord Diplock and Viscount Dilhorne, took the 
most restrictive interpretation of discretion of the court. Lord Diplock asserted that 
the judge has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant and otherwise admissible 
evidence on the ground that it was obtained improperly or by unfair means. 
                                                 
46 Antonin Scalia, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 University of Chicago Law Review 
1175, 1180. 
47 [1980] AC 402. 
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Therefore, the House of Lords is not concerned with how the evidence was 
obtained.48 With respect to real, reliable, physical evidence, according to the House 
of Lords, supervision of the police is not a judicial function. In addition, Viscount 
Dilhorne claimed that previous cases were wrong, because he had not been able to 
find any authority for the general principle for the exclusionary rule. I argue that both 
of their opinions were far from accurate. I reach that opinion on two grounds. 
First, there are many reported cases in which the House of Lords have expressed 
that there is judicial discretion. 
In England, before Sang the general rule was that criminal judges had discretion 
to decline to admit evidence on the ground that operation of the rule of admissibility 
would operate unfairly against the accused. Police trickery, bribery, threats, or other 
oppressive behavior to an accused could trigger the discretion.49 
As early as 1955, Kuruma50 was the first case regarded as establishing the 
existence of this kind of judicial discretion. Lord Goddard stated that “[n]o doubt in a 
criminal case the judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict rules 
of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused. … If, for instance, some 
admission of some piece of evidence … had been obtained from a defendant by a 
trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it out.”51 
A number of subsequent decisions re-affirmed the discretion recognized in 
Kuruma. Returning to the words of Lord Denning in 1970: 
 
The common law does not permit police officers … to ransack anyone’s 
house, or to search for papers or articles therein, or to search his person, 
                                                 
48 [1980] AC 402, 436. 
49 Callis v. Gunn [1964] 1 QB 495 (QB) 501. 
50 Kuruma Son of Kaniu v. Reginam [1955] 1 All ER 236 (PC) 239. 
51 [1955] 1 All ER 236 (PC) 239. 
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simply to see if he may have committed some crime or other. If police 
officers should so do, they would be guilty of a trespass. Even if they 
should find something incriminating against him, I should have thought 
that the court would not allow it to be used in evidence against him, if the 
conduct of the police officers was so oppressive that it would not be right 
to allow the Crown to rely on it.52 
 
    In the 1978 case of Jeffrey v. Black,53 Lord Widgery CJ once again emphasized: 
 
[I]f the case is such that not only have the police officers entered without 
authority, but they have been guilty of trickery or they have misled 
someone, or they have been oppressive or they have been unfair, or in 
other respects they have behaved in a manner which is morally 
reprehensible, then it is open to the justices to apply their discretion and 
decline to allow the particular evidence to be let in as part of the trial.54 
 
Courts play the most important role in administering the criminal justice system. 
They are there to do justice according to the constitution and law. Judges should 
enhance their roles as citizens’ protectors against the arbitrary actions of those in 
authority. If the executive branch attempts to erode the judiciary’s power, for 
example, to issue judicial warrants, the appropriate judicial response is to exclude 
evidence produced by unlawful searches. The exclusionary rule is the device for 
judges to administer criminal justice. 
Furthermore, in Sang, Lord Diplock claimed that the judge at the trial has no 
discretion to disallow illegally retained physical evidence.55 I argue that judges do 
have discretion to exclude illegally retained evidence. Undoubtedly the judiciary has 
a discretion to determine the admissibility of criminal evidence. The discretion 
                                                 
52 Ghani and Others v. Jones, [1970] 1 QB 693 (QB) 706 (emphasis added). 
53 [1978] 1 All ER 555. 
54 Ibid., 559. 
55 R v. Sang, [1980] AC 402, 437. 
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applies to evidence obtained not only by coercive interrogations but also by illegal 
searches. In the administration of criminal justice, judicial supervision is becoming 
increasingly important. It is hard to imagine that judges could say it is not their 
concern at any stage of the criminal process. 
From the very beginning of the investigative stage of the criminal process, 
before issuing a warrant, judges have to evaluate evidence and then decide whether 
the police establish that probable cause exists for a particular search and seizure.56 
Additionally, judges have to decide on detention orders and issue warrants for 
telephone taps. Otherwise, magistrates will become rubberstamps for police. 
Accordingly, the judiciary plays a crucial role in checking police power. 
Next, at the trial stage, for judges, the power and duty to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence is the necessary tool to enforce constitutional protections. It is the 
role of the judge to determine whether unlawfully obtained evidence should be 
inadmissible. Lord Justice-General Cooper, one of Scotland’s greatest judges, 
expressed the same view in Chalmers v. HM Advocate,57 saying that judges have 
“the power and duty to exclude from the cognizance of a jury evidence which … is 
inadmissible.”58 The power and duty from judges acts as a direct check against the 
abuse of power in executive branch. 
If the trial judge were not given discretion to suppress illegally obtained 
evidence, would that mean the police could use any illegal methods they prefer to 
collect evidence, and that judges would have no choice but to accept all of them? The 
answer is definitely no. Except judges, I cannot imagine any other participants in the 
                                                 
56 Probable cause is an indispensable element of the Fourth Amendment. It requires “reasonably 
trustworthy information … sufficient … to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed” or certain evidence of a crime will be located in the specific 
place to be searched. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
57 1954 JC 66. 
58 Ibid. 
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criminal justice system have the ability to check the arbitrary police power. Indirect 
supervision from the court is not replaceable by legislation and internal regulation. 
While the exclusionary rule is historically limited to involuntary confessions in 
England, the rule should not only be limited to cases where the evidence was 
unreliable. Judges should not consider the probative weight of the evidence prior to 
ruling upon its admissibility. The probative weight of the evidence and admissibility 
of evidence are completely two different issues. According to English law, a 
confession must not have been by torture. If it was, it is excluded, and the question of 
reliability need not be addressed.59 We should focus on the examination of the 
manner in which the evidence was obtained instead of whether the prejudicial effect 
outweighed its probative value. 
Only five years after Sang, Parliament promulgated the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, which rejected the opinion of Lord Diplock and Viscount 
Dilhorne. Under Section 78, judges have discretion to exclude evidence where 
admission of evidence “would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.” One of PACE’s significant 
functions is that it clearly directs the judiciary to police the police. 
The issue in England is whether excluding unlawfully obtained evidence would 
avoid unfairness to the accused at his trial. Under this premise, illegal evidence is 
excluded not because such evidence was unfairly obtained, but because it is unfair to 
prosecute the accused based on this illegally obtained evidence. 
It is the role of the court to determine whether unlawfully obtained evidence 
should be admissible. All judges have a discretion to exclude illegally obtained 
                                                 
59 J.A. Andrews and Michael Hirst, Andrews and Hirst on Criminal Evidence, (4th edn., Jordan, 
Bristol 2001) 19, 24. 
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evidence. This discretion should not limited to the evidence were unreliable and 
should not be exercised in a manner that compromises the defendant’s right to be 
free from torture. Judges should exercise their discretion to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence rather stick to the stereotypical passive attitude of the traditional search and 
seizure exclusionary rule. 
 
4.2.2 The exclusionary rule and police: Tremendous impact 
 
Prior to 1961, the United States Supreme Court had not interpreted the Constitution 
to require application of the exclusionary rule in state criminal proceedings. The 
states had the option to adopt or reject the exclusionary rule. The Court landmark 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio60 reversed Wolf 61 and required all states to exclude 
evidence procured by means of an illegal search and seizure from criminal 
proceedings through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp 
closed “the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official 
lawlessness”62 in violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable 
illegal searches and seizures. The impact of the exclusionary rule and Mapp were 
manifold. 
    First, the issuance of search warrants sharply increased. 
As Leonard Reisman, the head of the New York City Police Department’s legal 
bureau, observed that “before [Mapp], nobody bothered to take out search 
warrants.”63  The primary result of the exclusionary rule was a sharp increase in the 
                                                 
60 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
61 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
62 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961). 
63 S.E. Zion, ‘Detectives Get a Course in Law: They Return to Classroom to Study Court Decisions’ 
The New York Times (New York 28 April 1965) 50. 
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number of search warrants issued.64 History tells us that the police seldom applied 
for search warrants prior to Mapp in cities where the exclusionary rule was not 
adopted. The use of search warrants by the Boston police prior 1961 was negligible, 
but afterward, about 950 warrants were issued in 1963. In Cincinnati – another city 
whose courts had admitted illegally obtained evidence prior to Mapp – only three 
warrants were obtained by the police in 1958. The police obtained none in 1959. 
Only seven warrants were obtained in 1960. However, in 1964 the issuance of search 
warrants increased to 113.65 Similarly, according to the New York report, in the New 
York City the issuance of search warrants increased from virtually zero in 1961 to 
about 17,900 in 1966.66 
Secondly, the police began to take the Fourth Amendment seriously. 
Prior to the adoption of the exclusionary rule law enforcement agents were 
under no substantial pressure to seek clarification of the Fourth Amendment. 
California Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Traynor, one of the most respected 
jurists, expressed his concern about the issue of the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence and observed that: 
 
[T]ime after time [illegally obtained evidence] was being offered and 
admitted as a routine procedure. It became impossible to ignore the 
corollary that illegal searches and seizures were also a routine procedure 
subject to no effective deterrent; else how could illegally obtained evidence 
come into court with such regularity.67 
                                                 
64 B.C. Canon, ‘Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? : Some New Data and a Plea against a 
Precipitous Conclusion’ (1974) 62 Kentucky Law Journal 681, 709. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Lawrence Tiffany, Donald Mclntyre, and Daniel Rotenberg, Detection of Crime: Stopping and 
Questioning, Search and Seizure, Encouragement and Entrapment, (Little Brown, Boston 1967) 87; 
See also Arlen Specter, ‘Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora’s Problems for the Prosecutor’ (1962) 111 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 4. 




That is the reason why California converted to the exclusionary rule in 1955. Justice 
Traynor authored the California opinion adopting the rule in People v. Cahan.68 
Illuminating in this regard is this quote by Leonard Reisman, after Mapp decision: 
“Although the U.S. Constitution requires warrants in most cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court had ruled that evidence obtained without a warrant – illegally if you will – was 
admissible in state courts. So the feeling was, why bother?”69 
Thirdly, the response from the law enforcement officials was that the rule 
caused “tidal waves and earthquakes”. 
The conclusion about the exclusionary rule’s huge impact in the United States is 
the prevailing view among many law enforcement officials, especially police 
professionals in the field. Ervin, J. of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania compared 
the Mapp case to a “hurricane” which “swept over our fair land”.70 Arlen Specter, 
assistant district attorney in Pennsylvania, likened it to a “revolution”: 
 
Police practices and prosecution procedures were revolutionized in many 
states by the holding in … Mapp v. Ohio that evidence obtained from an 
illegal search and seizure cannot be used in a criminal proceeding … 
[There are indications] that the imposition of the exclusionary rule upon 
the states is the most significant event in criminal law since the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment … Mapp has rewritten the criminal law treatise 
for states which had admitted evidence regardless of law it was obtained.71 
 
Michael Murphy, the former Police Commissioner of the City of New York, 
                                                 
68 282 P2d 905 (Cal. 1955). 
69 S.E. Zion, ‘Detectives Get a Course in Law: They Return to Classroom to Study Court Decisions’ 
The New York Times (New York 28 April 1965) 50. 
70 Common v. One 1955 Buick Sedan, 198 Pa. Super. 133 (1962). 
71 Arlen Specter, ‘Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora’s Problems for the Prosecutor’ (1962) 111 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 4, 4. 
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described the effects of the Mapp case and observed that: 
 
I can think of no decision in recent times in the field of law enforcement 
which had such a dramatic and traumatic effect as this. … [Mapp] create 
tidal waves and earthquakes which require rebuilding of our institutions 
sometimes from their very foundations upward. Retraining sessions had to 
be held from the very top administrators down to each of the thousands of 
foot patrolmen and detectives engaged in the daily basic enforcement 
function.72 
 
4.2.3 The court and police: Judicial supervision 
 
The judiciary and the executive have different functions and responsibilities. The 
court, acting in the name of the constitution, should have the constitutional authority 
to police the police and ensure that the government acts within the bounds set by the 
constitution and legislature. This function could not be better exercised by other 
governmental agencies. The executive branch is not neutral and disinterested under 
the separation of powers doctrine. The powers of the executive are vast but not 
unlimited. The judiciary, separated from other branches of government, is in a 
position to check and balance the legislature and executive and ensure that they 
respect the constitutional rights of individuals, for example, the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures, the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. 
The courts should not abandon their judicial role. There are two central elements of 
the judicial role, as President of the Supreme Court of Israel Abaron Barak 
acknowledged in 2006, “One element is bridging the gap between law and 
                                                 
72 Michael Murphy, ‘Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law Enforcement’ (1966) 44 Texas Law 
Review 939, 941. 
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society. … The second major task is to protect the constitution and democracy.”73 A 
vital role of courts is to protect citizens from oppressive police conduct.74 The duty 
of the judge is to administer justice according to law. It is the courts that are the chief 
guarantors against torture and illegal searches. It is the role of courts to prevent 
executive usurpation and guard constitutional and legal rights. 
    A supreme court for the protection of fundamental rights is, without question, an 
essential component of the modern exclusionary rule. Every court has not only the 
inherent power but also the duty to oversee execution action and ensure that the 
police do not misuse their power to oppress citizens. The role of the courts is to stand 
between the state and its citizens to make sure that the police anticrime efforts 
conform to the constitution. 
The judiciary should refuse to condone brutalized extraction of confessions or 
other illegal acts committed in obtaining evidence of guilt. Otherwise, it will 
indirectly encourage wrongful acts carried out by agents of the executive. The use of 
illegal evidence is “denied in order to maintain respect of law; in order to promote 
confidence in administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from 
contamination.”75 Therefore, evidence obtained by illegal means which risks the 
conviction of the innocent should be rejected. The court should provide the guiding 
jurisprudence in these areas. 
 
                                                 
73 Abaron Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006) xvii, xviii. 
74 Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 15 (1968). 
75 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J, dissenting). 
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4.3 Powers without checks and balances? 
 
In this section, I will show that history has proven when courts do not step in by 
employing the exclusionary rule, the problem of police wrongdoing may get worse; 
the privacy of individual citizens will be more frequently infringed by the 
government. I will use three illustrations: the Judges’ Rule, unlawfully retained DNA 
evidence, and interception, to show that without the checks and balances in the 
criminal context some rights of the defendant would be a mere form of words. 
 
4.3.1 Judges’ Rules 
 
The first and a classic example is the Judges’ Rules in England. From 1912 to 1984, 
the treatment of suspects in England was governed by the Judges’ Rules. The Rules 
originated from the then Lord Chief Justice Alverstone’s letter to the Chief Constable 
of Birmingham in response to the question whether it was correct to caution after 
there had been two contradictory cases on this point. On the same circuit one judge 
had censured a member of his force for having cautioned a prisoner, while another 
judge had censured a constable for having omitted to do so.76 These guidelines, 
promulgated in 1912, amended and revised in 1918, 1930, 1947, 1948 and 1964,77 
had become the main guidelines for the police officers on methods of interrogation. 
    Rule І asked the police to state the following caution before questioning a 
suspect, “Do you wish to say anything? You are not obliged to say anything unless 
you wish to do so but whatever you say will be taken down in writing and may be 
                                                 
76 Mark Berger, ‘Rethinking Self-Incrimination in Great Britain’ (1984) 61 Denver Law Journal 507, 
519. 
77 Practice Note [1964] 1 WLR 152. 
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given in evidence.”78 Principle (e) of the preamble to the 1964 version of the Judges’ 
Rules, derived from Ibrahim79 and Gunn,80 stated that: 
 
It is a fundamental condition of the admissibility in evidence against any 
person, equally of any oral answer given by that person to a question put 
by a police officer and of any statement made by that person, that it shall 
have been voluntary, in the sense that it has not been obtained from him by 
fear of prejudice or hope of advantage, exercised or held out by a person in 
authority, or by oppression.81 
 
These Rules also required police investigators to inform and caution suspects of 
their right to keep silent and to consult a lawyer. Pursuant to Rule ΙΙ: 
 
As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall 
caution that person or cause him to be cautioned before putting to him any 
questions, or further questions, relating to that offence.82 
 
    In addition, Rule ΙΙΙ of the Rules reads: 
 
(a) Where a person is charged with or informed that he may be prosecuted 
for an offence he shall be cautioned in the following terms … (b) It is only 
in exceptional cases that questions relating to the offence should be put to 
the accused person after he has been charged or informed that he may be 
prosecuted … .83 
 
However, the Rules were not legally binding. They had no legal force 
                                                 
78 Rule І of the Judges’ Rules. 
79 Ibrahim v. The King, [1914] AC 599 (PC). 
80 Callis v. Gunn, [1964] 1 QB. 
81 Preamble to the Judges’ Rules (emphasis added). 
82 RuleⅡof the Judges’ Rules. 
83 Rule Ⅲ of the Judges’ Rules. 
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whatsoever. In effect, they were merely administrative guidelines for interrogation 
procedure and not viewed as having the status of law. In R v. Voisin,84 where the 
accused had written down some words at the request of the police without caution, in 
admitting the evidence, Lawrence J. stated that: 
 
These rules have not the force of law; they are administrative directions the 
observance of which the police authorities should enforce on their 
subordinates as tending to the fair administration of justice. It is important 
that they should do so, for statements obtained from prisoners, contrary to 
the spirit of the rules, may be rejected as evidence by the judge presiding at 
the trial.85 
 
Without the check and balance system, it is no wonder that the Rules were 
frequently flouted by the police.86 Nor did they bind the courts; breaches of the 
Rules were ignored by the judges. As Zuckerman accurately observed that “before 
1985 the courts tended to turn a blind eye to breaches of the Judges’ Rules,”87 the 
violations of the police, even if clear-cut, did not automatically result in the exclusion 
of evidence thus obtained. The judges were reluctant to exclude confessions only 
because they had been obtained in breach of the Rules. Under these circumstances, it 
was not surprising the Judges’ Rules only had very limited impact on the police. The 
Rules did not provide genuine protection to suspects.88 That is why, in 1981, the 
Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure recommended to “replace the vagueness 
of the Judges’ Rules with a set of instructions which provide strengthened safeguards 
                                                 
84 [1918] All ER Rep 491. 
85 [1918] All ER Rep 491(emphasis added). 
86 Michael Zander, Cases and Materials on the English Legal System (8th edn., Butterworths, London 
1999) 117. 
87 Ashworth Zuckerman, ‘Miscarriages of Justice and Judicial Responsibility’ (1991) Criminal Law 
Review 492, 498. 
88 Barry Cox, Civil Liberties in Britain (Penguin Books, Middlesex 1975) 175. 
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to the suspect and clear and workable guidelines for the police.”89 
 
4.3.2 Unlawfully retained DNA evidence 
 
The second example is the unlawfully retained DNA evidence. DNA technology is a 
well-established investigative tool and is having a huge impact on the criminal 
justice systems both in the United Kingdom and United States. The United Kingdom 
was the first nation to establish the forensic DNA database, the National DNA 
Database (NDNAD), in the world in 1995.90 The United States has the largest 
forensic DNA database in the world.91 Police can compare traces of DNA samples 
collected from suspects or found at crime scenes with samples in a DNA database to 
prove the identity of the perpetrator of a crime without the unreliability of eyewitness. 
Police also can match evidence and DNA samples left at different crime scenes to 
find out whether there is a link between different crimes. DNA may indicate whether 
a defendant was present or absent at a crime scene or if a suspect committed rape.92 
States are authorized to collect DNA samples from suspects with certain 
statutory limitations. PACE, for example, authorized the Forensic Science Service to 
retain samples from persons after an acquittal or dismissal.93 In 2003, the Criminal 
Justice Act allowed police to retain samples from people arrested for a recordable 
offense, regardless of whether or not they are charged.94 
                                                 
89 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.109]. 
90 Henry Greely and others, ‘Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to Catch Offenders’ 
Kin’ (2006) 34 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 248, 248. 
91 The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues, Nuffield Council Bioethics Report 49 [1.2] 
(2007). 
92 Kenneth Bredemeler, ‘In Virginia, Freedom from Fear for Crime Victims, Relief for Families’ The 
Washington Post (Washington 7 July 1999) A14. 
93 Section 63. 
94 Criminal Justice Act, United Kingdom (2003). 
 151
The retention of DNA samples is more controversial than the taking of the 
bioinformation. The old Section 64(1) of PACE before 2001, provided that: 
 
If – (a) fingerprints or samples are taken from a person in connection with 
the investigation of an offence; and (b) he is cleared of that offence, they 
must be destroyed as soon as is practicable after the conclusion of the 
proceedings. 
 
In R v. Nathaniel,95 the defendant was convicted of a rape committed in 1989. The 
primary evidence consisted of his DNA profile which was obtained from a sample 
taken from him in relation to offences in respect of which he was acquitted. The issue 
was whether it was permissible to use in evidence a sample which should have been 
destroyed under the then text of Section 64 of PACE. 
    Under old Section 64(1) of PACE the DNA profiles should have been destroyed 
as soon as practicable. However, his DNA profile was not destroyed. On the contrary, 
four years later, in 1993 it was entered on the computer index by the police again. 
Then the defendant was found to be connected to another rape in 1989. The court 
held that the evidence should have been excluded under Section 78 of PACE and 
said: 
 
To allow that blood sample to be used in evidence at a trial four years after 
the alleged offences when the sample had been retained in breach of 
statutory duty and in breach of the undertakings to the defendant must, in 
our view, have had an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial. It should 
not in our view have been admitted.96 
 
Although Section 64(3B) (b) made no provision for the consequences of a 
                                                 
95 [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 565. 
96 Ibid. 
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breach of the prohibition, I believe that Section 64(3B) (b) which does not provide 
for the exclusion of evidence is not only ineffective but also dangerous. As Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary indicated, more than 50,000 samples were 
being held unlawfully in 2000.97 
If the citizenry are not willing to “pay the price” that will inevitably accompany 
the enforcement of the law, they should persuade the legislature to amend the law.98 
This objection leveled at the exclusionary rule is misdirected. The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure of 1981 claimed that: 
 
We have rejected the use of an automatic exclusionary rule as a general 
means of securing compliance with the statutory rules we propose. … the 
rule that we propose should be made by Parliament to control police 
conduct rather than to the court’s exercise of a discretion to admit evidence 
or not.99 
 
The issue here is that the law was already set down by Parliament; however, the 
police just ignored the law. The provisions are decided by the legislature. It is not the 
function of the court to reconsider them. If the police obeyed old Section 64(1) of 
PACE, they could not keep every DNA profile, and link many suspects to all sorts of 
crimes. However, this is what legislative branch decided should happen. This is the 
price we would have had to pay to protect people from unrestrained government 
power. Otherwise, the provision in question is an empty gesture. 
In addition, in S and Marper v. United Kingdom,100 the ECtHR also held that 
                                                 
97 The Forensic Use of Bioinformation: Ethical Issues, Nuffield Council Bioethics Report 49 [4.37] 
(2007). 
98 In 2001, Section 64(1) of PACE was substituted by Section 82 of the Criminal Justice and Police 
Act 2001. The Criminal Justice and Police Act removed the requirement to delete police records from 
those who were charged but never convicted of a recordable offence. 
99 The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, ‘Report’ (Cm 8092, 1981) [4.131]. 
100 S and Marper v. United Kingdom (App no 30562/04 and 30566/04) (2009) 48 EHRR 50. 
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the indefinite retention of DNA of persons acquitted or persons having their 




Because of technological advances, covert investigative measures have become a 
much more powerful, cheaper and more convenient tool for police force. On the one 
hand, these measures, such as interception 102  of telecommunications by post, 
telephone or a computer network, photographic surveillance in a public place, use of 
tracking devices, could be useful and effective tools to obtain evidence in 
prosecuting organized criminal gangs and public officials who engage in corruption. 
On the other hand, any given circumstances mentioned above may be illegal, not in 
accordance with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and Article 8 of 
the ECHR. 
The ECtHR regarded the protection for privacy as an important concern. Using 
the ECHR as a legal basis, ECHR, Article 8, section 1 establishes privacy as a 
fundamental right: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.” This is the right which is clearly recognised and 
protected in the ECHR. 
However, in a series of decisions issued from 1984 until now, the ECtHR held 
that the United Kingdom was in violation of Article 8 through police violation of 
individuals’ rights of personal privacy by installing a listening device in a person’s 
                                                 
101 S and Marper v. United Kingdom (App no 30562/04 and 30566/04) (2009) 48 EHRR 50 [125]. 
102 The “interception” means the obtaining of information about the contents of a communication 
without the consent of the parties involved. 
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home,103 or police cell104 or intercepting telephone calls made to or from a person’s 
office.105 
The first example is Malone v. United Kingdom106 in 1984. Malone was 
prosecuted for handling stolen goods and during the trial the prosecution admitted 
that his telephone had been tapped on the authority of a Home Secretary’s warrant. 
Malone argued that the tapping was unlawful and he had a right to privacy in 
accordance with Article 8 of the ECHR. The High Court held that the phone tapping 
was not illegal and Malone’s case was rejected.107 The ECtHR, however, held that 
the United Kingdom had not provided the minimum degree of legal protection to 
which citizens were entitled under the rule of law and, accordingly, there had been a 
violation of Article 8.108 
Giving effect to the United Kingdom’s obligation under Article 8, the 
Interception to Communications Act 1985 was intended to provide a clear framework 
for authorising and controlling interceptions on a public telecommunication system. 
Similarly, in R v. Effick and R v. Mitchell,109 defendants were convicted of 
conspiracy to supply controlled drugs. The evidence against them was incriminating 
telephone conversations with a third party on a cordless telephone which had been 
intercepted by police. No warrant for interception had been obtained. The House of 
Lords held that intercepted conversations were admissible as a cordless telephone 
                                                 
103 Malone v. United Kingdom (App no 8691/79) (1984) 7 EHRR 14 [64]; Khan v. United Kingdom 
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(App no 30034/04) (2007) 44 EHRR 30 [18]. 
104 Allen v. United Kingdom (App no 48539/99) (2003) 36 EHRR 12 [35] and Wood v. United 
Kingdom (App no 23414/02) (2004) 36 EHRR 12 [33]. 
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does not form part of the public telecommunications system. 
Furthermore, in Halford v. United Kingdom,110 Halford, a former assistant chief 
constable, was pursuing a case of discrimination against her chief constable. While 
this was proceeding her telephone at police headquarters was monitored and she 
argued that this infringed her privacy contrary to Article 8. However, as the 
Interception of Communications Act 1985 did not cover the tapping of such 
conversations, the United Kingdom again fell foul of Article 8. The ECtHR held that 
the right to private life and correspondence applied to conversations held on premises 
of an employer and the interference of Halford’s telephone constituted a breach of 
her privacy as defined in Article 8.111 
In R v. Ahmed,112 evidence of tape-recorded conversations between defendants, 
which were intercepted from a police station and by the police, was admissible in 
their prosecution’s case for conspiracy to supply controlled drugs. The Court of 
Appeal held that to intercept conversations within a private telephone system did not 
infringe the Interception of Communications Act 1985 Section 1(1) which applied 
only to the public system. 
The main purpose of the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act 2000 was to 
ensure that the investigatory powers were used with the ECHR. Both making an 
unauthorised interception on a public113 and private114 system are offences. 
In R v. Khan (Sultan),115 the police were trespassing when they illegally 
installed the listening device in the house in 1992. At that time, as the United 
Kingdom lacked legal framework for the use of electronic listening devices by the 
                                                 
110 Halford v. United Kingdom (App no 20605/92) (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
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police, there was no statutory authority for the installation of the device. The 
surveillance had been in violation of the Article 8 of the ECHR, because it was not 
authorized by statute. Khan was convicted of a drugs offence entirely on illegally 
obtained taped recordings. 
This case raised issue of whether evidence of the illegally obtained taped 
conversation was admissible. His counsel argued that the evidence should be 
excluded because it was obtained illegally and in breach of Khan’s right to privacy 
under the ECHR. The trial judge, the Court of Appeal,116 and the House of Lords117 
all disagreed. 
Khan took his case to the ECtHR. The Strasbourg Court held unanimously that 
there had been a violation of the right to privacy, but did not hold that this required 
the evidence to be excluded. The ECtHR did not see the breach of right to privacy as 
requiring the exclusion of the evidence.118 
I assert that the use of evidence illegally obtained by interception conflicted 
with the requirement of a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6. Evidence obtained by 
such interference should therefore be excluded using the exclusionary rule under 
Section 78 of PACE. The decision by the ECtHR in Khan may be criticized on a 
variety of grounds. 
First, the ECtHR mistakenly mixed up the admissibility of evidence and the 
weight of the evidence. 
The ECtHR held that “the applicant had ample opportunity to challenge both the 
authenticity and the use of the recording.”119 This claim overlooks the fact that the 
                                                 
116 [1995] 1 Cr App R 242. 
117 [1996] 2 Cr App R 440. 
118 Khan v. United Kingdom (App no 35394/97) (2001) 31 EHRR 45. 
119 Ibid., [38]. 
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question in the present case is not the authenticity of the contested tape recording. It 
was not disputed that the recording in issue is genuine. Khan has never challenged 
the authenticity of the recording. It is not the point. The question must be answered is 
whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was 
obtained, were fair. 
Secondly, it seems that a trial cannot be described as “fair” where evidence 
obtained in breach of rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. 
The right to a fair trial holds a prominent place in a democratic society. Article 6 
includes a requirement of lawfulness. Fairness presupposes compliance with the law. 
The focus of Article 6 is on the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial. It is a right 
to be exercised within the framework of the administration of the criminal law. 
Even if the ECtHR’s function was limited to deciding whether the appellant had 
a fair trial, I can not imagine one can speak of a fair trial if evidence obtained in 
breach of fundamental right guaranteed by the ECHR. The ECtHR has narrowed 
protections in right to a fair trial, while expanding the authority of the sovereign to 
intrude into an individual’s life. 
Finally, the ECHR must be interpreted as a whole. 
The case law of the ECtHR interpreting Article 3 has provided a model for 
Article 6. While the actual language of Article 3 prohibits torture and is silent as to 
the admissibility of evidence obtained by torture, the Strasbourg Court has 
interpreted the bar on torture to include a bar on using the evidence procured by 
torture.120 The use of evidence obtained as a result of acts of violence or brutality or 
other forms of treatment that can be characterized as torture would be in violation of 
Article 6 and thus inadmissible. 
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With regard to Article 3, the admissibility of evidence is not merely “a matter 
for regulation under national law.”121 If it is not the role of the ECtHR to determine 
the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, why bother the ECtHR held that the 
evidence obtained by torture were inadmissible. There is no reason why the 
admissibility of evidence becomes merely a matter for regulation under national law 
when it comes to Article 6. 
The modern understanding of the scope of the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule is the prohibition of illegal searches and seizures, and interception protects 
reasonable expectation of privacy. If the ECtHR really wants to “ensure the 
observance of the engagement undertaken by the contracting states to the 
convention,”122 then judicial courage is needed to recognize the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures. The suppression of illegally taped material is necessary. 





Criminal procedure should impose procedural regulations on the criminal process by 
constitutional command. In this chapter, I have argued that the separation of powers 
principle, the constitution’s central structural principle, is the crucial building block 
of the exclusionary rule. It is important to maintain the checks and balances of three 
separate and distinct branches of government in the criminal justice system. Each 
branch is expected to remain with its sphere and to respect the powers that the 
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criminal justice system has assigned to the other branches. The judicial branch is 
intended to serve as a check on powers of the legislative and executive branches. The 
primary concern of the separation of powers doctrine is not to promote efficiency in 
the criminal justice system but to prevent the exercise of arbitrary power from the 
executive branch. 
All government actors in the criminal justice system are obliged to honor the 
constitution; otherwise, without the safeguard of the exclusionary rule, the right to be 
free from torture, and the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures would be 
reduced to mere words. This view would require strict adherence to the separation of 
powers doctrine in criminal matters. 
The exclusionary rule is tied to the separation of powers concept and can be 
justified on the principle of the separation of powers. The exercise of the 
exclusionary rule is to preserve separation of powers in criminal justice system. 
Without a secure structure of separated powers, the rule would be worthless. The 
system of checks and balances is central to a government that would not trample 
individual rights. The exclusionary rule exercises a reviewing function to ensure 
executive obedience with the constitutional commands. 
The right to be free from illegal searches and seizures is one of the most 
important constitutional rights. Although it is a constitutionally protected interest, it 
is sometimes be ignored by the police. In fact, at least to some extent, the 
exclusionary rule helped the Anglo-American system to evolve into a system that no 
longer ignores illegal police activity. The exclusionary rule is a safeguard intended as 
an implementation of the separation of powers. 
In order to take the concept of separation of powers seriously, courts should 
define the exact constitutional line and tell the police what they should and should 
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not do at the same time by establishing the exclusionary rule framework. The 
judiciary should protect the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. In 
failing to protect this constitutional liberty of the accused, the court has not fulfilled 
its constitutional duty. 
Government agents tend to assign great weight to the interest in apprehending 
and convicting criminals; the danger is that the rights of defendants are often 
neglected. I argue that, first, the investigative techniques, used by government agents 
should be prescribed by law and authorized by a prosecutor or judge rather than by 
the executive such as the Home Secretary or Chief Constable. Second, these 
operations must be necessary and proportionate to a suspect’s right to privacy. 
Warrantless interception seriously compromises the right to private life and the 
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless searches and seizures. The law 
should warrant and regulate the use of covert listening devices; otherwise it may 
constitute an interference with defendant’s right of private life. Courts should 
consider both the lawfulness and regularity in which the evidence is obtained as well 
as the fairness of the trial. I contend that without exclusionary rule, there are very 
few instances in which evidence obtained by the use of covert listening devices has 
been ruled inadmissible.123 
 
                                                 
123 See 4.3.3. 
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PART II: 
Reform for the Future – 






The purpose of this project is to find an appropriate model for those countries that 
have not yet developed the exclusionary rule. This Part focuses on the exclusionary 
rule in the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China), and this is the first academic 
thesis to consider this specific issue in depth. 
Police torture, using torture as a technique to retain evidence in the course of 
police interrogation, remains a very serious problem throughout China.1 Police 
torture has become a topic of pressing Chinese national concern because many 
innocent persons have confessed crimes that they did not commit. As the previous 
Part argued, the exclusionary rule is a useful legal tool available to courts and the 
best check for regulating police coercion and violence in the Anglo-American 
criminal justice system. The rule can be used in a new institutional strategy of checks 
and balances to prevent arbitrary government. This Part will shine a spotlight on the 
exclusionary rule in China. 
In order to establish judicial control over acts by the police, constituting 
                                                 
1 See 5.1. 
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intrusions into constitutionally protected rights of suspects, this Part will examine 
actual legal practices with the view to identifying the most effective means of 
regulating police torture and illegal searches in China. There is an urgent need to 
abolish torture through the exclusionary rule. 
My argument is that the exclusionary rule will help China to abolish police 
torture in interrogation; the rule will extract the firewood from under the cauldron. If 
it is true that police torture is systemic, then it should be tackled at the level of the 
criminal justice system through structural reform. Certainly, however, the 
exclusionary rule is no panacea for fixing all the problems in the Chinese criminal 
justice system overnight. This is not, of course, to argue that the exclusionary rule 
alone is a “magic formula” for the problem of torture in China. To establish the rule 
is not the end of our task; it is the first. Other steps are needed. For example, 
assistance of counsel during police interrogation, mandatory videotaping or 
audiotaping of interrogation in custody, 2  mandatory physical examination in 
detention centres and prisons, establishment of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, prompt investigation of all allegations of torture, and 
improvement of training courses for all practitioners in the criminal justice system. In 
2005, for example, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) of China decided to 
experiment with videotaping police interrogations. From 2006 to 2007, over two 
thousand and eight hundred People’s Procuratorate videotaped 34,973 cases; 1,100 
technicians and 5,000 investigators were trained. No torture was found in these 
cases.3 I claim that if Chinese want to prevent the future use of torture by the police, 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of how videotaping interrogations can be used to prevent police torture tactics in 
the United States, see S.A. Drizin and B.A. Colgan, ‘Let the Cameras Roll: Mandatory Videotaping of 
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they must adopt criminal justice reforms that include, but go beyond, the 
exclusionary rule. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Procuratorate: No Violation is Found When the Cameras are Rolling] (2007) 
<http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2007-11-14/0002116095.html> accessed 1 January 2011. 
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5 




Discussion of the confession exclusionary rule would be incomplete without mention 
of police torture. Thus, to examine the confession exclusionary rule, one must first 
examine police torture. In China, police torture is at the root of many wrongful 
convictions, imprisonment, and executions, of innocent people. In almost all cases of 
wrongful conviction, police torture plays a central role in the crafting of a case 
designed to achieve a conviction. However, to say China has no desire to solve the 
problem of police torture is simply untrue. Since 1996, under the external and 
internal pressure, China has made substantial strides in formalizing its criminal 
justice system by amending existing laws, enacting new laws and creating new 
policy agencies. Many amendments were made to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Law to ensure the protection of defendants’ rights. China emphasized 
the right to be free from torture through frequent high-level meetings and public 
statements. At a conference held by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) in 
2006, Wang Zhenchuan, SPP Deputy Secretary, acknowledged that the phenomenon 
of obtaining evidence by illegal methods is very pervasive. Some law enforcement 
personnel use torture regularly to coerce confessions from suspects. Almost all 
miscarriages of justice identified in the past few years involved illegal investigation. 
From 2005 to 2006, around 1,500 enforcement agents and police were convicted of 
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having used their privileges to encroach on civil rights.1 
In 2007 and 2009 Deputy Procurator-General Zhu Xiaoqing, regarding police 
torture, said that “almost all of the flawed cases discovered in recent years are closely 
linked to confessions extracted during interrogations.”2 The next year, the former 
Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court of China, Xiao Yang, instructed Chinese 
judges to “strictly follow the evidence rules and ensure that innocent citizens are not 
prosecuted” at the First Session of the Eleventh National People’s Congress.3 
In this chapter, I will argue that the current Chinese legal structure for combating 
police torture is not adequately armed. The fight against police torture has been 
plagued by many legal loopholes. Moreover, I do not accept that police torture is the 
unavoidable price of combating high crime rate in China. The prohibition against 
torture should be absolute. The exclusionary rule does not impede effective crime 
control; instead, it is the legal tool necessary to regulate police wrongdoing and to 
reduce miscarriages of justice. 
The first part of this chapter describes the nature and magnitude of the problem 
of police torture in China, highlighting examples of proven torture cases that came to 
the public’s attention. I will discuss the Chinese Criminal Law, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, their judicial interpretations, and some of the provisions and policies that 
violate the spirit of the exclusionary rule. It critiques the way in which China treats a 
suspect who has suffered from torture. 
Additionally, it identifies and analyzes barriers to (and restrictions on) effective 
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2  Human Rights in China, ‘Take Action: Put an End to Torture in China’ (10 Sep., 2008) 
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protection of the right to be free from torture. It reflects upon the values that appear 
to dominate the Chinese criminal process from a lawyer’s perspective.4 In other 
words, it examines the crime control model5 adopted by Chinese law enforcement 
officers, especially in the context of the exclusionary rule. The criminal process 
conforms to the crime control model, routinely granting wide latitude and discretion 
to the police, the prosecutors, and the judges. The Chinese criminal process can be 
captured by an evocative metaphor: “relay race”. I found that the procedural law of 
China embraces the crime control values articulated by Packer6 and argue that many 
of the rules which govern the criminal process are based on the principles similar to 
those which shape Packer’s crime control model. China promotes ordered society 
and an efficient judicial system at the expense of individual liberties. 
This chapter next turns to the wide powers of Chinese police. There are so many 
cases in which the police have operated without clear and uniform standards. In these 
cases, the police felt they were above the law. The wide scope of police power 
without judicial supervision opened the door to police torture. What role do courts 
currently play in monitoring police torture and illegal searches? For the reasons I will 
discuss, very little. There was almost no judicial supervision. It violated a core 
component of the constitution, the separation of powers. 
This chapter then challenges the proposition that the ban on police torture 
should be lifted. I argue that prohibition on police torture is absolute and the 
confessions obtained by torture cannot be justified under any circumstances. As 
illegally obtained confession and physical evidence can lead, and has led, to 
wrongful convictions, I contend that it would be a dangerous obstacle to the 
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administration of justice if evidence obtained by illegal methods could be used 
against the defendants in China. The lack of an exclusionary rule is the major factor 




5.1 Causes of police torture 
 
The police never have the authority to violate the law, only the incentive. The 
principal contribution of the confession exclusionary rule is simply to reduce that 
incentive. Despite official commitments to the prohibition against police torture, 
torture is a widespread practice in China. The routine practice of torture by political, 
military and judicial personnel is a long, sad history of savage barbarity. The 
torturers include state security agents, military personnel, the police, prison officers7 
and medical professions.8 In 2005, Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, visited Beijing and pointed out the practice of torture remains widespread 
throughout China.9 
   In addition, according to the United States State Department’s 1999 report on 
human rights, defendants frequently suffer “torture and mistreatment,” “forced 
confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and 
                                                 
7 N.D. Kristof, ‘Jailed Pro-Democrats in China Charge Torture’, N. Y. Times (New York 1 Sep. 1992) 
A4. 
8  In China, some Chinese psychiatrists subjected thousands of mentally healthy dissidents to 
psychiatric punishment; however, being in a psychiatric hospital with the mentally disordered would 
truly drive a mentally normal person insane. See Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Minds: Political 
Psychiatry in China Today and its Origins in the Mao Era, (Human Rights Watch and Geneva 
Initiative on Psychiatry, New York 2002) 84-89. 
9 UNCHR ‘Special Rapporteur on Torture Highlights Challenges at End of Visit to China’ (2 Dec 
2005)<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/677C1943FAA14D67C12570CB0034966D?ope
ndocument> accessed 1 January 2011. 
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denial of due process.” 10  The report continued that “the judicial system denies 
criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process because authorities attach 
higher priority to maintaining public order and suppressing political opposition than to 
enforcing legal norms.”11 In 2007, the United States State Department stated that 
Chinese police officers used “electric shocks, beatings, shackles, and other forms of 
abuse”.12 Torture of suspects in China occurs during periods of incommunicado 
detention before a suspect is brought before a court. 
    Furthermore, no matter how “effective” torture is, it comes at a steep price: tens of 
thousands of victims suffer. From January 1979 to June 1980, over 10,000 cases of 
alleged police abuses were heard. Over 9,000 such persons have been found guilty.13 
The SPP statistics indicated that between 1979 and 1989 there were an average of 
364 criminal cases of confessions obtained by torture, and 400 cases per year in the 
1990s. The SPP reported that from 1993 to 1994 between one-third and one-fourth of 
all torture cases resulted in death; 241 persons were tortured to death and 64 persons 
suffered severe injuries.14 In addition, most allegations of police torture do not 
surface until the trial. These official numbers are only the tip of the iceberg. 
Every police officer is expected to act within the law. Nevertheless, in practice, 
for some police officers the use of illegal investigation methods, excessive force, 
psychological trickery and high-pressure tactics is accepted as a necessary evil in 
Chinese criminal investigations. 15  Although the government’s passive attitude 
                                                 
10 United State Department’s 1999 Report on Human Rights 
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/284.htm > accessed 1 January 2011. 
11 Ibid. 
12 United State Department’s 2007 Report on Human Rights 
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100518.htm> accessed 1 January 2011. 
13 Shao-Chuan Leng, ‘Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Some Preliminary Observations’ (1982) 
73 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 204, 216. 
14 Wang Gangping (ed.), The Crime of Tortured Confession (People’s Procuratorate Press, Beijing 
1997) 9. The information here is proven torture not the cases of alleged torture. 
15 See 5.3. 
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towards torture is a tragedy, the sorrow of the victims and their families is a tragedy 
many times over.16 Torture cannot be undone. Victims may never be able to return to 
the life they knew before being tortured. 
The aim of the exclusionary rule is to avoid torture and arbitrary searches by the 
law enforcement officers. In order to eradicate torture, perhaps an even more 
important question we face is to find out why police resort to torture. Torture by law 
enforcement authorities is unfortunately widespread in China. Just why China 
displayed a disregard for the law and defendants’ human rights is an intriguing 
question; why there was gross violation of defendants’ human rights? 
Not until 1996 did the People’s Republic of China law guarantee the accused the 
right to be free from torture.17 Both the Criminal Law and Code of Criminal 
Procedure forbid the use of torture to obtain confessions. The Criminal Law makes it 
a criminal offence to torture or ill-treatment during interrogations. Article 247 states: 
 
A judicial officer who extorts by torture a confession from a suspect of 
crime or a defendant or extorts, by means of violence, testimony from a 
witness shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than 
three years or criminal detention. A judicial officer who causes another 
person’s deformity or death shall be sentenced heavily in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 234 or 232 of this Law. 
 
In the past, commentators and academics have provided a broad attack on the torture 
problem,18 which cannot lead to substantial improvements. It seems that China is 
                                                 
16 R.F. Mollica, ‘Psychological Impact of Trauma and Torture’ (1987) 144 The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 1567, 1571; see also Derrick Silove, ‘The Psychosocial Effects of Torture, Mass Human 
Rights Violations, and Refugee Trauma: Toward an Integrated Conceptual Framework’ (1999) 187 
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 200, 206. 
17 In 1996, Article 247 was amended. 
18 H.L. Fu, ‘Criminal Defense in China: The Possible Impact of the 1996 Criminal Procedure Law 
Reform’ (1998) 153 The China Quarterly 31, 32; see also D.C. Turack, ‘The New Chinese Criminal 
Justice System’ (1999) 7 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 49, 72. 
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trying to solve the problem of police torture, but why then is the problem still so 
serious? Why do Chinese police torture? 
The Chinese government needs to focus on the roots of the problem. The more 
we understand about the causes of the problem, the better we can figure out solutions 
to the problem. It would be a better approach to solve the problems at their root. The 
reasons are complex. No single factor can be singled out as determinative. Moreover, 
one factor may lead to another, in the long run creating a vicious circle. There are at 
least five reasons why Chinese government officials resort to torture: extracting 
confessions, the influence of historical tradition, winning convictions and then 
getting benefits, satisfying the “enforcement index” and a lack of investigative 
technology. I will explore each in turn. These are not mutually exclusive. These 
impetuses to torture continue. 
 
5.1.1 Subjective causes 
 
There are several subjective causes why torture confessions are disproportionately 
likely to arise in China. First, extracting confessions. For some police officers, if they 
do not get confessions to find the “truth” some of the time, they probably are not 
doing their jobs as police. The main cause is the desire to obtain confessions. Torture, 
which usually occurs in police stations, has been widely used as a method of 
obtaining confession from suspects and even witnesses. The most common form of 
police torture is beating.19 Confession evidence is important and powerful in the trial 
process. It has been called “the most potent of weapons for the prosecution”.20 
                                                 
19 Guan Jinhua (ed.), 基本人權保護與法律實踐 [The Protection of Basic Human Rights and Legal 
Practice] (Xiamen University Press, Xiamen 2003) 327. 
20 S.M. Kassin and Katherine Neumann, ‘Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of 
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Traditionally, confessions of guilt have been the best evidence in China.21 The 
Chinese criminal justice system has placed too much emphasis on confessions. 
Torture may yield any information, whether true or false. In order to cease the pain, 
suspects (whether guilty or innocent), when subjected to torture, will admit anything, 
including a crime they did not commit. That is why it was common for suspects to be 
tortured in order to extract confessions. 
As the police realize that these incriminating statements routinely result in 
convictions because of the dramatic impact of a suspect who seemingly openly 
admits his guilt to the police, they disregard statutory guarantees and try to get 
confessions at any cost. 
Secondly, there exists the influence of historical tradition. Before turning to an 
examination of Chinese criminal process today in the context of torture, a brief 
historical excursus may be useful. Our struggles with the issue of torture in China are 
nothing new. Judicial torture (i.e., torture by officials authorized by the law) is as old 
as judicial history. The earliest use of judicial torture of which we have much 
knowledge in China was in the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.). It was also used in 
ancient Greece and Rome. Both in China and in Rome not only the accused, but also 
witnesses could be tortured.22 
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founding Father of the Republic of China, formally outlawed 
judicial torture in 1912. He noted torture should not be allowed regardless of any 
specific context. All devices used to torture in the past must be destroyed.23 
                                                                                                                                          
the “Harmless Error” Rule’ (1997) 21 Law and Human Behavior 27, 27. 
21 Wang Min, ‘淺析民警刑訊逼供的心理狀態及治理對策’ [Analyzing the Psychological Situations 
and Governance of Police Torturers] (2001) 83 Policing Studies 21, 22. 
22 Peter Reddy, Torture: What You Need to Know (Ginninderra Press, Charnwood 2005) 19. 
23 Ye Xiaoxin (ed), 中國法制史 [The Chinese Legal History] (Beijing University Press, Beijing 
1989) 252. 
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Although we cannot rule out the possibility that deep-seated historical traditions of 
torture throughout Imperial China (221 B.C. – A.D. 1911) might have an impact on the 
current issue, it is wrong to think that in ancient China all judicial torture was 
desirable, atrocious and employed randomly. Most of the judicial torture was 
imposed by law. Law enforcement officers could not torture anybody for any reason. 
The judiciary in ancient China did not advocate judicial torture. It was never seen as 
the best method. 
The Qin Code, for example, stated that it was better not use torture in the trial 
process. If the suspect changed his confessions many times, he might be subjected to 
torture. There were rules designed to prevent the unlimited application of judicial 
torture; these rules tried to “keep it within legally defined boundaries.”24 First, if the 
suspect was subjected to torture, it had to be recorded in the trial record. Second, 
according to Tang Lue (Code of the Tang Dynasty), promulgated in A.D. 630, 
confessions was required only in cases where the facts were unclear; only limited 
torture was permitted. The young, the old and the disabled could not be interrogated 
under torture.25 That is the reason why there are few recorded cases of death by 
judicial torture during the Tang Dynasty.26 In addition, according to Da Ming Lue 
(the Great Ming Code), promulgated in A.D. 1368, only limited torture was permitted. 
The young (persons of 15 years of age or less), the elderly (70 years of age or more), 
the disabled,27 and pregnant women28 should not be judicially tortured. As Klaus 
Muhlhahn noted, “[t]orture could be used only after enough evidence had been 
gathered by the investigation. Limits were set on the amount of torture, the 
                                                 
24 Klaus Muhlhahn, Criminal Justice in China: A History, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
2009) 49. 
25 Article 474 of the Tang Lue. 
26 AD 619-906. 
27 Article 428 of the Da Ming Lue. 
28 Article 444 of the Da Ming Lue. 
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instruments that could be used, and parts of the body that could be affected.”29 
    Police torture is wrong even if the defendant is “really guilty”; however, it goes 
on around the world even in the 21st century. It is not only a shame of the past but 
also a transgression of the present. Most police officers obey the law when 
interrogating suspects and conducting searches. But we cannot avoid the unfortunate 
reality that police wrongdoing exists, particularly in the context of interrogation and 
search. Police torture and police coercive interrogation were rife from the 1950s until 
now in China. 
We cannot ignore the influence of Mao Zedong’s class-oriented doctrines on the 
judicial problem during 1949 to 1979. In the Maoist era, criminal law is merely a 
weapon to be used in attacking criminals and suppressing crimes. Mao drew a sharp 
distinction between the “people” and “enemy” of socialism. The “people” were those 
who favoured, supported and worked for the cause of socialist construction. The 
“enemy” were those who resisted the socialist revolution and sabotaged socialist 
construction.30 Law was the weapon used by police and courts to combat the enemy. 
Only “people” are entitled to human rights and those accused of crimes under the 
Criminal Law were considered as belonging to the “enemy”. Criminals do not 
deserve protection. The “enemy” were not entitled to the procedural protections 
provided by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, according to Mao, it was 
reasonable to deprive the rights of criminals. 
Thirdly, there is the issue of winning convictions and then getting benefits. Police 
have a reward structure based on the number of cases solved, while failure to solve 
                                                 
29 Klaus Muhlhahn, Criminal Justice in China: A History, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
2009) 49-50. 
30  Mao Tse-tung, 毛澤東選集  [Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tsetung] (Foreign 
Language Press, Beijing 1971) 433-34. 
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cases could lead to reprimand or demotion.31 There is real incentive for enforcement 
agents to “win” cases. By torture, law enforcement agents may get two kinds of 
benefits. First, the enforcement agents can get higher financial rewards. The police 
authority provides for bonuses to police officers who solve high profile cases quickly. 
Second, winning convictions will assist with career progression. In other words, the 
police may get promotion. Most Chinese police agencies are governed by 
meritorious performance with regard to promotion. For example, in the Yu Xianglin 
case, the superintendent in charge of the case was promoted to the post of chief judge 
in Jing Shan County.32 
In order to pursue higher positions and bonuses, some superintendents and the 
upper ranks just ignored the legal standards and turned a blind eye to officers’ 
misconduct. I found that a similar phenomenon has appeared in other national 
settings.33 The impetus to police torture seems to continue. 
 
5.1.2 Objective causes 
 
There are two objective causes. First, satisfying the “enforcement index”.34 One 
slogan in China is, “Any cat is a good cat if it catches mice.” Well, any police officer 
                                                 
31 See 5.1.2. 
32 Mao Lixin, ‘余祥林冤案的偵查錯誤剖析’ [The Analysis of Wrongful Conviction of Yu Xiang Lin 
Case] (2006) <http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/ss/200601/20060109183013.htm> accessed 1 January 
2011. 
33 For example, in 1989, Wei En-cheng and Chen Wu-hsiung were arrested for the murder of the Yang 
Chun-tien family in Taiwan. According to the medical records, both suspects were subjected to 
beatings, electric shock and water torture by seven police officers in the Feng Yuan Police Precinct 
and police car; they were forced to confess to the murder. The superintendent of Feng Yuan Police 
Precinct immediately got promotion to the Chief Inspector in the Taichung City Police Bureau. Both 
suspects were completely innocent. See 79 Chungsu 1489 (The Taiwan Taichung District Court, 1990); 
80 Shangsu 646 (The Taiwan High Court Taichung Branch Court, 1991); 81 Shangkengyi 120 (The 
Taiwan High Court Taichung Branch Court, 1992). 
34 執法指標。 
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is a good officer if he can satisfy enforcement criteria. And, police officers who 
cannot meet the enforcement criteria might be punished or removed. The primary 
structural basis for police torture appears to be pressure from higher authorities to 
meet enforcement criteria, which encourages police to obtain confessions and 
evidence by torturing suspects and conducting illegal searches. The “enforcement 
index” exists in the Chinese police system.35 While the criteria were set according to 
the crime rate and clearance rate in the specific area in the past, the predicted criteria 
usually cannot match the actual clearance rate. 
Furthermore, the strike-hard campaign was launched in 1983 and has been an 
ongoing annual campaign. Law enforcement agents usually are given a quota for 
how many suspects should be caught for various crimes.36 Legal constraints imposed 
by law would likely have less effect on police under great pressure from their bosses 
to make a quota. 
The ability of local police force to meet these criteria is considered an important 
index of performance. Quantitative rather than qualitative standards determine 
promotion. Performance is rewarded by credits for bonuses and promotion, while 
failure to meet these criteria may entail the risk of disciplinary sanctions, demotion, 
or a reduction in salary. In 2001, for instance, Jing Aikuo, a taxi driver, was 
sentenced to death for the transportation of 3,600 grams of heroin in Gansu Province, 
but it transpired that the drugs were planted by two anti-drug “heroes” Chang 
Wenzhuo (the deputy chief of the Linzhao County Police Department) and Bian 
Weihong (top anti-narcotics officer of the Linzhao County Police Department). The 
                                                 
35 Chang Jian, ‘執法指標’ [The Enforcement Index] (2003) 5 Political Science and Law 130, 130-132; 
see also Ian Jun and Yang Xiaoping, ‘試論公安執法指標對警察權的影響’ [The Impact of the 
Enforcement Index towards Police Power] (2005) 2 Journal of Adult Education of Gansu Political 
Science and Law Institute 100, 100-102. 
36 G. Wehrfritz and M. Laris, ‘Rulers are the Law’, Newsweek Atlantic Edition, (1997) 47. 
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enforcement criteria for each anti-narcotics officer in the county is 1,300 grams of 
drugs. The anti-narcotics officers who had been involved in planting drugs were 
awarded bonuses of 100,000 RMB (£9600).37 
Unrealistic expectations of enforcement criteria have resulted in police 
administrators pressuring police officers to solve as many cases as possible. The 
Ministry of Public Security, the highest police organ in China, even publicly 
emphasized that murder cases must be solved.38 
Every country, even those countries with the most advanced investigative 
technology, including the United Kingdom and United States, has unsolved murder 
cases. It is impossible for any country, including China, to solve every murder case. 
When facing a murder case without sufficient evidence, how should Chinese police 
meet the “must be solved” criterion and close the case? For some of them the only 
way is to torture a “wretch” and allow him to be the “murderer”. 
There is no denying that police work is often a hazardous and frustrating task. 
There are five principal sources of immense pressure existing for police to solve high 
profile cases quickly and they must solve these cases. These are: the enforcement 
index, their supervisors (or senior officers), the media, victims (or the victim’s family) 
and the public. These circumstances and significant pressure enhance the likelihood 
that the use of false arrests, police torture, illegal detention,39 perjury40 and the 
                                                 
37 ‘公安局副局長炮制販毒大案’ [Deputy Chief of the Police Department Makes the Drug Case], 
Jiangnan Daily (26 August, 2002) 13. 
38 ‘公安部︰命案必破不會引發刑求’ [The Ministry of Public Security: Death Cases Must be Solved 
Will not Trigger Torture] <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-05-16/12419876496.shtml> accessed 1 
January 2011. 
39 Suspects facing lengthy detention and interrogation often feel compelled to confess. 
40 In 2002, Wang Weiqing was tortured to death by a detective in Guangdong province. In order to 
cover up the truth of the torture, forty Hua Zhou police officers lied to government investigators and 
firmly asserted that Wang was committed suicide by hitting the tea table under oath at trial. See Cao 
Jingjing, ‘廣東化州民警刑訊逼供打死人’ [Guangdong Police Tortured Suspect to Death] (2007) 
<http://i.mop.com/ZHENGYILVSHI/blog/2007/11/22/5130711.html> accessed 1 January 2011. 
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planting of evidence to effectively meet predicted targets will occur. However these 
pressures are endemic in any criminal justice system and do not excuse the police for 
their failure to abide by the law. The point is that all relevant actors in the criminal 
justice system are bound by the Criminal Law and Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Illegal methods are rampant because it is relatively easier, quicker, promising 
and “efficient”; they are viewed as the shortcut to clarify crimes. Police torture is 
viewed as the fastest way to get the result. Enforcement criteria were viewed as the 
“original sin” of police wrongdoing. Law became the tool of law enforcement agents 
who achieved the goal. 
Secondly, China is lacking in investigative technology. A lack of new 
investigative technologies also is a cause of torture. According to my research, many 
torture cases happen in rural China or poor areas.41 Some districts lack the judicial 
resources, including investigative technology and investigative personnel with 
adequate training. They do not have advanced forensics laboratories, modernized 
equipment and forensic chemists to collect and preserve evidence. Under these 
circumstances, some police resort to torture to investigate. These resource shortages 
affect police officers at least in some districts. 
 
 
   5.2 Barriers to the protection of defendants’ rights 
 
In the last few decades, China has made progress in combating the extensive and 
longstanding problems with police torture. In 1996, China announced an amendment 
                                                 
41 See Chapter 7. 
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to the Criminal Law to address police torture and intensify its effort to combat torture. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure provided some protections by prohibiting illegal 
means of gathering evidence such as torture, coercion, or inducement,42 and by 
prohibiting convictions based solely on the defendant’s confession. 43  These 
safeguards, however, are far from enough. The government has done little to 
eliminate legal and social barriers to the protection of Chinese defendants. In this 
sense, it is crucial to understand what the barriers to effective protection of the right 
to be free from torture are. My goal here, then, is to identify fundamental barriers to 
the protection of defendant’s rights. There are at least four barriers. 
 
5.2.1 “Legal foundation” of torture 
 
From the perspective of legislation, the “legal foundation” of police torture in China 
is Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides: 
 
When interrogating a criminal suspect, the investigators shall first ask the 
criminal suspect whether or not he has committed any criminal act, and let 
him state the circumstances of his guilt or explain his innocence; then may 
ask him questions. The criminal suspect shall answer the investigators’ 
questions truthfully … . 
 
The focus should be on the word “truthfully”; confessions are expected to be 
truthful – as judged subjectively by the interrogators and not by the suspects. A 
suspect who refuses to confess was generally seen as obdurate and be treated 
severely. On the contrary, a defendant who confesses often receives lenient 
                                                 
42 Article 43. 
43 Article 46. 
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punishment.44 
In the past decades, the Chinese version of “Miranda warnings”: the 
eight-character phrase “坦白從寬 抗拒從嚴” [Leniency for those who confess; 
severity for those who resist!] appeared on the wall of many interrogation rooms.45 
This Chinese “Miranda warnings”46 assumes that the law enforcement officers know 
the suspect to be guilty, and that he is merely being stubborn when he resists their 
urgings that he confesses. The defendants’ cooperation with the police in 
investigations is highly expected. More importantly, suspects were legally bound to 
answer truthfully and unambiguously the questions asked of them. However, what is 
the character of this obligation? Most police regard this as a legal obligation, not 
merely a moral obligation. If suspects do not fulfill their obligations, police officers 
think they should take measures to assure the fulfillment of suspects’ obligations. 
Hence the police often feel it justified and even legally indispensable to extract 
confessions. 
Under existing practice, the state may penalize individuals for refusing to 
answer (potentially incriminating) questions. If suspects do not answer the 
investigators’ questions “truthfully” by subjective feelings of police or refuse to 
answer questions, they might be treated cruelly and frequently tortured, and 
sometimes be tortured to death. In 2001, for instance, the police illegally arrested and 
detained a male who was reported as having pushed a woman down in Hubei 
Province. As the suspect refused to answer police questions, five police (at least one 
of them was under 18) beat him to death during interrogation. They buried the body 
                                                 
44 Cai Ianbing, ‘論刑訊逼供屢禁不止的原因及對策’ [The Reasons and Resolutions to Torture] 
(2000) 2 Journal of Hunan Public Security College 54, 55. 
45 Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1993); see also Klaus Muhlhahn, Criminal Justice in 
China (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2009) 243. 
46 In other words, these are the opposite of Miranda warnings! 
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under the police station in order to avoid punishment.47 
Some police will seek confessions at virtually all costs and use whatever 
techniques they can to extract them. In effect, Article 93 gives police a broad license 
to torture and dehumanize suspects in their custody. Under such circumstances, it is 
not surprising that police torture is so pervasive in China. Suspects who refuse to 
cooperate with public officials might be subjected to torture. For example, Wang 
Zongxiao, a suspected drug dealer who was arrested by the Shanghai police in 1988, 
was subjected to torture during interrogation in an attempt to extract information 
from him. The police reminded Wang of the Communist Party policy repeatedly 
throughout the interrogation, if he told the officers everything, he would receive 
leniency; if he refused to speak, he would be treated with severity.48 
Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure destroys the very essence of the 
defendant’s fundamental right against self incrimination. There is no right to silence 
for the accused in China. Defendants are expected to answer questions in the police 
station, procuratorates and the courts. This is the main reason why the problem of 
police torture in China cannot be solved even today. Even worse, it is considered that 
Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be applied at the beginning, at 
every stage and until the very end in the criminal process.49 
No one shall be obliged to give incriminating evidence against himself. A 
defendant shall not be obligated to prove his innocence. It is undoubtedly true that 
anyone suspected or accused of crime should not be compelled to co-operate with the 
any investigation authorities; otherwise miscarriages of justice will definitely occur. 
                                                 
47 ‘刑訊逼供打死人埋屍工地’ [Tortured to Death], Southern Metropolis Daily’, (28 May 2004) 
<http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2004-05-28/09272651339s.shtml> accessed 1 January 2011. 
48 Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp 1541 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
49 Li Yunzhao, ‘刑訊逼供屢禁不止的原因及對策研究’ [The Reasons and Solutions of Endless 
Torture] (2002) 8 Journal of Beijing University 155, 156. 
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The agents of the state should prove their cases. For these reasons, I propose to 
abolish Article 93. 
 
5.2.2 Lacking enforcement mechanisms 
 
The lack of enforcement of the laws, however, is another problem. At first glance, 
Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits torture, threat, enticement, 
deceit or other unlawful means: 
 
Judges, procurators and investigators must, in accordance with the legally 
prescribed process, collect various kinds of evidence that can prove the 
criminal suspect’s or defendant’s guilt or innocence and the gravity of his 
crime. It shall be strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture and to 
collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other unlawful means. 
 
It prescribes no remedy for violation. When the Chinese Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) Interpretations made clear that the 
police could not torture suspects under existing law, they were trying to avoid police 
torture by offering a confession exclusionary rule.50 For example, Article 61 of the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the 
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law51 provides that “[i]t shall be strictly forbidden to 
collect evidence by illegal methods. Evidence obtained by torture, threat, enticement 
and deceit or other illegal methods are inadmissible.” In addition, Article 265 of the 
                                                 
50 Article 61 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the 
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law and Article 265 of the Chinese People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal 
Procedure Rule. 
51 ‘最高人民法院關於執行《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》若干問題的解釋’ [Supreme People’s 
Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law], 
promulgated on 29 June, 1998, effective on 8 Sep., 1998. 
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Chinese People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule52 provides that “[i]t shall 
be strictly forbidden to collect evidence by illegal methods. Confessions from 
suspects, victims and witnesses obtained by torture, threat, enticement and deceit 
cannot be used to incriminate.” It indicates that evidence obtained through methods 
mentioned above should not be admitted into evidence in a criminal prosecution. 
These laws and judicial interpretations provided by the Supreme People’s Court 
and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, however, have often failed to address crucial 
concerns relating to violations of the right to be free from torture and, perhaps more 
importantly, generally lack any mechanisms for enforcement. Courts should enforce 
these judicial interpretations provided by the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate by barring the prosecution from using evidence obtained by 
illegal methods at criminal trials. 
The exclusionary rule is still not adopted in Chinese law. No special provision 
in the Code of Criminal Procedure addresses the exclusionary rule. China should 
elevate the rule to a level of criminal procedure law or evidence law immediately; 
otherwise, the right to be free from torture is merely lip service paid by the 
government. 
 
5.2.3 The Political-Legal Committee 
 
The Chinese Communist Party’s central Political-Legal Committee is a sub 
committee of the Party’s Central Committee charged with supervision of China’s 
entire legal system. The Political-Legal Committee usually includes the deputy Party 
                                                 
52 ‘人民檢察院刑事訴訟規則’ [People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule], promulgated on 
16 Dec., 1998, effective on 18 Jan., 1999. 
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secretary of Political-Legal matters, the president of the court and procuracy, and the 
heads of various ministries or bureaus including public security, state security, justice 
and civil affairs.53 
The function of the Committee is to discuss and decide cases believed to be 
difficult, important or to have socially significant implications before trials. The 
Committee can make determinations on everything from individual criminal cases, 
which may result in the phenomenon of “verdict first, trial second”. Moreover, in 
some difficult cases, the Committee may even “recommend” that the Basic Court and 
Intermediate Court agree a specific verdict before the trial. Courts have to follow 
Party recommendations. Judges who decide cases contrary to Party dictates may be 
subject to be discharged or transferred.54 
The first example is the Li Huawei case. In 1986, Li Huawei’s pregnant wife 
Xing Wei was murdered in Liaoning Province. In the horrific crime scene Xing’s 
blood spurted on the floor. As result of trying to rescue his wife and their unborn 
child, Li had her blood on his clothes. Li protested his innocence, stating repeatedly 
that finger-print and foot-print found at the scene of the crime were not his. Police 
challenged Li as to how Xing’s blood could have ended up in a spot of blood found 
on his clothes. Li was questioned and tortured incommunicado for a continuous 
seventy-two hour period with very limited food and water. 
    The police also detained Li’s mother Yang for over ten hours and told her that 
“your son admitted that he had killed his wife and already told you. Why you did not 
confess?” Yang said “I don’t know.” The police said “you are not allowed to say I 
                                                 
53 Shiping Zheng, Party vs. State in Post-1949 China (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1997) 
172. 
54 M.Y.K. Woo, ‘Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese Courts’ in Karen Turner and Others 
(eds.), The Limits of the Rule of Law in China (Washington University Press, Seattle 2000) 171. 
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don’t know, otherwise we will put you in jail.” Not until Yang had incriminated Li, 
was she allowed to go home. Then the police told Li that “your mother said that you 
told her you killed your wife.” Witnesses were forced to change their statements that 
Li was not at the scene of the crime. Further, all physical evidence favoured Li were 
concealed by the police. Li was charged with the murder of his wife. 
 The Yingkou City Political-Legal Committees decided the sentence before the 
trial. The torture confessions were admitted and Li was convicted and sentenced to 
death with a reprieve by the Yingkou City Intermediate Court. Li’s defense lawyer 
Ma visited the Intermediate Court many times and asked them why they had been so 
“lenient” to Li – that is, why they had decided not to execute Li. The vice president 
of the court said “Li cannot be executed as this case is not so clear.” After Li had 
served 14 years in prison, the real murderer was caught and admitted the crime.55 
The second example is a particularly well-publicized case. In 1994, Yu 
Xianglin’s wife Zhang Zaiyu left their home because of her mental illness. Yu was a 
police officer in Jing Shan County in Hubei Province. Zhang’s family suspected that 
their daughter, Zhang was murdered by Yu and they decided to inform the police. 
Three months later, an unidentified female dead body was found in a pond near Yu’s 
home. Yu was arrested because Zhang’s brother claimed the dead body looked like 
his sister. 
Over a fortnight of police interrogation, Yu only ate two meals a day; drank very 
little and was deprived of sleep. Yu was seriously tortured and was forced to confess 
to the murder. Yu made confessions in despair while going through marathon 
torturing, suggested four ways to “kill” his wife and left the police to pick one among 
them. His confessions had been entirely fabricated. Yu was sentenced to death 
                                                 
55 Kuo Kuosong, ‘The Truth of a Murder Case’, The China Youth Daily (25 Feb. 2001). 
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penalty by the Jing Zhou Intermediate Court. He appealed. The Hubei Province High 
Court quashed the conviction because of insufficient evidence. After the intervention 
of the City and County Political-Legal Committees, the case was transferred to the 
Jing Shan County Basic Court. 
The Political-Legal Committee asked the Jing Shan County Basic Court and 
Jing Zhou Intermediate Court to imprison Yu for fifteen years. After Yu had served 
almost one decade in prison, surprisingly, Zhang returned home one day in 2005. The 
Jing Shan County Basic Court retried the case and said Yu was completely 
innocent.56 
The Chinese court system has four different levels: basic courts, intermediate 
courts, high courts and the Supreme Court. The Intermediate Court may be the court 
of first instance over criminal cases punishable by life imprisonment or the death 
sentence.57 According to Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Jing 
Zhou Intermediate Court should be the court of first instance. The Jing Shan County 
Basic Court, appointed by the Committee, even did not have jurisdiction to hear this 
case. 
The Chinese criminal justice system should not be operated merely as an 
instrument of Communist Party control. The Political-Legal Committee should not 
override the judgments of formal judicial and legal apparatus. I contend that the 
function of the Political-Legal Committee has to be changed. 
 
                                                 
56 Mao Lixin, ‘余祥林冤案的偵查錯誤剖析’ [The Analysis of Wrongful Conviction of Yu Xianglin 
Case] (2006) <http://www.dffy.com/faxuejieti/ss/200601/20060109183013.htm> accessed 1 January 
2011. 
57 Article 20 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
The intermediate people’s courts shall have jurisdiction as courts of first instance over the 
following cases: (1) counter-revolutionary cases and cases jeopardizing the State security; 
(2) ordinary criminal cases punishable by life imprisonment or the death sentence; and (3) 
criminal cases in which the offenders are foreigners. 
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5.2.4 The right to counsel 
 
In an ideal world, the right to counsel,58 including the attorney-client privilege, acts 
to ensure that a defendant receives professional advice exclusively from his attorney. 
The right to counsel is a fundamental fair trial right.59 It is of crucial importance for 
the fairness of the criminal justice system that the defendant be adequately defended. 
The confrontation between defendant and prosecutors can hardly be called fair if 
there is no lawyer to assist him. In actual practice this has not been the case. Chinese 
defense attorneys face at least three difficulties: (1) difficulties in client access;60 (2) 
difficulties in reviewing case files; (3) difficulties in obtaining evidence. It seems that 
the main reason behind these difficulties is because lawyers are in opposition to the 
law enforcement agents: all these actions of the “trouble makers” – lawyers – will 
interfere with the investigation, slow down the criminal process and only benefit the 
guilty. 
The utilitarian approach dominates the Chinese criminal justice system, where 
the crime control model prevails. The crime control model represents many of the 
traditional values of the Chinese criminal justice system.61 As Trevaskes correctly 
observed that “[i]n the traditional Chinese view, criminal law is used as a sword to be 
wielded in a fight against crime. Since the law was traditionally conceived as a tool 
to fight and eliminate crime, other important aspects of the law, such as its function 
in protecting human rights, did not develop in traditional jurisprudential thinking.”62 
                                                 
58 Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
59 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
60 Andrew Worden, ‘ “A Fair Game?” of Law and Politics in China, and the “Sensitive” Case of 
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61 See 5.1.1. 
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However, when the scales tilt too far in the direction of crime control, due process 
rights suffer. 
One of the tenets of the crime control model is a trust in the fact-finding of 
police and prosecutors.63 The criminal justice system practiced the principle of 
“deciding a case according to facts”.64 In addition, Article 6 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure explicitly recognizes that “[i]n criminal proceedings, the People’s Courts, 
the People’s Procuratorates, and the public security organs must … base themselves 
on facts … .” However, in the rigorous pursuit of “truth”, rules protecting the 
defendants’ rights were often swept aside. Until today, as discussed above in 5.1.1 
and as we will see below, China identifies strongly with the crime control model in 
this regard and the criminal justice policy followed the basic tenets of what Packer 
called the crime control model.65 
The criminal process is a linear process, separated into stages that are performed 
at different times. Each stage calls upon the police, prosecutor and judge to perform 
specific, compartmentalized tasks. Viewing the criminal process in linear stages 
suggests that law enforcement agents are composed of an assembly line: 
investigating, prosecuting, and then convicting. There are three stages of a criminal 
proceeding in China: investigation, prosecution and the trial. The end product of the 
assembly line is the conviction. China mainly focuses on efficiency in apprehending, 
trying, and convicting offenders. I argue that, in every single stage, many of the rules 
which govern the criminal process are based on the principles similar to those which 
shape Packer’s crime control model. 
First, right from the first stage of the criminal process – the investigation phase, 
                                                 
63 See 1.3. 
64 Article 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
65 See 1.3. 
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according to Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has every disadvantage as 
soon as the accused is apprehended. 
The criminal justice system regards the suppression of crime as the primary 
function of the criminal process. That is why the Code of Criminal Procedure is 
expansive, vague and silent about the limits of police investigative powers. In the 
investigative phase, the criminal process leans rather heavily toward the crime 
control model. 
(1) There is no general legal requirement of probable cause to arrest, search, 
seizure, or detain.66 Prior to an arrest, the police do not need to have probable cause 
to believe that the defendant engaged in the charged activity. (2) Identity checks need 
not be based on individualized suspicion, and detention for identification purposes 
may last for up to 24 hours.67 (3) Police powers to interrogate are broad. Defendants 
are not provided with protections against coerced testimony, illegal searches, and 
presumptions of guilt. Defendants have no right to remain silent and are not immune 
from questions on their silence; on the contrary, defendants have a duty to answer 
questions truthfully when asked by investigators.68 It seems that the entire criminal 
process was designed to get the suspect to talk. In practice, it becomes the legal duty 
for suspects to assist the police under Article 93,69 not to mention the (non)Miranda 
rule. (4) Defendants may be held in investigatory detention for up to seventy-two 
hours without probable cause, judicial approval, or mandatory court appearance.70 (5) 
There is no general judicial warrant requirement for the use of electronic surveillance, 
any type of undercover investigations or covert operations. 
                                                 
66 See 6.3. 
67 Article 65 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
68 Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
69 Wang Haiyan and Hu Changlong, 刑事證據基本問題研究 [The Study of Basic Questions of 
Criminal Evidence] (Law Press, Beijing 2002) 4. 
70 Article 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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To ensure that maximum number of criminals are prosecuted, at least to some 
extent, the criminal process relies on a “presumption of guilt”. However, the thought 
of presumption of guilt in the criminal process is the ideological root of confession 
by torture. During the investigation phase, China assumed that efficient police 
investigation and prosecutions could control crime. Therefore, police are given wide 
investigative powers of arrest, search, seizure71 and interrogation. The police are so 
accustomed to exercising their unconstrained discretion arbitrarily that they may 
honestly believe they are suppressing crime or they are enforcing the “law in action”. 
It seems that for them this is often the quickest means to establish whether the 
suspect is factually guilty and only the factually guilty have something to hide. 
One difficult problem in Chinese criminal process is generated by dissonance 
between “law in books” and “law in action”. The police are the most powerful of all 
criminal justice officials in China. The broad power of the police remains 
unchecked. 72  Meanwhile, police misconduct is widespread. Police torture and 
coercion, for example, which have a lot to do with ordinary law enforcement, are 
mostly ignored.73 The questioning of the accused in the investigation stage is an 
essential aspect of criminal proceedings. These interrogations were carried out by the 
police, and the accused was seldom allowed the assistance of lawyer. It is worth 
noting that not until 1996 were detained people allowed to access a lawyer in the 
investigation phase. In practice, lawyers are not appointed until the trial stage. Even 
in the court phase, defense attorneys have relatively little power and the role of 
defense attorneys remains highly circumscribed. 
What is worse is that some police officers even think the legal rights are in their 
                                                 
71 See 6.3.1. 
72 See 5.3.2. 
73 See Chapter 5. 
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hands. For instance, according to Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
during the investigation stage, lawyers may offer legal counseling.74 Yanfei Ran, an 
experienced Chinese defense lawyer, recalled his experience when he tried to meet 
his client at the detention centre in Beijing. One police officer refused his request to 
meet the client. Ran argued that according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
lawyers have the right to meet their clients. The police replied that, “you have a right? 
Your rights are in my hand.”75 
Secondly, the prosecution phase is a link between the investigation phase and 
the trial phase in the assembly line. 
Gongjianfa (公檢法)76 bring a kind of assembly line because there is a such 
close relationship between the police, the prosecutor, and the judiciary. Article 7 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
 
In conducting criminal proceedings, the People’s Courts, the People’s 
Procuratorates and the public security organs shall divide responsibilities, 
coordinate their efforts and check each other so as to ensure the correct 
and effective enforcement of the law.77 
 
                                                 
74 Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
After the criminal suspect is interrogated by an investigation organ for the first time or 
from the day on which compulsory measures are adopted against him, he may appoint a 
lawyer to provide him with legal advice and to file petitions and complaints on his behalf. 
If the criminal suspect is arrested, the appointed lawyer may apply on his behalf for 
obtaining a guarantor pending trial. If a case involves State secrets, the criminal suspect 
shall have to obtain the approval of the investigation organ for appointing a lawyer. 
The appointed lawyer shall have the right to find out from the investigation organ about 
the crime suspected of, and may meet with the criminal suspect in custody to enquire 
about the case. When the lawyer meets with the criminal suspect in custody, the 
investigation organ may, in light of the seriousness of the crime and where it deems it 
necessary, send its people to be present at the meeting. If a case involves State secrets, 
before the lawyer meets with the criminal suspect, he shall have to obtain the approval of 
the investigation organ. 
75 Yanfei Ran, ‘When Chinese Criminal Defense Lawyers Become the Criminals’ (2009) 32 Fordham 
International Law Journal 988, 1014-15. 
76 Gong means the police. Jian means the procuratorate. Fa means the court. 
77 Article 7 of the Code of Criminal procedure (emphasis added). 
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From 1975 to 1978, all Chinese Procuratorate78 offices were abolished. All powers 
of the Procuratorate were even transferred to the police.79 Chinese prosecutors work 
within hierarchical bureaucratic structures. The prosecutors are obliged to obey 
orders in relation to specific cases. Certainty of “outcomes” is the goal of the 
criminal justice system, which is supposed to provide certainty of prosecution. Under 
these circumstances, for the prosecutors the criminal justice system should prevent 
the “factually guilty” from escaping from prosecution and conviction. 
Further, as mentioned above, for defense attorneys, it is exceedingly difficult as 
a practical matter to meet their clients, particularly those defendants in detention 
centre or in prison. In general, an accused in detention is unlikely to have much 
opportunity to meet with counsel until the prosecutors have finalized the case. Even 
when the accused has access to counsel, not only the police but also prosecutors may 
impose unreasonable conditions on meetings between the accused and counsel.80 
Article 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
 
The appointed lawyer shall have the right to find out from the investigation 
organ about the crime suspected of, and may meet with the suspect in 
custody to enquire about the case. When the lawyer meets with the suspect 
in custody, the investigation organ may, in light of the seriousness of the 
crime and where it deems it necessary, send its people to be present at the 
meeting. If case involves State secrets, before the lawyer meets with the 
suspect, he must obtain the approval of the investigation organ. 
 
Because the specific language of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not clear 
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79 Article 25 of Chinese Constitution 1975. 
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and because courts have interpreted these written provisions narrowly, the criminal 
justice system provides wide discretion to the investigative authorities. For example, 
although Article 96 provides that if the case involves state secrets, the lawyer has to 
obtain the approval of the investigation organ. However, the investigative authorities 
distort Article 96 as it is almost impossible for lawyers to meet their clients without 
getting the approval of investigative authorities in any case, not only those limited to 
state secrets.81 
Additionally, the meetings with lawyers may be limited to thirty minutes or 
even interrupted by law enforcement officers or even prosecutors. 82  The true 
lawyer’s personal experience is here. When dealing with a corruption case, Kang 
Huaiu, a defense lawyer, argues: 
 
During the meeting, I am very confident. I enquired the facts of the case 
directly. Suddenly the prosecutor interrupted our conversation and 
seriously told the suspect that he was not allowed to discuss this issue. I 
took out the related judicial interpretations from the High Court and High 
Procuratorate. The prosecutor just ignored these interpretations and argued 
they know this document but their Procuratorate does not inform the 
prosecutors to follow the document, thus they cannot enforce it. I said that 
“can I argue that I do not know the law, and then the law is invalid to me?” 
The prosecutor did not even want to answer my question and just repeated 
that “we do this all the time, you are not allowed to ask the facts of the 
case.” I am afraid and asked “may I ask the amount of the bribery? May I 
ask …?” He replied: “No, this is the rule.” The meeting finished very 
quickly. Afterwards, the prosecutor patted my shoulder and said: “I hope 
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that you lawyers can cooperate with us.” As a lawyer, what did I do in the 
meeting? All my work, as the law enforcement officers told me, is “letting 
the suspect feel comfortable.” I am here to let the suspect feel comfortable 
and to bring them some comfort.”83 
 
Let us return to the context of illegally obtained confessions and the 
exclusionary rule. If defense attorneys were not allowed to discuss the facts of torture 
cases with their clients, how could they defend their clients? How could lawyers give 
opinions about consequences that are likely to result from a client’s conduct? How 
could lawyers assist the client to determine the validity, scope, meaning, or 
application of the law? Without knowing all the facts, how could lawyers possibly 
know whether or not their clients were tortured? 
Further, the issue of burden of proof offers another example of that the criminal 
process moves toward the crime control model. There exists no burden of proof on 
the prosecutor in the context of the exclusionary rule. The Code of Criminal 
Procedure is silent about this important issue. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard does not exist. The silent legislation has again shifted the criminal justice 
system to a crime control model on the interrogation of suspects to gain evidence of 
their guilt. As will be discussed in more detail in 6.2, the burden of proof should be 
on the prosecutor once the defendant has made a police torture case.84 The Code of 
Criminal Procedure should impose a higher burden of proof on prosecutors regarding 
the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. 
In addition, most scholars ignore the question of, “what role should the 
prosecutor play in excluding illegally obtained evidence?” The prosecutor can 
                                                 
83 Kang Huaiu, ‘讓我看到法律 – 刑辯律師的真實處境及其他’ [Let Me See the Law – The Real 
Reality of Defense Attorneys] (2005) The Lawyer and Law 1, 2. 
84 See 6.2.1. 
 194
evaluate evidence, whether it is admissible or inadmissible, in considering whether it 
is likely the defendant is guilty. The reality is that Chinese prosecutors keep using 
illegally obtained evidence to prosecute suspects,85 as the evidence the prosecutor 
has against the defendant is instrumental in his decision to pursue a prosecution. A 
prosecutor’s task is to introduce evidence that enables judges to reach the conclusion 
that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if the evidence is 
inadmissible, the prosecutor can use it in the indictment and introduce the evidence 
in the trial stage. The prosecutor, however, shares in the responsibility of ensuring a 
fair trial. In this context, it is crucial for a prosecutor to increasingly rely on the 
exclusionary rule prior to arraignment to protect the innocent from conviction 
pursuant to Article 265 of the People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule, 
which provides that confessions from suspects, victims and witnesses obtained by 
torture, threat, enticement and deceit cannot be used to incriminate.86 Prosecutors 
also play their role in the administration of justice. A prosecutor cannot give evidence 
obtained by torture of the person in criminal proceedings. Article 16 of United 
Nations Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors87 provides: 
 
When prosecutors come into possession of evidence against suspects that 
they know or believe on reasonable grounds was obtained through recourse 
to unlawful methods, which constitute a grave violation of the suspect’s 
human rights, especially involving torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, or other abuses of human rights, they shall refuse 
to use such evidence against anyone other than those who used such 
methods, or inform the Court accordingly, and shall take all necessary steps 
to ensure that those responsible for using such methods are brought to 
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In addition, under Article 3 of the Regulations Concerning a Number of 
Questions of Excluding Illegally Obtained Criminal Evidence,89 the latest judicial 
interpretations regarding the confession exclusionary rule issued by the Supreme 
Court and the Supreme Procuratorate, a Chinese prosecutor should exclude illegally 
obtained confessions during the investigative phase.90 
Another problem is the abuse of power by the prosecutor. Prosecutors exercise 
their authority with almost no supervision. A striking example of prosecutor abuse of 
power appears in the Chen case. Chen, a Chinese defense attorney and a graduate of 
Beijing University School of Law, defended a corruption case in 2001. When the 
prosecutor in charge of this case tried to get information from Chen’s client, Chen 
curtly replied, “I am his lawyer, I cannot reveal my client’s information to you 
because I have the privilege not to do so.”91 The prosecutor angrily told Chen, “Let’s 
wait and see if you can have your privilege.”92 Several days later, Chen was 
summoned by the prosecutor and was detained for one year.93 
A license to enforce law is not a license to break law. The attorney-client 
privilege, the oldest confidential communications privilege in the common law,94 
protects communications, written or oral, between a client and attorney made in 
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confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.95 This privilege is the main 
restraint on prosecutors seeking to investigate defense attorneys and helps the proper 
functioning of the legal system. Unfortunately, the prosecutor’s action in this case 
completely disregarded any concept of the attorney-client privilege. 
The suppression of crime cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result 
of illegal investigations by the police. While the rise in crime undoubtedly requires 
that appropriate measures be taken, the right to a fair administration of justice 
nevertheless holds such a prominent place that it cannot be sacrificed for the sake of 
expedience. 
Thirdly, no exclusionary rule exists in the trial stage. 
Courts are the “judicial organs of the state”96 and carry the responsibility to 
administer justice, under Article 123 of the Constitution. The judiciary should be the 
key check on the executive branch. Yet it seems that Chinese courts do not take their 
responsibility to administer justice seriously. The Code of Criminal Procedure 
process features no exclusionary rule, and no right of confrontation to ensure the 
quality of the evidence that courts consider. As I will discuss in Chapter 6, the most 
serious problem in the way courts currently determine facts is their use of illegally 
obtained evidence.97 
According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, illegally or unfairly obtained 
evidence is not excluded. There is no exclusionary rule that prevent the presentation 
of illegally obtained evidence at the trial, and almost no opportunity of any kind for 
the exclusion of evidence. There exists neither the confession exclusionary rule nor 
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96 Article 123 of the Chinese Constitution provides: “The People’s Courts in the People’s Republic of 
China are the judicial organs of the state.” 
97 See Chapter 6. 
 197
the search and seizure exclusionary rule in China. Courts admit almost any type of 
illegal evidence. 
The Chinese presiding judge has full control of the process, asking most of the 
questions himself and guiding matters with a firm hand. Judges fail to focus on 
procedural justice, concentrating mainly on the substantive justice. China still adopts 
the approach that generally allows the admission of almost any evidence, regardless 
of how obtained. Courts continue to adhere to the crime control model of criminal 
adjudication when evaluating confessions, interrogations, and searches and seizures. 
Courts continuously reflect the desire to permit illegally obtained evidence to be 
admitted in criminal trials, particularly those perceived as “serious”, and where the 
confession and material is central to the prosecution case. Judges prefer crime control 
model values rather than those of due process model, notwithstanding a police breach 
of Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Despite the frequency and consequences of police torture, current responses to 
the problem are ineffective. The Du Peiwu case and the Liu Yun case, for instance, 
send a clear signal to Chinese courts to admit any evidence in criminal cases.98 
Courts have held that the defendant should prove torture, brutality and similar 
outrageous conduct. Illegally or unfairly evidence is still admissible because the lack 
of the exclusionary rule. As a result, exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is still 
not a remedy in China. 
There is no effective remedy for a breach of Article 43 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. In the context of the confession exclusionary rule, the standard and the 
only court procedure is to do nothing except to claim that the allegation of torture as 
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unsupported by the evidence or unfounded.99 In a murder case defended by Yanfei 
Ran in the Beijing High Court, for example, the only evidence was the tortured 
confession. Even within the confession, there were contradictions. The defendant 
was sentenced to the death penalty with two years’ suspension.100 Until now, I find 
that no court has held that it is a violation of a suspect’s constitutional or legal rights 
to illegally obtain evidence. Courts still use it against at trial and hesitate to exclude 
the illegal evidence. 
China emphasizes the need for a reliable fact finding process, repression of 
criminal conduct and reduction in crime. Courts placed discovering the truth about 
the factually guilty before the fair treatment of the accused. However, it is crystal 
clear that the duty of judges is not to continue the work of the police and prosecutors, 
and then obtain a conviction at all cost but to act as a minister of justice. 
All in all, I liken the relationship between the police, prosecutor and judge in the 
Chinese criminal process as a “relay race”. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, the police, the prosecutor and the judge work together to go 
after the predominant goal: the suppression of crime. Applying the physical metaphor, 
the progress of the Chinese criminal justice system is ideally to be accomplished by 
passing the physical object from hand to hand, like a baton in a relay race. The 
handling of criminal cases resembles a relay race. The police, the prosecutor and the 
judge are the runners in the relay race. The defendant seems like the baton in the race. 
In the first stage (investigating stage), the baton is in the grasp of the police. Like 
runners in a relay race, law enforcement officers concentrate on passing the baton to 
the next runner as soon as possible, leaving the rest of the race to the succeeding 
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runners. When the prosecutor take charge, they take over the baton and retain it until 
they have made a prosecution. Finally, the prosecutor hands the baton to the court so 
that the court can make a conviction. During the criminal process, the law 
enforcement officers avoid dropping the “baton” in the race.101 At the finishing line, 
Chinese criminal justice system is devoted to providing certainty of outcomes for 
criminal offenders. 
As one who studies Chinese criminal process, it strikes me that the greatest 
defect in the criminal process is that most actors in the criminal justice system, 
including judges, totally identify with the crime control model to the exclusion of 
fidelity to the due process model, even though law enforcement officers may not 
even be aware of the content of Packer’s crime control model. 
I reject the crime control model’s too much emphasis on efficiency. It is my 
belief that the Chinese criminal justice system can prove to be efficient, but not at the 
expense of human rights. If “efficiency” suggests shortcuts around reliability, these 
demands must be rejected. The criminal process is more complicated than simply the 
police finding the “truth” and all crime investigation techniques should be under 
effective control. Fair trial is more complicated than bad guys getting their just 
deserts. We should try to use the due process model as a means to promote human 
dignity in the criminal process. 
It is time to reassess the Chinese criminal justice system. It is time to 
acknowledge that the insistence on the crime control model of the past fifty years 
have gradually eroded the right to be free from torture, and the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures imposed upon Chinese citizens. 
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5.3 Too much power and too little supervision 
 
The purpose of this section is to call attention to the scope of powers granted to the 
Chinese police, and the limited controls established over them. The Chinese police 
forces seem to have the widest power in the world. As the police are perceived as 
being effective at crime control, no one even tries to limit their investigatory power. 
On the whole, China grants the police too much power102 and there is too little 
judicial supervision103 over police investigation. At the same time, law enforcement 
officers enjoy extremely wide discretion in deciding how to use these far-reaching 
powers.104 It creates disequilibrium in the existing Chinese criminal justice system. 
It is such an imbalance that poses a significant and growing threat for the protection 
of defendants’ rights. 
Police wrongdoing has played an important role in most wrongful conviction 
cases. Police departments, however, lack substantial internal and external 
mechanisms to regulate and govern the collection of evidence and the conduct of 
criminal investigations. 
 
5.3.1 Broad investigatory powers 
 
On the “too much power” side, the Code of Criminal Procedure confers broad 
investigatory powers on the police who possess the powers to arrest,105 detain,106 
                                                 
102 See 5.3.1. 
103 See 5.3.2. 
104 See 6.3. 
105 Article 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
The public security organs shall be responsible for the investigation, detention, execution 
of arrests and pre-trial examination in connection with criminal cases. The people’s 
procuratorates shall be responsible for the procuratorial work, the approving of arrests, 
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interrogate, conduct searches 107  and seizures, 108  and various administratively 
coercive measures almost without judicial supervision. For example, criminal 
suspects can be detained for up to forty days before formal charging.109 With regard 
to the individual’s privacy, the restrictions and conditions provided by the Code of 
Criminal Procedure is too lax and full of loopholes. 
    In order to rule out general warrants, in general, both the United Kingdom and 
United States have developed a procedure that allows premises to be searched only 
under authorization by the court. In the United States, for example, the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution provides: 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
                                                                                                                                          
and the investigation and initiation of public prosecution in connection with cases 
accepted directly by them. The people’s courts shall be responsible for the trial. No other 
organ, organization or person shall have the right to exercise such powers, unless the laws 
otherwise provide. 
106 Under Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, police may detain a person, if: 
1. if he is plotting to commit a crime or is in the process of committing a crime or is 
discovered immediately after having committed a crime; 2. if he is identified as having 
committed a crime by the victim or by an eyewitness; 3. if criminal evidence is found on his 
body or at his residence; 4. if he attempts to commit suicide or escape after committing the 
crime, or he is a fugitive; 5. if there is a possibility of destroying evidence or falsifying 
evidence or colluding to make confession tally; 6. if he refuses to give his real name and 
address, or his identity is unknown; or 7. if he is strongly suspected of vagrantly committing 
crimes, frequently committing crimes or committing crimes in gangs. 
107 Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
For the purposes of collecting criminal evidence and tracking down a criminal offender, 
the investigating personnel may search the person, belongings and residence of the crime 
suspects and persons who might hide the criminal offender or criminal evidence, as well 
as other relevant places. 
108 Article 114 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “All articles and documents found in the 
course of an inquest and search, which may be used to prove the guilt or innocence of the crime 
suspect, shall be seized; articles and documents irrelevant to the case may not be seized.” 
109 Article 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
A public security organ which finds it necessary to arrest a person already detained shall, 
within three days after the detention, submit a request to the people’s procuratorate for 
approval. Under a special circumstance, the time limit for submitting the request for 
approval may be extended by one to four days. With regard to major suspects committing 
crimes from one place to another, repeatedly committing crimes or committing gang crime, 
the time limit for submitting requests for approval may be extended to 30 days … . 
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affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
 
The Fourth Amendment requires the courts to issue warrants.110 In contrast, the 
Chinese police can issue arrest warrants111 and search warrants112 themselves. It is 
unclear what degree of suspicion is required. The government is not required to show 
probable cause to believe that the individual is violating the law before an intrusion 
is justified prior to execution of the search. 
At first sight, Articles 65 and 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appeared to 
provide protection for suspects. The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that police 
may hold a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 24 hours.113 If police 
decide to arrest the detained suspect, they should submit a written request for approval 
of the arrest, together with the case files and evidence, to the procuratorate. The 
procuratorate then decide whether to approve the request.114 The procuratorate may 
issue an arrest warrant on the police officer’s application if he or she is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect committed a crime within the 
procuratorates’ jurisdiction.115 
The problem is that these requirements have remained dead letters. In practice, 
the police bypass the Code of Criminal Procedure116 and use the much more loosely 
                                                 
110 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
111 Article 71 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
112 Article 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
113 Article 65 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
114 Article 66 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
A public security organ intending to arrest a crime suspect shall submit a written request 
for approval of the arrest, together with the case files and evidence, to the people’s 
procuratorate at the same level for examination and approval. The people’s procuratorate 
may, when necessary, send its personnel to participate in the discussion of major cases at 
the public security organ. 
115 Article 59 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “An arrest of a crime suspect or a 
defendant must be approved by the people’s procuratorate or decided by the people’s court, and shall 
be executed by the public security organ.” 
116 Chen Ruihua, ‘超期羈押的法律分析’ [Legal Analysis of Illegal Detention] (2000) People’s 
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regulated administrative detention as a substitute for the ordinary criminal procedure. 
Various forms of incarcerations do not provide procedural safeguards for suspects. 
For instance, according to the Security Administration Punishment Regulation 
(SAPR), the police can send a suspect who committed minor offenses to labor camp 
without the participation of lawyers or the approval of the procuracy or courts. The 
maximum term of Laodong jiaoyang (re-education through labour) that can be 
imposed by the police is detention for four years.117 
The result of giving sweeping powers to the police with little supervision has 
been the birth of superpower executive branch in the criminal justice system. 
Virtually unlimited police power is the very source of police torture. Restrictions on 
the investigatory power of the police are necessary. The most important rights are the 
rights to be free from torture, and to be free from illegal searches and seizures. 
Effective judicial restraints against the huge police power are therefore imperative. 
 
5.3.2 Limited judicial supervision 
 
On the “too little supervision” side, there is limited judicial oversight of 
administrative action, which causes rampant police wrongdoing. There is no check 
through judicial review with respect to the rights of criminal suspects under the 
constitution. There are no effective restraints on police wrongdoing. Without judicial 
supervision to speak of and internal constraints, it is no wonder arbitrary enforcement 
is high. Chinese criminal courts have almost no control over police work. Article 7 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
                                                                                                                                          
Procuratorial Semimonthly 4, 8. 
117 Article 3 of the State Council Supplementary Regulations about Laodong jiaoyang (1979). 
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In conducting criminal proceedings, the People’s Courts, the People’s 
Procuratorates and the public security organs shall divide responsibilities, 
coordinate their efforts and check each other so as to ensure the correct 
and effective enforcement of the law.118 
 
Article 7 violates the spirit of judicial independence. In performing the checking 
function of the judiciary, judges must be free from other branches of the government. 
How could neutral and independent courts coordinate with procurators and the police 
in criminal proceedings? In practice, courts, procuratorates and the police overly 
emphasized “coordinate” and completely ignored the “checks”. 
    One of the slogans in China has been that “[p]olice, procuratorate and courts are in 
a family”.119 The coordination relationship between the three not only seriously 
affects the proper functioning of the criminal justice system but it also causes the 
system to appear unfair, especially in anti-crime campaigns. 
The 1983 anti-crime campaign provides the most striking example of the 
improper working relationship. According to Qu Mingsheng, a defense lawyer in 
Hubei Province, during the campaign, prosecutor, court and defense attorneys were 
on the team with the police to apprehend criminals. They all were members of team 
and shared the same objective. Procurators and judges utilized the same clerical staff. 
Defense attorneys served as police and procurators. Procurators allowed defense 
attorneys to ghost write the interrogation records themselves. Procurators were 
members of trial panels. They were all on the same side. Instead of a presumption of 
innocence and of a public trial, all trials were secret and held in detention centres.120 
                                                 
118 Article 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (emphasis added). 
119 Jin Xueren, ‘公檢法機關之間互相配合 一個沉重而陳舊的刑事訴訟法原則’ [Public Security 
Organs, Procuratorial Organs and People’s Courts Act in Concert: A Heavy and Obsolete Principle in 
Code of Criminal Procedure] (2002) 1 Journal of Huaqiao University (Political and Social Sciences) 
80, 83. 
120  Qu Mingsheng, ‘我也參加了嚴打鬥爭 ’ [I Anticipated the Strike Hard Battles] (2008) 
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In addition, some local officials do not view torturing suspects as a serious crime and 
take no action against it.121 Local protection been acknowledged as a problem 
plaguing the judiciary. 
 
5.3.3 The price of crime control 
 
During the second half of the twentieth century the crime rates in China have been 
spiraling.122 Its criminal justice system has focused on crime control policies in 
general. There are some myths in the Chinese criminal justice system, such as: the 
innocent do not confess to crimes they did not commit; defendants receive the 
effective assistance of counsel; the accused has too many rights, guilt or innocence is 
resolved through fair and public trials, the presumption of innocence actually guides 
criminal justice determinations and the criminal justice system is “soft” on crime. It 
seems that governments have always found a basis on which to justify harsh criminal 
justice policies, usually predicated on the perceived desperate consequences, for 
example the high crime rate, if the affected government is not allowed to resort to 
these “tough” policies. The combination of these myths fuels government responses 
to demands for harsher criminal justice policies, for example, coercive interrogation. 
    To respond to the rising crime rates, the government conducted three much 
publicized “Strike Hard” at crime campaigns in 1983-87, 1996 and 2000.123 During 
these campaigns, the government ignored procedural rules guaranteed by the Code of 
                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.qfls.com/blog/u/qf-qms/archives/2008/169.shtml> accessed 1 January 2011. 
121 See 5.2.3. 
122 Craig Smith, ‘Chinese Fight Crime with Torture and Execution’, N.Y. Times (New York 9 Sep. 
2001) 1. 
123 For discussion, see, Murry Tanner, ‘Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics’ in Borge 
Bakken (ed.), Crime, Punishment and Policing in China (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 
2005) 171-188. 
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Criminal Procedure and imposed frequently brutal methods and tough 
punishments.124 Trevaskes identifies four strategies in relation to the implementation 
of the 1983-1986 “strike hard” campaign: announcing crime as a major problem; 
making criminals the enemy of modernization; changing criminal procedure and 
sentencing practice.125 In order to solve the serious problem of crime and punish 
criminals, the government ignored the legal constraints imposed by the judiciary and 
did not restrain police arbitrariness, for example, large waves of arrests, swift trials 
and severe punishment (in particular the massive use of the death penalty).126 Law 
enforcement officers, detective officers in particular, saw themselves as engaged in a 
“war” and themselves as “warriors”. 
First of all, during the 1983 anti-crime campaign, the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress passed “A Decision Concerning Swift Trial 
Procedure of Criminals Seriously violating Social Safety”, which included shortened 
time periods for the delivery to defendants of bills of prosecution and summons and 
notice, and shortened time periods for appeals in certain cases,127 from ten days to 
three days. 
Secondly, while Article 11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the 
defendants shall have the right to have access to defense, all defendants were not 
entitled to have counsel. All criminal defenses were suspended.128 
Thirdly, Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that during an 
                                                 
124 Craig Smith, ‘Chinese Fight Crime with Torture and Execution’, N.Y. Times (New York 9 Sep. 
2001) 1. 
125 Susan Trevaskes, Courts and Criminal Justice in Contemporary China (Lexington Books, Lanham 
2007) 118-134. 
126 Murry Tanner, ‘Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics’ in Borge Bakken (ed.), Crime, 
Punishment and Policing in China (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2005) 171. 
127 The decisions applied to cases of murder, rape, robbery, bombing, and other seriously violation of 
public safety. 
128 Central Political-Legal Committee, Report Concerning about Strike Hard at Criminal Crime 
Activities (1984) < http://www.people.com.cn/GB/historic/1031/3642.html> accessed 1 Nov. 2008. 
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interrogation, the number of investigating personnel may not be less than two. Qu 
Mingsheng, a defense attorney served as a procurator during the 1983 campaign, told 
his mentor procurator that it was illegal to interrogate a defendant alone. The 
procurator scolded Qu and told him that “this is the special time. You have to treat it 
correctly. You do not have to sign in the interrogation records and do not bother to 
think about which two names will be signed in the records.”129 
From August 1983 to July 1984, the procuratorates prosecuted about one million 
people. The courts passed judgment on 861,000 accused people; 24,000 people were 
executed.130 The efficiency of these campaigns is said to be justified by their 
instrumental contribution to punishing the guilty and reducing crime rates. China’s 
anti-crime policies, however, had limited impacts in curtailing crime and these 
impacts did not last long. The historical record does not support the claim that harsh 
police tactics alone can solve the problem of soaring crime rate. The crime rates 
slightly declined after the 1983 anti-crime campaign. However, crime rates rose 
gradually again in 1986. Ten years later, China had to again conduct national “Strike 
Hard” campaigns; crime rates rose again in 1998.131 
The Chinese criminal justice system resorted to this sacrificing suspects’ rights 
strategy, and the resulting increase in crime rates has shown that such hard-line 
tactics alone are not the answer. Simply imposing repressive and brutal methods 
involving torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment cannot alone 
solve the problem of the high crime rate in Chinese society. 
The cost and potential cost of anti-crime campaigns, achieved at a very high 
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cost of a grave violation of the suspect’s human rights, outweighed their relative 
benefits. The stakes are high, however, and these campaigns would be ineffective. In 
the long run, these anti-crime campaigns simply do not work. Almost immediately 
upon the cessation of the 1983-87 campaign, the crime rate quickly resumed its rapid 
upward trend.132 Some legal enforcement agents might think it is better that one 
hundred innocent people be convicted than that one guilty person go free. Under 
such situations, many of them were convicted with testimony obtained by the police 
possessed of unrestrained power to seize persons, hold them in secret custody and 
wring from them confessions by physical and mental torture. Some of them served 
decades in prison and even lost their valuable lives.133 As was well described by 
Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce that “[t]ruth, like all good things, may be loved 
unwisely, may be pursued too keenly – may cost too much.”134 
 
 
5.4 Justification for torture and torture evidence? 
 
Is the use of evidence obtained by torture fair or foul? The police investigation 
scholar Du Jingji purported to justify the use of confessions obtained by torture as an 
important and necessary anti-crime weapon as “the number of real crimes solved 
through the illegal criminal practice of tortured confession is far, far greater than the 
number of false cases it creates.”135 The problem with these arguments is fully 
                                                 
132 Murry Tanner, ‘Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics’ in Borge Bakken (ed.), Crime, 
Punishment and Policing in China (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham 2005) 181. 
133 See 5.1-5.2. 
134 Pearse v. Pearse (1846) 1 DeG.. & Sm. 12; 63 E.R. 950, 957. 
135 Du Jingji, ‘A Superficial Discussion of the Tortured Confession and Policies to Deal with It’ in 
Wang Huaixu (ed.), Research and Practice of Investigation and Interrogation (China People’s Public 
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cloaked in the formalities of state criminal justice policy. The problem with this 
argument is three-fold. 
 
5.4.1 Ignoring treaty obligations 
 
Although the Chinese government had avowed its commitment to international 
standards prohibiting the use of torture, this commitment had little effect on such 
conduct. The problem still persists. 
First, the Chinese government misconstrues and ignores China’s various treaty 
obligations that prohibit torture in various contexts. 
The first problem is that the justification for torture and torture evidence clearly 
fell foul of the Chinese government’s international human rights commitments. The 
People’s Republic of China replaced the Republic of China as a permanent member 
of the Security Council in 1971. Since World War II, the international community has 
established numerous treaties and declarations to prohibit torture. The fundamental 
individual right to be free from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment is an internationally recognized right, which the court must enforce in all 
its proceedings. Various international documents obligate China to protect suspects 
against torture by state, for example, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) (UDHR).136 From 1988, China has ratified a number of 
international human rights conventions which obligated China to refrain from 
sanctioning or permitting torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment. There is an affirmative obligation by China to take all necessary measures 
                                                                                                                                          
Security University Press, Beijing 1998) 374. 
136 Article 5 of UDHR provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.” 
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to enable individuals to enjoy the rights guaranteed in the international treaties. Two 
of these conventions expressly prohibit torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Afterwards, China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(1966) (ICCPR) in 1999.137 
Secondly, adoption of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) (UNCAT) should be significant move 
forward in affirming the goal of nations to eradicate torture. UNCAT, ratified in 
1988,138 expressed a revolutionary proposition in Article 15, according to which 
each state party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been 
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings. 
Article 15 speaks directly to the inadmissibility of evidence obtained through torture. 
Governments must make sure that private individuals do not interfere with the other 
individuals’ exercise of their rights under the international human rights instruments 
mentioned above. Accordingly, without exception, China should comply with its 
international obligations and legal standards. 
 
5.4.2 Prohibition of torture is absolute 
 
Torture should never, ever be used. The right to be free from torture is a fundamental 
human right. Under any circumstances, torture, like cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, is absolutely prohibited by international human rights law, for example, 
the Geneva Conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR) 
                                                 
137 Article 7 of ICCPR provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.” 
138 Article 2(1) of UNCAT provides: “Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” 
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Article 3,139 the American Convention on Human Rights (1969) Article 5(2),140 the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) Article 5, 141  and the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985) Article 1.142 
Prohibitions against torture are a part of international human rights law. 
Torture is universally prohibited under all circumstances. Both the Geneva 
Conventions and the UNCAT absolutely prohibit torture. Specifically, Article 2(2) of 
the UNCAT recognizes that torture cannot be justified under any circumstances 
“whether a sate of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency.” Furthermore, the inadmissibility of evidence obtained by torture 
is understood without any exceptions whatsoever under international law. 
In order to ensure compliance with international law under the UNCAT, Chinese 
authorities cannot justify police torture by claiming that these apparent abuses are 
necessary to combat the growing threat of organized crime and other violent 
elements of Chinese society. If the government could torture suspects to get 
confessions and then use the confessions to obtain a conviction, there would no 
mechanism to limit the government’s power over the administration of the criminal 
justice system. Accordingly, police torture must be vigorously denounced under any 
circumstance even if the accused is suspected of a heinous crime. Since the ban on 
police torture cannot be derogated from, no claim of fighting crime can ever justify 
                                                 
139 Article 3 of ECHR provides: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.” 
140 Article 5(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights provides: “No one shall be subjected to 
torture, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be 
treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.” 
141 Article 5 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights provides: 
Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human 
being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation 
of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
and treatment shall be prohibited. 
142 Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture provides: “The State 
Parties undertake to prevent and punish torture in accordance with the terms of this Convention.” 
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deviating from it. The aim of fighting crime and the high clearance rate may not be 
invoked as justifications of torture and the use of evidence illegally obtained in 
investigation to incriminate the accused during the trial proceedings. 
 
5.4.3 Slippery slopes 
 
Some legal scholars defend torture, arguing that under some circumstances 
(especially in the name of “war on terror”), it is justified as a proper and necessary 
means of ensuring efficient law enforcement and crime control.143 They proclaim 
that tortured confessions are admissible. Here are two examples: First, in 2002, Alan 
Dershowitz accepts nonlethal torture, argues that in some scenarios144 the use of 
torture is legally justified145 and suggests that sterilized needles be inserted under 
fingernails of suspected terrorists to extract information from them when the 
information may lead to the immediate saving of lives.146 He claims it might be 
appropriate for torture to receive explicit authorization in the forms of judicial torture 
warrants.147 Second, Jay Bybee, a federal judge and assistant attorney general of the 
United States, argues that officials can use torture against suspected terrorists without 
being held liable. According to him, “torture” refers only to infliction of the sort of 
extreme pain associated with death or organ failure.148 
Those who favour leaving the door open for torture or coercive interrogation 
                                                 
143 A.M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat Responding to the Challenge 
(Yale University Press, New Haven 2002) 142-49; Memorandum from Office of the Assistant 
Attorney General to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002) 33-39. 
144 For instance, “ticking bomb” scenarios. 
145 A.M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat Responding to the Challenge 
(Yale University Press, New Haven 2002) 142-49. 
146 Ibid.,144. 
147 Ibid.,156-63. 
148 Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Attorney General to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President (Aug. 1, 2002) 33-39. 
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tactics usually argue that the more torture, the more crimes will be solved, and more 
lives will be protected. Yet this chain of proof is not established at all. It has never 
been shown that there is any correlation between coercive interrogation tactics and a 
decrease in crime. In contrast, I argue that the more we leave the door open for 
torture, the more Chinese citizens might be tortured in the future. The fear is that 
allowing the relevant activity will lead to a practice or outcome that is unequivocally 
unacceptable; any rationalizations of torture will help the practice thrive. It may 
“open the floodgates”. As Sir William Holdsorth asserted that “[o]nce torture has 
become acclimatized in a legal system it spreads like an infectious disease.”149 
There are several different aspects of the analysis of slippery slopes in the 
context of torture. If we give up the no-torture taboo in criminal process, then the 
criminal justice system will embark on a descent along a slippery slope as 
enforcement agents will resort to torture in situations that are farther and farther 
away from the category of “rare” cases, torture methods and the candidate of torture. 
The contagion effect will definitely emerge. It is my position that if we “legitimize” 
the use of torture, we won’t able to stop; torture will escalate in China. 
First, there will be the increasing “rare” cases. 
The first serious problem is with a flat exception to torture and the confession 
exclusionary rule for “rare” cases. We can draw up a short list for “rare” cases, but it 
is very difficult to keep it short. Torture should be subject to a blanket prohibition. 
Supposedly, torture of suspects who committed some cases, for example, murderer, 
career armed robber and rapist, is justified. If the degree of a suspect’s guilt is 
proportional to the permissibility of torturing him, can we torture the kidnapper who 
                                                 
149 William Holdsorth, vol. 5 of A History of English Law (3rd edn., Methuen, London 1945) 194-95. 
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refused to reveal where the innocent children was?150 Should we torture suspected 
terrorists to collect information that might be necessary to stop future attacks? Can 
we use torture as legitimate means of extracting confessions and other information 
towards suspects who committed the organized crime, human trafficking and 
international crime? A short list of serious crimes is not likely to stay short. 
In terms of efficacy of police torture, does torture produce reliable information? 
Torture, according to Judge Antonio Cassese, is especially effective with common 
criminals (for example, theft). Many thieves said that after an hour of torture, they 
admitted to everything they had done.151 Under such circumstances, most crimes in 
the penal code will be subject to torture. Police torture, however, should not be a last 
resort to solve those cases mentioned above. 
Secondly, torture techniques are brutalizing. 
The removal of legal and psychological constraints against torture may increase 
police brutality. Once police torture is authorized, the torturers tend to become more 
and more expert in using them effectively. When old methods of torment become 
ineffective, they will be replaced with more subtle and sophisticated ones. Harsh 
police tactics may become harsher. The torturers will learn to torture their victims 
without leaving any trace, for example, exposing suspects to extreme cold and heat. 
    Thirdly, there will be the increasing candidate of torture. 
The Roman Republic began using torture to assure that confessions extracted 
from slaves were true. However, during the late Empire, judicial torture was 
extended to second-class citizens,152 and was used against “free citizens charged 
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with high treason, which was known as crimen majestatis.”153 
If we legalize police torture, more and more complete innocents, excluding 
criminal suspects, might be permissible subject to torture. For example, police may 
threaten that the suspect’s mother is going to be tortured if the suspect does not 
cooperate. Police may torture uncooperative witnesses or informants to secure 
incriminating information. It may also become a device for punishing prisoners and 
intimidating political opponents of the regime, potentially disruptive religious-based 
movements such as Falungong, labor activists, and minority rights activists including 
Tibetans and Xijiang Muslims claiming self-determination.154 
Relaxing the confession exclusionary rule provided in the Chinese judicial 
interpretations increases the likelihood of police torture and coerced confessions, 





This chapter has explored the character and magnitude of the police torture problem 
in China. China’s long history and ongoing police torture coupled with the ghastly 
conditions of pre-trial confinement make imperative the need for a sharper 
instrument for dealing with this particular police misconduct. Abuses including 
police torture and threat were not conjectural, but actual and endemic. I am opposed 
to the use of force, threats, promise of leniency, trickery and deceit in order to secure 
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incriminating information from the suspects as all of which might well induce an 
innocent person to confess. 
The civilisation of a society is mirrored in how it treats the suspects and 
defendants by its law enforcement agents of the nation. In any event, government 
officials should not view torture as the shortcut to the solving of crime. Physical and 
psychological violence against defendants to procure confessions and evidence 
violates fundamental principles of justice. Criminal procedure law should not be used 
as an instrument of repression to serve the ends of the party in power. The abolition of 
Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary. 
In fact, there is no greater failure of the Chinese criminal justice system than the 
conviction and execution of an innocent person. A series of chilling cases, however, 
ushered in an era of profound concern about police tactics in extracting confessions 
in China after 1949. There is an understandable impulse to say that these scandals are 
the result of a few bad apples. Unfortunately, that is not true; there are still many 
apple trees. Furthermore, the number of unreported cases may be quite large. Have 
the lessons from the chilling cases mentioned above been learned? It is unlikely 
without the exclusionary rule. While the Chinese government appears to have taken 
some measures to strengthen the right to be free from torture, these reforms still cannot 
solve the problem of torture. Police torture continues to plague China. 
Given the failings of the current criminal justice system to protect the right to be 
free from torture, it is evident that a massive overhaul of the system is in order. An 
enforceable ban on police torture would be a good start. Obtaining confessions from a 
defendant by means of torture violates the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the 
evidence thus obtained should never ever be used at trial. A guarantee of freedom 
from torture which does not carry with it the exclusionary rule will be reduced to 
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mere words. To comply fully with the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate interpretations, the Chinese legislature should establish the 
exclusionary rule to ensure the right to be free from torture, and the right to be free 
from illegal searches and seizures. 
The Chinese authorities should seek to revolutionize the judicial supervision of 
police interrogation and searches. China should make combating police torture a 
higher priority and advance this cause through establishing the exclusionary rule. The 
court should suppress evidence where the investigator has failed to follow the rules. 
As we seek a solution to eradicate police torture in China, I propose to resolve 
the question of torture by using the confession exclusionary rule. In addition, in order 
to guard against illegal searches, search warrants should be issued by the court. An 
enforced search and seizure exclusionary rule would be a promising follow-up. We 
contend that the rule is an indispensable shield against the overzealous police and the 
most effective way to solve this problem. The judiciary shall not tolerate illegal law 
enforcement practice and refuse to use such evidence against any suspects. Ban on 
torture includes a ban on evidence retained through torture. 
I conclude that the exclusionary rule places significant restraints on the use of 
torture and illegal searches that we performed in order to obtain evidence to be used 
against the suspect in a criminal trial. This is a road of no return. If China leaves the 
window open a crack, the wind that has chilled to the bone in imperial China will 








Although the Chinese government seems intent on solving the problem of police 
torture,1 the courts have adopted a purely passive attitude when confronted with 
illegally obtained evidence. As discussed below, if the police are trying to use 
illegally obtained evidence, judges almost always find a way to admit it. Judges tried 
to avoid the torture issue in trial; in the eyes of most of them, the admissibility of 
evidence seems like an uncomplicated issue.2 
    In civil law systems, including China, criminal judges should render an 
explanation of the admissibility of evidence at issue in written judgments. Even if the 
evidence is inadmissible, the court should provide reasons. However, courts often do 
not address the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence in their judgments.3 
Additionally, judges are reluctant to suppress testimony as a result of a violation 
of Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.4 Courts also have been reluctant to 
suppress physical evidence obtained by illegal methods from criminal trials because 
they are so powerfully probative of guilt.5 In a empirical study in 2006 on the power 
                                                 
1 See Chapter 5 Introduction. 
2 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
Judges, procurators and investigators must, in accordance with the legally prescribed 
process, collect various kinds of evidence that can prove the criminal suspect’s or 
defendant’s guilt or innocence and the gravity of his crime. It shall be strictly forbidden to 
extort confessions by torture and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit or other 
unlawful means. 
5 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
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to exclude illegally obtained evidence, Wu Danhong concluded that Chinese judges 
were reluctant to exercise their exclusionary powers following a finding that 
evidence had been illegally obtained.6 This reluctance was especially acute in 
serious criminal cases.7 Extremely few cases have reported exclusion of crucial 
evidence due to torture, illegal searches and seizures or other violations of suspects’ 
rights. 
China prioritises the need to maintain law and order over the rights of suspects.8 
This reflects a pragmatic view that a police investigation should not be restricted if it 
produces the “right” outcomes. The practical result of this passive attitude is to 
undermine the incentive to eliminate police wrongdoing. As a practical matter, 
having illegally obtained confessions excluded is extremely difficult in China. The 
difficulty stems from both the passive attitude of judges9 and the burden of proof.10 
This chapter ventures into an area of evidence law in which the practical 
dimension is strong. The chapter will challenge the notion that Chinese courts should 
maintain a passive attitude toward the illegally obtained evidence, by examining the 
cases of Du Peiwu and Liu Yong. This chapter is divided into three main parts. First, 
the major purpose of this section is to canvass the attitude of Chinese criminal judges 
towards illegally obtained evidence. The Chinese approach to confessions obtained 
by torture has been mostly consistent from 1949 to today: the chief criterion for 
admissibility of evidence is its relevance to the charge. Relevant evidence is 
admissible, however it has been obtained. 
                                                 
6 Wu Danhong, ‘非法證據排除規則的實證研究 – 以法院處理刑訊逼供辯護為例’ [A Positive 
Study of Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Cases Concerning Using Torture to Coerce a 
Confession] (2006) 28 Modern Law Science 143, 144-45. 
7 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
8 See 6.3.3. 
9 See 6.1.3. 
10 See 6.2. 
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The second section then deals with whether, where torture is alleged, the burden 
of proof should fall on the suspects or prosecution. The main issue here is whether it 
is for a defendant to prove that statement was obtained by illegal methods, or for the 
prosecution to prove that it was not obtained illegally. The next question that arises is: 
what is the relevant standard of proof? The Chinese literature has largely overlooked 
the subject of the burden and standard of proof. I believe this important subject needs 
special attention. It explores the reasons why procuratorates should show the 
nonexistence of police torture. I contend that China should amend the provisions of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure that the burden of proof of the 
nonexistence of police torture should lie with the prosecution. 
Lastly, the third section turns to an analysis of evidence obtained by searches 
and seizures. There were many deficiencies in the Code of Criminal Procedure that 
led to the lack of a search and seizure exclusionary rule. I will address the 
deficiencies in the related law. Systematic abuses have accumulated over the past 
decades and the law’s deficiency is the crucial causative factor. A change in the 




6.1 Judicial response to police torture 
 
The Du Peiwu case and Liu Yong case are classic examples of the attitude of the 
courts when considering the admissibility of confessions obtained through torture. 
My review of cases shows that Chinese courts are generally reluctant to exclude 
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evidence obtained by torture, especially in the case in which the exclusion would 
result in releasing a defendant who was clearly guilty of the charged offense. What is 
most frightening about the court’s approach to the admissibility of illegally obtained 
evidence is its apparent unwillingness to accept the basic principle that the end of 
efficient crime control does not justify the means used. 
 
6.1.1 The Du Peiwu case 
 
6.1.1.1 If you do not confess, we torture you 
I will start with two cases, both of which attracted national attention. The first is the 
Du Peiwu case which provides a dramatic illustration of the court’s attitude towards a 
typical wrongful conviction case. In 1998, Du Peiwu, a policeman, was accused of 
murdering his wife (a policewoman) and her boyfriend (a deputy superintendent) in 
Kunming of Yunnan Province. Du was illegally arrested, detained and serious beaten. 
The Deputy Superintendent of the Kunming Police Station told Du that “if you do 
not want to confess to others, just tell me the truth. We are all police officers. Once 
you confess to me, I will try my best to help you.”11 After ten days of incessant 
interrogation, incommunicado detention, and torture, he falsely declared that he had 
murdered two victims. 
    His hands, legs and knees were covered with bruises. Du had evidence that the 
charges against him were based on a false confession obtained through torture (sleep 
deprivation, hanging by the hands and serious beatings). In order to prove the 
existence of torture, Du asked the procuratorate to take pictures of his injuries. 
                                                 
11 Cui Min, ‘再論遏制刑訊逼供’ [Rethinking the Elimination of Torture] (2003) 76 Journal of 
Zhejiang Police College 24, 26. 
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In trials, Du alleged that he made the statement in order to avoid further torture. 
His defense lawyer objected to the charge, contending Du’s confessions were 
inadmissible because of they were obtained by torture. Du also asked the 
procuratorate to show the picture of bruises. The procuratorate at first claimed there 
was no picture and then argued that the picture was missing. The judge asked Du to 
prove the existence of torture. To do this, Du had secretly hidden the bloody clothes 
after he was tortured.12 
 
6.1.1.2 If you are not guilty, prove it – The response 
During his next interrogation by judge, in order to prove his mistreatment, he took 
his shirt off to reveal wounds from being beaten, hung by handcuffed wrists, shocked 
with a cattle prod, and showed the bloody clothes in public. This was plainly visible 
to all during the trial. However, the judge prevented Du from pursuing this point and 
said “stop arguing this question. If you are not guilty, prove it.”13 The judges 
disagreed on whether the evidence obtained through torture should be inadmissible. 
The court allowed the use of the statements obtained through torture. The trial court 
had erred in admitting the confessions into evidence. 
In spite of a solid alibi and a lack of physical evidence linking him to the 
murders, Du was convicted and sentenced to death by the Kunming Intermediate 
Court.14 Du appealed his death sentence to the Yunnan High Court, apparently 
arguing that he was entitled to suppression of the illegally obtained confessions. Du 
                                                 
12 Hu Ming, ‘刑訊逼供的證明責任之思考 – 兼談英美法系證明責任分層理論給我們的啟示’ 
[The Thinking of the Burden of Proof for Torture – Lessons on the Burden of Proof in Common Law] 
(2005) 4 Journal of Chinese People’s Public Security University 60, 60. 
13 Chao Mingwei, ‘由杜培武案解讀司法程序層面的公正審判權’ [Interpreting the Right to a Fair 
Trial in the Judicial Procedure from the Case of Du Peiwu] (2008) 12 Legal System and Society 147. 
14 Kun Xing Chu 394 (The Kunming Intermediate Court, 1998). (1998) 昆刑初字第 394 號（昆明市
中級人民法院） 
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was spared immediate execution and given a sentence, peculiar to the Chinese 
system, namely, the death penalty with a two-year reprieve by the court.15 After Du 
had been detained for over two years, the real murderers were caught.16 Du’s 
convictions rested solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by the police 
by brutality and violence. 
In the present case, if after examining all the evidence, the judges had a 
reasonable doubt as to the admissibility of the confession; they should have found Du 
not guilty. The judges, however, turned a blind eye to torture and took a wholly 
passive attitude toward the admissibility of confessions obtained by torture in this 
case. Here, the defendant’s “confession” was involuntary and the court should have 
required the prosecution to prove that the confessions were voluntary. For further 
analysis of Du, see infra 6.1.3. 
 
6.1.2 The Liu Yong case 
 
6.1.2.1 Insufficient evidence to support the claim of torture – The 
response 
Another disappointing criminal case is that of Liu Yong. It again illustrates the 
acceptance of the crime control framework.17 From 1989 to 2000, Liu Yong, the 
kingpin of an organized group in Shenyang City of Liaoning Province, was involved 
in assaults, robbery, possession of firearms and ammunition and bribery of public 
                                                 
15 Uan Gao Xing I Chu 68 (The Tieling Intermediate Court, 1999). (1999) 雲高刑一中初字第 295號
（雲南省高級人民法院） 
16 Wang Zhao and Zhou Jing, ‘杜培武案的證據學思考’ [The Case of Du Peiwu as Viewed from the 
Science of Evidence] (2003) 19 Shantou University Journal (Humanities and Social Sciences 
Bimonthly 54, 54. 
17 See 1.3. 
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officials (including the former President and Vice President of the Shenyang City 
Intermediate Court). 
During the trial in the Tieling Intermediate Court (first instance), Liu alleged 
that he had been beaten and tortured by police officers. Despite this, the court 
allowed the use of the confession evidence. Referring to the issue of police torture, 
the court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim.18 The 
confession evidence was admitted at trial despite Liu’s objections. The Intermediate 
Court emphasized that Liu did not prove that he was tortured by the police. Liu was 
convicted of all the crimes mentioned above and sentenced to death. 
Liu’s defense lawyer consulted fourteen Chinese scholars, including, Chen 
Guangzhong (the former President of China University of Political Science and Law) 
and Chen Xingliang (Vice-Dean of the Beijing University Law School). These 
scholars concluded that evidence obtained by torture should be excluded.19 
Liu appealed his case to the Liaoning High Court (second instance). In the trial 
of second instance, after interrogating the police officers who were in charged of 
guarding Liu and interrogating Liu, the court concluded that “they cannot exclude the 
possibility that Liu was tortured by the police during the investigation.”20 It seems 
that in light of the new information concerning the confessions obtained by torture, 
Liu was spared immediate execution and sentenced to death with a two-year 
reprieve.21 Although the High Court did not explain why the sentence was changed 
                                                 
18 Xie Zhong Xing Chu 68 (The Tieling Intermediate Court, 2001). (2001) 鐵中刑初字第 68 號 （鐵
嶺市中級人民法院） 
19 Chen Xingliang, ‘中國刑事司法改革的考察 : 以劉涌和余祥林案為標本’ [The Examination of 
Chinese Criminal Justice Reform: Taking the Example of Liu Yun and Yu Xianglin] (2006) 6 Zhejiang 
Social Sciences 59, 60. 




from death to death with a reprieve, the most probable reason is that it accepted Liu’s 
claims of torture. 
However, many persons demanded an immediate death penalty.22 Because the 
strident public uproar, in a rare and controversial move, the Supreme People’s Court 
(SPC) held, in 2003, an extraordinary third trial. The Supreme People’s Court 
concluded that there had been no torture by the police at the investigation stage. The 
Supreme People’s Court quashed the verdict and reinstated the original death 
sentence, which was immediately carried out.23 After the Supreme People’s Court’s 
final ruling in December 2003, Liu was immediately taken from the court to a nearby 
funeral home to be executed and cremated within four hours.24 
 
6.1.2.2 The error of the court 
Both Du Peiwu and Liu Yun are very disappointing. The reasoning in the Liu Yun case 
by the Supreme People’s Court is extremely vulnerable on several different levels 
and from several different perspectives. The case Liu provided the Supreme People’s 
Court with an opportunity to provide guidance on the issue of the burden of proof of 
evidence obtained through torture. Unfortunately, the Supreme People’s Court 
missed the chance. I argue that the Supreme People’s Court erred in three respects. 
To begin with, the SPC claimed that according to the statements of police officers in 
charged of interrogating and detaining Liu, these officers did not torture Liu,25 but 
these officers might be torturers. It seems unrealistic to expect these police torturers 
                                                 
22 Ji Xiangde, ‘民憤的正讀 – 杜培武余祥林等錯案的司法性反思’ [An Authentic Interpretation of 
the People’s Wrath – Reflection on Unjust Cases of Du Peiwu and Yu Xianglin, etc.] (2006) 28 
Modern Law Science 153, 155. 
23 Xing Ti 5 (The Supreme People’s Court, 2003). (2003) 刑提字第 5 號（最高人民法院） 
24 Hong Lu and Terance D Miethe, China’s Death Penalty: History, Law and Contemporary Practices 
(Routledge, London and New York 2007) 113. 
25 Xing Ti 5 (The Supreme People’s Court, 2003). (2003) 刑提字第 5 號（最高人民法院） 
 226
would confess to torture if the court takes a passive attitude. 
Secondly, the Supreme People’s Court argued that between August 2000 and 
July 2001, the designated Shenyang Police Hospital examined Liu and his 
co-defendants thirty-nine times; no marks were found in their bodies.26 Because the 
marks resulted from torture fade after several days, the fact that no marks were found 
does not establish the nonexistence of torture. In addition, the designated Police 
Hospital was under the control of the Shenyang Police Station. The credibility of its 
reports is very doubtful. 
Thirdly, the Supreme People’s Court claimed that the way in which the 
statements (provided by the defense lawyer) obtained from witnesses to prove the 
existence of torture did not conform to the “related laws” and the witnesses 
statements contradicted each other27 but the Court did not explain what the “related 
laws” are and how the witnesses’ statement contradicted. The issue in this case is 
whether the investigation methods used by police, instead of the defense lawyer, 
conformed to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
It is worth noting that the Intermediate Court emphasized that Liu did not prove 
that he was tortured by the police. The High Court stubbornly refused to admit the 
existence of torture even after interrogating the police officers who were in charge of 
guarding and interrogating Liu. On the issue of existence or nonexistence of torture 
the Du Peiwu and Liu Yong courts were silent. The dicta of both cases are equivocal; 
they neither affirmed the nonexistence of torture nor admitted its existence. 
                                                 
26 Xing Ti 5 (The Supreme People’s Court, 2003). (2003) 刑提字第 5 號（最高人民法院） 
27 Ibid. 
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6.1.3 The court’s response: Passive attitude 
 
This section discusses the responses of the court to the defense lawyer’s argument 
that confessions should be inadmissible because they were obtained by torture. The 
Chinese criminal justice system presented dismal pictures of official lawlessness: the 
judiciary simply evinced a passive attitude toward confessions obtained through 
torture. I outline the court’s three prevalent responses to this situation. 
    First, the court completely ignored the issue of torture. 
Both the issue of torture and the admissibility of evidence obtained through 
torture are often not considered by courts.28 Judges have turned a blind eye to cases 
of police torture. For example, in Du, the judges simply ignored the stark evidence 
that Du had been tortured into confessing. Additionally, in the Zhong Huazhou 
case,29 the defense lawyer argued that it is very likely the defendant was tortured; 
therefore the statements obtained during custodial interrogation should be 
inadmissible. The court said nothing about this important issue at all. The judge did 
not give his reasons for his decision at this issue. This violates the principle that “the 
judge must give his reasons for his decision.”30 As Lord Denning put it a half 
century ago, “in order that a trial should be fair, it is necessary, not only that a correct 
decision should be reached, but also that it should be seen to be based on reasons.”31 
    Furthermore, a number of empirical studies conducted in China in the 
confession exclusionary rule context provide support for my observation. Using 
participant observation, Wu Danhong observed a trial of drug case in an intermediate 
                                                 
28 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
29 Xian Xing Chua 0134 (The Hangzhou City Xiaoshan District Court, 2005). (2005) 蕭刑初字第
0134 號 (杭州市蕭山區人民法院) 
30 Alfred Denning, The Road to Justice (Stevens and Sons, London 1955), 29. 
31 Ibid. 
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court in the south of China. The procuratorate asked whether the first defendant pled 
guilty. The first defendant pleaded not guilty and argued that the reason he confessed 
was because the police beat him. The judge did not say anything and asked the 
procuratorate to keep asking questions. The procuratorate read the first defendant’s 
incriminating confessions and told the first defendant that all other three 
co-defendants had confessed that he also committed the crime, and that it is useless 
to attempt to retract the original confessions. The procuratorate also claimed that 
since the first defendant had overturned his original confessions, he has to provide 
new evidence; otherwise, he belongs to the category of people who refuse to plead 
guilty. For this “reason”, the procuratorate suggested that the court should impose a 
severe sentence on the defendant. During the whole trial, the trial judge took a 
completely passive attitude toward the existence of torture. After the trial, the judge 
made no reference to tortured confessions.32 
Moreover, in 1984, the General Assembly of the United Nation adopted the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT).33 China became a signatory to the UNCAT in 1988.34 At 
that point the UNCAT became binding on China. China is committed to the 
world-wide elimination of torture. Article 12 of UNCAT requires each state party to 
investigate any torture allegations when reasonable grounds exist to believe such acts 
have occurred.35 Article 15 of UNCAT speaks directly to the use of evidence 
obtained by torture and makes clear that confessions made as a result of torture are 
                                                 
32 Wu Danhong, ‘非法證據排除規則的實證研究 – 以法院處理刑訊逼供辯護為例’ [A Positive 
Study of Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Cases Concerning Using Torture to Coerce a 
Confession] (2006) 28 Modern Law Science 143, 144. 
33 G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51 at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984). 
34 Xue Hongtao, ‘國際人權公約在中國的實施’ [The Practice of International Human Rights 
Conventions in China] (2008) Human Rights 21, 22. 
35 Article 12 of the Torture Convention. 
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inadmissible. It requires states to ensure that “any statement which is established to 
have been made as result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any 
proceedings.”36 Article 15 provides the court with the right to suppress evidence 
procured through torture in any proceedings, and an important enforcement and 
prevention tool in the fight against torture. 
As a signatory to UNCAT, China should actively fight the perpetrators of torture 
and take sufficient steps to investigate and prevent it. Thus, any suspect who alleges 
that he has been subjected to torture must be assured that allegations of abusive 
conduct are taken seriously, and that his case will be fully investigated and examined 
by competent authorities. 
I call on China to join with the community of law-abiding nations in prohibiting, 
investigating, and prosecuting all acts of torture, undertaking to prevent other cruel 
punishment, and excluding confessions obtained through torture. At the moment, I 
assert that China should adopt the burden of proof 37 to prove torture used by the 
international community38 in UNCAT cases. These decisions39 decided by the 
United Nation Committee against Torture may provide some guidance and helpful 
for Chinese adjudicators. In the future, China should bring its Code of Criminal 
Procedure into conformity with the UNCAT and enact laws that incorporate the 
UNCAT’s provisions in domestic law. It is important to look to norms of 
international law for guidance. 
Secondly, was there insufficient evidence to prove torture? 
                                                 
36 Article 15 of UNCAT. 
37 Article 3 of UNCAT implicitly lays the burden of proof on the State party. 
38 International law and practice in relation to torture place greater emphasis on the role of the States 
and their duties. 
39 Tunisia [2003] UNCAT 13; CAT/C/31/D/189/2001 (20 November 2003) [9.15]; Sweden [2002] 
UNCAT 10; CAT/C/28/D/185/2001 (25 May 2002) [10]; Switzerland [1994] UNCAT 1; 
CAT/C/12/D/13/1993 (27 April 1994) [7.3]. 
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In China’s inquisitorial system, it is the obligation of the judge to take all steps 
necessary to decide both questions of fact and law, and then to determine whether the 
accused has committed the alleged offense. The judge should ex officio investigate 
evidence for the purposes of discovering the truth. The Code of Criminal Procedure 
explicitly states that “if the collegial panel has doubts about the evidence, it may 
announce an adjournment, in order to carry out investigations to verify the evidence. 
When carrying out investigations to verify evidence, the People’s Court may conduct 
inquest, examination, seizure, expert evaluation, as well as inquiry and freeze.”40 
Judges were allowed to investigate evidence on their own initiative. In fact, the 
court does have broad powers to fully investigate a claim of torture. They can ask the 
accused (maybe the victim of torture), police, and witnesses before the trial judge, 
subpoena medical documents and decide admissibility of evidence. Of course when 
the court refuses to exercise its powers, the only and inevitable result is that there is 
insufficient evidence to prove torture. 
Another study of Hainan province criminal cases from 2000 to 2005 found that 
in 19 of the 33 cases where lawyers argued that confessions should be suppressed 
because of torture, the court admitted all confessions and claimed that there was 
insufficient evidence that defendants could prove the existence of torture.41 
I assert that the Chinese courts have an obligation to investigate complaints of 
torture or ill treatment. The obligation to open an investigation arises whenever a 
suspect has made a credible allegation of torture or ill treatment by the police. The 
duty to investigate claims of torture is implied under both Article 247 of the Criminal 
                                                 
40 Article 158 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
41 Wu Danhong, ‘非法證據排除規則的實證研究 – 以法院處理刑訊逼供辯護為例’ [A Positive 
Study of Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Cases Concerning Using Torture to Coerce a 
Confession] (2006) 28 Modern Law Science 143, 144. 
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Law42 and Article 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.43 These two articles 
establish an obligation for China to investigate claims of torture or ill-treatment. 
Thirdly, the court asks for “fact sheet”44 from the police to close the case. 
Here the court has not taken all reasonable steps to investigate the abuses. 
Prompt investigation of violations does not exist, as when defendants file torture 
claims, the court usually ask the police to provide a “fact sheet” and the investigation 
of torture will be closed. The “fact sheet” is a simple paper which is supposed to 
provide the “facts” in the period of interrogation. Some courts asked the police 
station concerned to provide a paper stating that “after the investigation, there is not 
any illegal investigation in our police station.”45 The provider of this fact sheet 
might be the police torturers.46 In effect, it is virtually impossible to ask these police 
torturers to confess to the existence of torture in the fact sheet. 
Furthermore, except under very limited circumstances, the court usually gives 
police torturers lenient sentences instead of harsh ones. In the Du Peiwu case, for 
instance, two of the police torturers were respectively given 12 and 18 months 
suspended sentences.47 
                                                 
42 Article 247 of the Criminal Law provides: 
A judicial officer who extorts by torture a confession from a suspect of crime or a 
defendant or extorts, by means of violence, testimony from a witness shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention. A judicial 
officer who causes another person’s deformity or death shall be sentenced heavily in 
accordance with provisions of Articles 234 or 232 of this law. 
43 Article 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: “In conducting criminal proceedings, the 
People’s Courts, the People’s Procuratorate’s and the public security organs must strictly observe this 
law and any relevant stipulations of other laws.” 
44 情況說明書。 
45 Wang Jiancheng, ‘漠視程序的慘痛代價 – 從杜培武案件引發的思考’ [The Price of Ignoring 
Procedure – Thinking Triggered from Yu Xinglin Case] in Cheng Guangzhong and Jiang Wei (eds.), 
訴訟法論叢第 8 卷 [The Procedure Law Ⅷ] (Legal Press, Beijing 2003) 275. 
46 Chen Xingliang, ‘中國刑事司法改革的考察 : 以劉涌和余祥林案為標本’ [The Examination of 
Chinese Criminal Justice Reform: Taking the Example of Liu Yun and Yu Xianglin] (2006) 6 Zhejiang 
Social Sciences 59, 62. 
47 Wang Zhao and Zhou Jing, ‘杜培武案的證據學思考’ [The Case of Du Peiwu as Viewed from the 
Science of Evidence] (2003) 19 Shantou University Journal (Humanities and Social Sciences 
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Under Articles 247 and 232 of the Criminal Law, where a police torturer who 
causes another person’s deformity or death, the sentence range is three years to death 
sentence.48 Some judges even departed from the Criminal Law range, found jail time 
unnecessary and exempted torturers from punishment. For example, in 1992, three 
police torturers who tortured suspects to death were exempted from criminal 
punishment because of their “outstanding work performance” and “good 
performance”.49 In the Xingcheng case,50 all six defendants are guilty of illegal 
search and yet free from punishment.51 However, I do not see why they should be 
free from punishment by criminal law. 
    In light of Du and Liu, the courts, as well as the procuratorates, are unconcerned 
with the manner in which a confession is procured. It seems that the goals of crime 
control and “accuracy” are always paramount in China. In these two cases, although 
the court has had opportunities to establish the burden of proof of evidence obtained 
through torture, they completely ignored the issue. The Supreme People’s Court in 
Du and Liu are endorsing values that align them with crime control principles. 
 
 
6.2 Burden and standard of proof 
 
The exclusionary rule, broadly speaking, should comprise two major elements. First, 
                                                                                                                                          
Bimonthly 54, 55. 
48 Article 247 of the Criminal Law. 
49 Bi Xiaoqing, ‘中國犯罪嫌疑人和被告人的權利保護與反酷刑制度’ [Protection of the Rights of 
Suspects and Defendants, and Prohibition of Torture in China] in Liu Hainian, Li Lin and Morten 
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50 See 6.3.3. 
51  Gu Minkang, ‘憲法權利的深層保護  – 從垃圾袋的處理說起 ’ [Further Protections of 
Constitutional Rights: Cases of Handling Garbage Bags] (2006) 7 Law Science 84, 87. 
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the substantive element, which includes the ambit of the illegally obtained evidence 
and the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. Second, the procedural element, 
which includes the procedure to review the admissibility of tortured confessions and 
the burden of proof of illegally obtained evidence. 
    Just like two wings of a bird and two wheels of a bicycle, the substantive 
element and procedural element are two indispensable elements of the rule. On the 
one hand, without the substantive element, there is no object for the procedural 
element to review. On the other hand, without the procedural element, the substantive 
element may become a dead letter and pay lip-service to the exclusionary rule. 
According to Article 265 of the People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure 
Rule, confessions from suspects, victims and witnesses obtained by torture, threat, 
enticement and deceit cannot be used to incriminate.52 In addition, Article 61 of the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the 
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law provides that “[i]t shall be strictly forbidden to 
collect evidence by illegal methods. Evidence obtained by torture, threat, enticement 
and deceit or other illegal methods are inadmissible.”53 If any statement obtained 
from a person under torture must be excluded during trial, the next important issue is 
the burden and standard of proof. The efficacy of the confession exclusionary rule 
depends on judicial practice in that it is judges who determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence of police torture. Judges have to decide whether the 
procuratorates or defendants should prove the existence of torture or other illegal 
methods, and what the standard for the burden of proof is. 
                                                 
52 ‘人民檢察院刑事訴訟規則’ [People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule], promulgated on 
16 Dec., 1998, effective on 18 Jan., 1999. 
53 ‘最高人民法院關於執行《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》若干問題的解釋’ [Supreme People’s 
Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law], 
promulgated on 29 June, 1998, effective on 8 Sep., 1998. 
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The problem of the burden of proof is significant. Legislatures and courts 
should be sensitive to burden of proof issues in torture cases and seek to lessen the 
defendant’s burden. So far, however, both the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
relevant judicial interpretations fail to stipulate on this matter. In other words, the law 
has failed definitively to designate the bearer of the burden, and the degree of proof 
necessary, to establish those factors upon which the evidentiary admissibility of a 
confession depends. I will attempt to defend the following thesis: that we should 
place the ultimate burden of proof on the prosecution. 
 
6.2.1 Heavy burden on defendants 
 
Defendants (i.e., victims of torture) are in strategically more difficult positions. 
Although the Code of Criminal Procedure does not specify where the burden of proof 
lies when defendants allege torture, and no statute places the burden of proof on 
defendants, most judges have imposed a heavy burden on defendants to prove the 
existence of torture rather than on the procuratorates to show the nonexistence of the 
contested declaration. 54  In practice, the defendant’s signature on a confession 
establishes a strong presumption in favor of its validity. For example, in the Du 
Xianbing case,55 the confession was admissible because he did not provide evidence 
to prove that the confession was obtained by torture. In the same year, in the Zhong 
Haiming case,56 the court argued that there was no evidence to support the existence 
of torture claimed by the defendant. In order to have an illegally obtained confession 
                                                 
54 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
55 Wu Fa Xing Chu 58 (Ganzhou City Wuxi County Court, 2008). (2008) 巫法刑初字第 58 號 (重
慶市巫溪縣人民法院) 
56 Gan Zhong Xing Er Chu 16 ( Jiangxi Province Ganzhou City Intermediate Court, 2008). (2008) 贛
中刑二初字第 16 號 (江西省贛州市中級人民法院) 
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excluded, the defendant must overcome the weight of these presumptions first. 
    Additionally, judges do not explicitly address the issue of on whom the burden 
would lie to prove the use or nonuse of torture in verdicts.57 I contend that placing 
the heavy burden of proof on defendants is one of the ways the court has cabined the 
operation of the exclusionary rule. In one trial, for example, when the defendant 
argued that “I said so because I was badly beaten up by the police at that time.” The 
judge warned the defendant and said that he should stop talking nonsense without 
evidence or the defendant would be barred from arguing the issue again.58 The 
question is, how could the defendant prove the existence of torture? 
    It is preposterous to contend that defendants should bear the burden as there 
exists a significant hurdle for defendants who would bear the almost impossible 
burden of demonstrating the existence of torture and establishing their innocence. 
The flaw in placing the burden in defendants is plain. First, the defendant does not 
even know the identity of the torturer. Secondly, the defendant is in the dark. 
Obviously, there would be no documentation of torture. Since torture often takes 
place in private or in places where people are in held in custody, where preservation 
of physical evidence of the torture by defendants would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible. Thirdly, the suspects have no access to any corroborating documents 
from official sources. Logically, it would be completely unrealistic to expect 
defendants to obtain forensic evidence of torture and then to prove the existence of 
torture, brutality, and similar outrageous conduct in criminal cases, because 
defendants are denied access to such evidence. It would be exceedingly rare for 
                                                 
57 See 6.1.1-6.1.2. 
58 Wu Danhong, ‘非法證據排除規則的實證研究 – 以法院處理刑訊逼供辯護為例’ [A Positive 
Study of Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Cases Concerning Using Torture to Coerce a 
Confession] (2006) 28 Modern Law Science 143, 144. 
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defendants to be able to offer any direct evidence to establish that physical abuse 
occurred. Even assuming that a suspect can demonstrate that beatings occurred, he 
must further prove that his wounds are caused by the police, he did not hurt himself 
“accidentally” or by other suspects. 
Some police forces in China have learnt to torment defendants in such a way as 
either not to leave marks or to leave marks that disappear after a couple of days. 
They have developed new, more sophisticated ways of doing so that are harder to 
detect. For example, beating the sole of the suspect’s feet with a truncheon, beating 
him over the head with a telephone directory, putting the suspect in front of an air 
conditioner blowing cold air directly on him, and taking the suspect’s clothes off in a 
freezing room. The police torturers may illegally prolong detention so as to conceal 
critical physical evidence of torture.59 
    When defendants argue the existence of torture and produce evidence, for 
example, showing wounds, providing photographs of bruises or medical reports on 
those injuries afterwards, in response, the prosecution should show that the 
preponderance of the evidence favoured the nonexistence of torture in the 
procurement of the evidence; although this is less stringent than the higher standard 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., proving the nonexistence of torture to a 
virtual certainty. 
    There are serious shortcomings in the traditional way of looking at the burden of 
proof.60 In both Du Peiwu and Liu Yun, the court assigned the burden of proof to 
defendants by requiring them to prove the existence of torture. Given this heavy 
burden on defendants, it is hardly surprising that illegally obtained evidence is rarely 
                                                 
59 Cui Min, ‘再論遏制刑訊逼供’ [Rethinking the Elimination of Torture] (2003) 76 Journal of 
Zhejiang Police College 24, 27. 
60 See 6.2.1-6.2.3. 
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suppressed. As Lord Nicholls has observed: 
 
[This] approach … place[s] on the detainee a burden of proof which … he 
can seldom discharge. In practice that would largely nullify the 
principle … that courts will not admit evidence procured by torture. That 
would be to pay lip-service to the principle.61 
 
The result is that defendants cannot discharge the burden placed on them. Placing the 
burden of proof on defendants will further discourage allegations of torture as 
defendants may think it will make no difference to tell judges or procuratorates about 
the fact of torture. 
 
6.2.2 Limited burden on the prosecution 
 
In a criminal case, broadly speaking, the law places the burden of proof on the 
prosecution. The cardinal principle is that the prosecution bears a burden to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offense; otherwise, the 
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. The prosecution, not the defendant, bears the 
burden of showing that the defendant’s confession in its case was not obtained 
illegally. There are six separate reasons for placing the ultimate burden of proof on 
the prosecution. 
The first is that, in criminal proceedings, because an accused must be 
considered innocent until proven guilty, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The procuratorates bears the burden of 
proving the guilt of the accused. Defendants do not have to prove their innocence. 
                                                 
61 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2), [2005] UKHL 71 [80]. 
 238
The procuratorates carries the burden of proving every element of the crime charged 
against defendants and refuting arguments posed by defendants (this specifically 
includes the nonexistence of torture). It should be for the state to prove the guilt of a 
person suspected of having committed an offense as the power and resources of the 
state are immense in comparison to defendants. It is also for the prosecuting 
authorities to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was not obtained 
by torture. If the prosecution fails to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of 
the accused then the accused is entitled to an acquittal. It is imperative we abide by 
this principle. 
In the second place, the procuratorate is the party wishing to use the illegally 
obtained evidence. It is the procuratorate who seek to rely upon evidence which was 
extracted under torture. Therefore, it is appropriate that the procuratorate prove its 
veracity. 
In the third place, the prosecution has the best access to evidence of 
nonexistence of torture. Some would say that to always prohibit the state from 
placing the burden of proof on defendants is too inflexible. However, some matters 
may be far easier for the prosecution to prove than the defendant, or it is simply be 
more expedient to require the prosecution to disprove torture than to require the 
defendant to prove the existence of it. The procuratorate with huge power and 
abundant judicial resources stands a much better chance than the suspects of 
obtaining further details on the circumstances of the torture. The procuratorate can 
obtain access to any place or premises and be able to secure the setting where torture 
allegedly took place. The videotaping of interrogation in custody and physical 
examination reports in detention centres are more readily obtained by the prosecution 
than the defendant. On the contrary, the defendants have no means or resources to 
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investigate. 
In addition, referring to Article 2 of ECHR, the ECtHR held that where the 
events in issue lie wholly within the exclusive knowledge of the state, as in the case 
of persons within their control in detention, strong presumption of fact will arise in 
respect of injuries and death occurring during the detention. In such a situation the 
burden of proof should be regarded as resting on the state to provide a satisfactory 
and convincing explanation.62 
In the fourth place, on one hand, the imposition of burden of proof not only will 
force the procuratorate and police to collect evidence in a more thorough manner, for 
example, mandatory videotaping or audiotaping of interrogation in custody, medical 
testimony, mandatory physical examination in detention centres and prisons. On the 
other hand, the police can use these mandatory measures, such as videotape 
confessions, to protect themselves regarding the claim of torture. That is why I insist 
that interrogations need to be entirely recorded. 
Fifthly, we must never forget the bedrock Anglo-American principle of the 
presumption of innocence. The Chinese law also recognizes the right of the accused 
to the presumption of innocence.63 The existence of a legal burden imposed on the 
accused may violate the presumption of innocence.64 The prosecution bears the 
burden of proof, which is inextricably linked to that basic premise fundamental to all 
criminal trials: the presumption of innocence. 
Sixthly, and finally, but not least, it may deter police misconduct. Given the 
terrible danger that the innocent will be convicted on the basis of false confessions 
                                                 
62 Salman v. Turkey (App no 21986/93) (2002) 34 EHRR 425, 483. 
63 Article 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
64 Fan Chongi and Xa Hong, ‘聯合國刑事司法準則與中國刑事訴訟法的再修改’ [United Nations 
Criminal Justice Regulations and Revision of Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure] (2007) 11 
People’s Procuratorial Semimonthly 24, 27. 
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obtained through torture, imposing the burden of proof on the prosecution is an 
indirect means of regulating police wrongdoing. The allocation of the burden to the 
prosecution is particularly important because it may help deter police misconduct. 
This imposition provides the Ministry of Public Security with greater incentives to 
educate and monitor its police officers. Placing the burden on the prosecution also 
gives additional protection to the citizen’s right to be free from torture. 
    From the aforementioned analysis, one must conclude that, the statutory 
prohibition on police torture in the criminal law cannot succeed in eliminating the 
practice without substantial changes in the Code of Criminal Procedure about the 
burden of proof. When a suspect falls into the hands of the police and, later shows 
wounds, bruises, fractures or other traces of trauma, ill-treatment by the police is 
presumed as long as no other cause has been proven by the government. This is 
crucial because by placing the burden of proof on the procuratorate, courts can 
eliminate the prior insurmountable hurdle that had required defendants to prove the 
existence of police torture. A failure on the prosecutor’s part to submit related 
information without a satisfactory explanation may give rise to the drawing of 
inferences as to the well-foundedness of the defendant’s allegations of torture. 
 
6.2.3 A party that asserts it must prove? 
 
Chinese procuratorates, including procuratorates in Du Peiwu and Liu Yun, insisted 
that the burden of proof of torture falls on the defendant. The following argument by 




If the defendant argued that he was tortured by the police, then he should 
prove that. As the procuratorate is not the party wishing to accuse the 
torture by law enforcement agents, it is impossible for them to bear the 
burden of proof. According to the rule that a party that asserts an issue 
must prove it, the defendant should bear the burden.65 
 
    Chinese courts, including the Supreme People’s Court, also took the same view 
that the burden of proof of torture falls on the defendant. For example, in the Liu 
Yong case, the Liaoning High Court (second first instance), took this position. The 
High Court declared that: 
 
Referring to Liu Yong … and their defense lawyers argued that defendants 
were tortured, after the investigation, this issue had arisen during the 
first-instance proceeding and the defense lawyers had submitted relevant 
evidence. The opinion of the prosecution was the torture issue should not 
affect the trial and adjudication. During the second-instance proceeding 
defense lawyers again submitted relevant evidence, after interrogating the 
police officers who were in charged of guarding Liu and interrogating Liu, 
this Court cannot exclude the possibility that Liu was tortured by the police 
during the investigation.66 
 
In the famous case of Liu Yong, the Supreme People’s Court took the same view and 
stated that: “The way in which witness statements gathered and submitted by defense 
lawyers of Liu Yong did not conform to related law. There were sometimes 
contradictory confessions.”67 According to the opinions of the court, it seems that 
the prosecution bears no burden of proof at all. 
These opinions held by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and Supreme 
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People’s Court are plainly wrong. In urging that the burden of proof of torture should 
fall on the defendant, the Senior Procuratorate mentioned above places considerable 
reliance on the rule that “a party that asserts an issue must prove it.”68 I have great 
difficulty seeing why. 
We need to distinguish between the burden and standard of proof in civil and 
that in criminal cases, especially in an inquisitorial system. In the context of the 
burden of proof, there is a sharp line between civil and criminal cases. It is here that 
there exists a fundamental difference between civil and criminal law cases with 
regard to the burden and standard of proof, evidence gathering, and protection of 
defendants’ rights. 
The trial of a civil action involves a dispute between persons in their private 
dealings. The chief role of the judge is to adjudge rights between two persons. The 
judge must give equal consideration to the interests of each of the parties. Thus, it is 
reasonable to require the party asserting a claim to bear the burden of proof. The 
general rule is that he who asserts must prove, meaning that anyone who is seeking 
to convince the legal system to take action on behalf of a party, bears the burden of 
establishing whatever propositions are necessary to justify that action. Thus, it 
appears logical to place that burden on the plaintiffs. Additionally, the standard of 
proof in civil cases is lighter and only requires the plaintiff to prove against the 
defendant by the preponderance of the evidence standard. Furthermore, in Khudoyov 
v. Russia,69 the ECtHR reiterates that ECHR proceedings “do not in all cases lend 
themselves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (the 
person who alleges something must prove that allegation)” because in certain 
                                                 
68  Zhang Jun, Jiang Wei and Tian Wenchang (eds.), 刑事訴訟  : 控辯審三人談  [Criminal 
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instances the state alone has access to information capable of corroborating or 
refuting torture allegations.70 
By contrast, at a criminal trial, unlike the position in civil trials, the primary task 
of the criminal judge is to protect the accused from a wrong conviction.71 This 
protective attitude is squarely aligned with the principle of the presumption of 
innocence, which also protects the accused from wrongful conviction. This is the 
reason why the prosecution bears the burden of proof when criminal conduct is 
alleged. 
The principle in criminal trials is that the prosecution bears the burden of proof 
when criminal conduct is alleged. The burden of proof always remains with the 
prosecution. Because, at a criminal trial, society would deprive the defendant of his 
life, liberty, or property, the burden and standard of proof was designed to exclude 
the likelihood of an erroneous conviction. That is why the standard of proof here 
requires a high degree of certainty; during trial, the prosecution must prove beyond 
all reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable question that the defendant has 
committed the offence, otherwise, the court must rule in favour of the defendant and 
set him free due to lack of evidence. In other words, the defendant is not guilty 
unless guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Furthermore, there is a significant difference between the Anglo-American 
adversarial criminal justice system and the Chinese inquisitorial system with regard 
to the burden and standard of proof. I contend that in an inquisitorial system of China, 
where the court itself is inquiring into the facts, there exists no “a party that asserts 
an issue must prove” rule in criminal law cases. 
                                                 
70 Khudoyorov v. Russia (App no 6847/02) (2006) 113. 
71 H.L. Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law – Justice in the Search for Truth (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2008) 227. 
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If the accused argued that “I was not at the crime scene on the night of victim’s 
killing” or “John Doe committed the crime”, he has no burden to prove an alibi or the 
third party guilt. The only thing he needs to do is point to some evidence on the issue, 
and then the court will verify his claim and find out whether he is telling the truth. 
By the same token, if the accused charged with murder, he asserted that he did not 
kill the victim; does he need to prove he is not guilty? The answer is undoubtedly no. 
We are currently dealing with the burden and standard of proof in criminal cases 
instead of that in civil cases. It is a serious mistake to argue that because “a party that 
asserts an issue must prove it”, therefore we should place the burden of proof on 
criminal defendant in China. The prosecution should carry the burden of showing 
that the defendant was not tortured. 
 
6.2.4 Anglo-American approach 
 
The burden of proof includes the evidential burden of proof (evidential burden, the 
burden of producing of evidence or the burden of production) and the persuasive 
burden of proof (persuasive burden, the burden of persuading the trier 72 as to his 
guilt or innocence or legal burden of proof).73 
The evidential burden of proof means that the responsibility of one party to 
show that there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence (or 
nonexistence) of a fact in issue. This burden determines “whether an issue should be 
                                                 
72 The jury or magistrates. 
73 Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence (10th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 72-73; Fiona 
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left to the trier of fact.”74 By contrast, the persuasive burden of proof means that the 
obligation of one party to meet the requirement that a fact in issue be proved (or 
disproved). This is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is 
true. This burden determines “how the issue should be decided.”75 
The difference between these burdens was explained by the House of Lords in R 
v. DPP, ex parte Kebeline,76 the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v. Gill77 (a case 
concerning duress) and Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Fontaine 78 (a case 
concerning mental disorder automatism). This essential difference was never better 
expressed than it was by Lord Hope: 
 
It is necessary in the first place to distinguish between the shifting from the 
prosecution to the accused … the “evidential burden,” or the burden of 
introducing evidence in support of his case, on the one hand and the 
“persuasive burden,” or the burden of persuading the jury as to his guilt or 
innocence, on the other. A “persuasive” burden of proof requires the 
accused to prove, on a balance of probabilities, a fact which is essential to 
the determination of his guilt or innocence. It reverses the burden of proof 
by removing it from the prosecution and transferring it to the accused. An 
“evidential” burden requires only that the accused must adduce sufficient 
to raise an issue before it has to be determined as one of the facts in the 
case. The prosecution does not need to lead any evidence about it, so the 
accused needs to do this if he wishes to put the point in issue. But if it is 
put in issue, the burden of proof remains with the prosecution. The accused 
need only raise a reasonable doubt about his guilt.79 
 
    The burden of proof lies on the prosecution on every issue except that of 
                                                 
74 R v. Fontaine, [2004] 1 SCR 702 [11]. 
75 R v. Fontaine, [2004] 1 SCR 702 [11]. 
76 R v. Director of Public Prosecutions Ex Parte Kebeline and Others, [2000] 2 AC 326. 
77 R v. Gill, [1963] 2 All ER 688. 
78 R v. Fontaine, [2004] 1 SCR 702. 
79 R v. Director of Public Prosecutions Ex Parte Kebeline and Others, [2000] 2 AC 326, 378-80. 
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insanity. The principle that the burden of proof in criminal cases falls to the accuser 
and not on the accused had long been established in English common law in 1935. 
The classic exposition of this principle is to be found in the leading case of 
Woolmington v. The Director of the Public Prosecutions. 80  Lord Sankey best 
articulated this principle and stated that “throughout the web of the English Criminal 
Law one golden thread is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to 
prove the prisoner’s guilt.”81 
Before the court determines that a statement obtained through torture is 
inadmissible, it has to determine whether the prosecution or the suspects should 
prove the existence or nonexistence of torture, and what should be the standard for 
this burden of proof. At common law the judge decides on how the relevant 
confession has been obtained, whereas the jury decides whether the confession was 
true. In England, the admissibility of confession evidence is governed by Section 76 
(2) of PACE. Following the common law, Section 76 (2) of PACE stipulates that if 
the prosecution wish to adduce the accused’s confession in evidence they must prove 
that it was not secured in the prohibited ways.82 Otherwise, a confession by the 
accused is inadmissible in proof of his guilt. The standard imposed on the 
prosecution is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. 
Lord Bingham describes the view of placing the burden of proof on the individual to 
                                                 
80 [1935] AC 462. 
81 [1935] AC 462, 481. 
82 Section 76(2) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act provides: 
If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession 
made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession was or may 
have been obtained – (a) by oppression of the person who made it; or (b) in consequence 
of anything said or done which was likely, in the circumstances existing at the time, to 
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court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence against him except in so far as 
the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the confession 
(notwithstanding that it may be true) was not obtained as aforesaid. 
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show that the disputed evidence has not been obtained by torture83 as “a test which, 
in the real world, can never be satisfied.”84 
In the United States, the use of a confession obtained by torture is prohibited. 
When a confession challenged as involuntary is sought to be used against a criminal 
defendant at his trial, the Supreme Court has held that the Fifth Amendment requires 
that the prosecution must prove at least by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
confession was voluntary.85 
    When the defendant files a motion to exclude the confession as being the result 
of torture, a voluntariness hearing must be conducted in the absence of the jury 
before a confession can be admitted.86 Courts are very strict in keeping from the jury 
evidence of confessions when there is any reasonable doubt of their being voluntary. 
The procedure is known as the voir dire, or trial within trial. At this hearing, it is the 
prosecution to prove the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the 
evidence.87 The “truth” and accuracy of these confessions will not be considered at 
the voluntariness hearings. 88  The judge must determine an issue as to the 
voluntariness of a confession before it can be submitted to the jury in a criminal trial. 
Furthermore, the states are free to adopt a higher standard. Some states, for 
example, the State of Maine, have adopted a stricter standard of proof. In State of 
Maine v. Collins,89 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the Maine 
Constitution requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
                                                 
83 A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 71 [121]. 
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85 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 
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confession was voluntary.90 Overall, in the United States, the government has the 
burden of persuasion that its evidence is not tainted by illegal searches.91 
For those reasons mentioned from 6.2.1 to 6.2.3, therefore, I think that it would 
be completely wrong to place burden of providing involuntariness on the 
defendant.92 In my opinion, this position, taken by Anglo-American law, is very 
desirable. Moreover, there is a growing European Union dimension to criminal 
justice. The ECHR is an additional human rights instrument that implement the 
customary international law prohibition on torture. Decisions of the ECtHR may also 
be useful for guidance to Chinese adjudicators in implementing in dealing with 
torture claims. 
In regards to Article 3 of ECHR, for example, say X was ill treated by the police, 
if the victim was not detained, he can see the doctor. The doctor reported several 
injuries on the body of X, corresponding the allegations of X. In this situation, of 
course X can provide the related medical report to prove his claim. Plainly, it is 
natural for victims to provide relevant evidence to prove their claim. However, it is 
impossible for most detained defendants to access this evidence. 
The reversal of the burden of proof means that once the applicant has an 
arguable claim93 that he has been tortured by agents of the state,94 the burden of 
proof then moves to the state to disprove the existence of torture. The state is 
responsible for proving that the state is not liable, instead of applicants proving the 
existence of torture. The burden of proof of torture should fall on the state, not the 
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91 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1969). 
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applicant. In short, the ECtHR places the burden of proof on the government.95 
There are two situations in which the reversal of the burden of proof occurs. 
First, the state alone has access to sources of information. Second, the events in issue 
lie wholly within the exclusive knowledge of the state, for instance, in the case of 
persons within their control in custody.96 Referring to the standard of proof, the 
ECtHR has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”.97 
To summarize, I argue that China should place the burden on the prosecution to 
prove the non-use of torture, as long as the defendant can establish an arguable claim 
that authorities obtained the evidence through evidence. In other words, the 
defendant must first satisfy the evidential issue – i.e., to make torture an issue which 
the judge has to consider and then places the legal burden upon the prosecution to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was no torture.98 
 
 
6.3 Evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure 
 
According to my observation, China has not historically seen it as part of its function 
to exclude items of evidence on the grounds of illegality. It is apparent, for China, 
that the exclusion of physical evidence for breaches of constitutional rights is a 
relatively new and uncommon practice. The basic assumption is that all relevant 
evidence, especially physical evidence, should be available to the court, and that the 
                                                 
95 Ribitsch v. Austria (App no 18896/91) (1995) 21 EHRR 573. 
96 Salman v. Turkey (App no 21986/93) (2002) 34 EHRR 425. 
97 Khudoyorov v. Russia (App no 6847/02) (2006) 112. 
98 The prosecution has to disprove the existence of torture. 
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police should deal internally with questions of misconduct,99 apart from examples of 
extreme wrongdoing. In other words, all relevant evidence is admissible however 
obtained. Chinese courts thus apply an inclusionary rule of evidence. However, it 
would be ironic if the government did not allow the police to torture and commit 
illegal searches, but permits prosecutors and judges to use evidence obtained by the 
methods mentioned above. 
    The focus of this section is mainly on the law of search and seizure, and real 
evidence discovered in breach of the law. Because of the generally wide scope of 
search and seizure powers and the lack of close judicial supervision in this area, the 
police enjoy almost complete discretion in deciding against whom to use their vast 
array of search and seizure powers. I contend that the search and seizure law in 
China imposes almost no limits on the means the government may use to pursue its 
crime control objectives. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that no physical 
evidence has been suppressed based on an illegal search and seizure. The Code of 
Criminal Procedure provides no safeguards for the accused at all against the 
admission of evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures. 
 
6.3.1 Deficiency of search and seizure law 
 
A search is a governmental invasion of a person’s privacy and we try to minimize the 
intrusion of the search to what is necessary to complete the search for the items listed 
with particularity in the warrant. 
    At the constitutional level, while Article 39 of the Constitution provides that
                                                 
99 ‘公安部︰命案必破不會引發刑求’ [The Ministry of Public Security: Death Cases Must be Solved 
Will not Trigger Torture] < http://news.sina.com.cn/c/l/2006-05-16/12419876496.shtml> accessed 1 
January 2011. 
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“[t]he home of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. Unlawful 
search of, or intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited,”100 once the government 
violates Article 39, there is no remedy of excluding evidence from the criminal 
process. At the statutory level, the search and seizure law in China is impossibly 
simplistic. All searches and seizures by government agents are controlled by merely 
ten articles, five articles related to search101 and seizure102 respectively, in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure. The general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
could not be used to satisfy the fundamental rights standards on the right to be free 
from illegal searches and seizures. 
In effect, I will contend that the Chinese government leaves the power to search 
and seize solely in executive hands.103 Unless the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule is explicitly established and applied, the current “warrant requirement” in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure is unlikely to fully eliminate police wrongdoing 
problems. 
The requirement of warrants was designed to protect suspects from 
investigatorily overreaching. Whilst Article 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
provides that “[w]hen a search is to be conducted, a search warrant must be shown to 
the person to be searched,”104 the Code of Criminal Procedure has failed to unravel 
four important questions in need of resolution: (1) Under what condition searches 
and seizures can be carried out? (2) Who has the authority to issue search and seizure 
warrants? (3) What is the scope of searches and seizures? and (4) How should 
evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures be dealt with? 
                                                 
100 Articles 39 of the Chinese Constitution. 
101 Articles 109-113 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
102 Articles 114-118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
103 See 6.3.1- 6.3.2. 
104 Article 111 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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First and foremost, the Code of Criminal Procedure lacks the “probable cause” 
requirement 
The Code of Criminal Procedure’s shortcomings are apparent. One striking 
deficiency of the search and seizure law is what it omits: probable cause. On the one 
hand, probable cause is an important validating element of a search. On the other 
hand, it is a restraint on the government’s search power. It serves to protect the public 
by limiting the government. 
With regard to the condition to carry out searches and seizures, with all criminal 
investigations, the threshold question as to under what condition law enforcement 
investigators can conduct searches and seizures initially, it seems that the answer is, 
whenever investigators would like to “collect evidence and track down an 
offender”.105 
Currently, probable cause for a search or seizure is not required in China. Law 
enforcement officials are not required to believe that the items sought are related to 
the criminal activity under investigation, and that the items reasonably may be 
expected to the located in the place to be searched at the time the search warrant 
issues. 106  Thus, the police always have the legal right to search and seize 
incriminating evidence even when they lack probable cause to search. 
The probable cause requirement in criminal investigation has been applied for 
good reason: to protect citizens from unauthorized and unreasonable government 
intrusion. The lack of this requirement widely opens the door to abuses by 
government agencies.107 Therefore, I contend that the Code of Criminal Procedure 
                                                 
105 Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
106 Articles 109 and 114 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
107 The Editor, ‘延安黃碟案引發的法學思考’ [Legal Thoughts Triggered from the Blue Videodisc 
Case in Yanan] (2003) Jurist Review 10, 10-11. 
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should require that search warrant will be issued only upon a showing of “probable 
cause”. I would emphasize, above all things, that no warrants should be issued except 
upon probable cause. 
Second, there is the issue of who is authorized to grant warrants. 
The second question is who has the authority to issue search and seizure warrant. 
Ironically, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the bedrock source of law pertaining 
search and seizure issues, provides nothing to govern this issue. As noted before,108 a 
central proposition in warrant procedure in the Anglo-American legal system is that 
the determination of issuing the warrant (or the determination of probable cause) is to 
be made by the judge or prosecutor, not the police officer who seeks the warrant. 
However, Article 205 of the Public Security Criminal Case Procedure Provisions109 
provides: 
 
In order to collect criminal evidence and track down an offender, under the 
authorization of the superintendent of public security bureau at county 
level or above, investigators may conduct searches of the person, 
belongings, residences and other relevant places of criminal suspects.110 
 
In addition, Article 178 of the People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rules,111 
adopted by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, provides that “[w]hen a search is to 
be conducted, a search warrant must be shown to the person or his family members 
to be searched. The Chief Procuratorate issues search warrants.”112 
In the Anglo-American criminal justice system, search and seizure warrants are 
                                                 
108 See 4.1.2. 
109 ‘公安機關辦理刑事案件程序規定’ [Public Security Criminal Case Procedure Provisions], 
effective on 14 May, 1998. Degree No.35 of the Ministry of Public Security. 
110 Article 205 of the Public Security Criminal Case Procedure Provisions. 
111 ‘人民檢察院刑事訴訟規則’ [People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule], promulgated on 
16 Dec., 1998, effective on 18 Jan., 1999. 
112 Article 178 of the People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rules. 
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usually obtained from a judge. Information should be presented to a neutral judge, 
who will make the determination whether a search warrant will be issued.113 In 
contrast, in the Chinese criminal justice system, only the judge cannot issue search 
and seizure warrants. A judge cannot review an application for search warrant and 
determine that there is probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime exists in a 
particular place before issuing the warrant. Yet, the police and procuratorate can issue 
search and seizure warrants. The judge’s power in this context was totally superseded 
by the power of the police and procuratorate. 
Additionally, the Public Security Criminal Case Procedure Provisions and 
People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rules are merely “quasi-judicial 
interpretations”, not even “judicial interpretations”. They are internal regulations 
respectively for public security organs and procuratorate. In practice, these 
“quasi-judicial interpretations” have superseded the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
Public Security Bureau and Supreme People’s Procuratorate authorized themselves to 
issue warrants.114 Under these circumstances, it is impractical to expect “neutral” 
police and procuratorate to issue the search warrant. It is extremely easy for the 
police to get a search warrant anytime they want to. 
Thirdly, the scope of searches and seizures is an important issue. 
Referring to the particularity of warrants, a search warrant should describe with 
particularity of (1) the criminal activity under investigation; (2) the items to be seized; 
and (3) the place or person to be searched. If a warrant lacks particularity, there is no 
limitation to safeguard the individual’s privacy interest against the wide-ranging 
exploratory searches. A search warrant is intended for purposes of searching physical 
                                                 
113 See 4.1.2. 
114 Article 205 of the Public Security Criminal Case Procedure Provisions and Article 178 of the 
People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rules. 
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evidence. Such limitation prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant 
describing another. 
The actual content of the search warrant is much too simplistic in this difficult 
area. Chinese executing officers can examine any evidence bearing a relationship to 
the offense and may “conduct searches of the person, belongings, residences and 
other relevant places of criminal suspects and persons who might conceal criminals 
or criminal evidence.”115 It is completely unclear how far the “other relevant places” 
may eventually reach. The court has also refused to define the concept of the 
overbroad term within a warrant. During an examination or search, any belongings or 
document “that may be used to prove the guilt or innocence of a defendant shall be 
seized.” 116  We need to limit government authority to search and seize only 
particularly-described items. Without checks and balances on the initiation of 
searches, decisions about whom to search, for what reasons, and how, were largely 
entrusted to the police. 
Fourthly, here is the question of the admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal 
searches and seizures. 
The admissibility of confessional and physical evidence is an issue that the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and the Supreme People’s Court have never explicitly 
addressed. This issue is totally ignored in China. There is no provision for this issue 
in Code of Criminal Procedure. A general rule for the admissibility of physical 
evidence is without regard for how the evidence was obtained.117 There is no 
potential weapon in the Chinese courts with which to combat police illegality. 
                                                 
115 Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
116 Article 114 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
117 Zhou Fuming, ‘我國確立非法證據排除規則的必要性和可行性’ [The Necessity of Establishing 
the Exclusionary Rule in China] (2007) 1 Law Science 142, 143. 
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6.3.2 General warrants 
 
General warrants, issued without sufficient basis and capable of being used as 
instruments for intrusive official searches, were an evil because they constituted a 
license to law enforcement officers to abuse their powers in a manner that was ultra 
vires. I consider general warrants to be the most serious concern with regard to 
searches and seizures, because the power of Chinese law enforcement officers is 
almost unlimited in this context and warrantless searches are common.118 
    It appears, at least on the surface, that Code of Criminal Procedure provides for 
a warrant requirement. 119  In fact, the equivalent of blank search warrants is 
permitted in China. The warrant is nothing more than a fishing license and leads to 
an exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings. The scope of warrants covers 
only the contents of an investigator’s name, suspect’s name and address of premises 
which it is intended to search. The content of the search warrant used by the police is 
that “[a]ccording to Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we send 
investigator ______ [insert name of person who is to execute warrant] to search the 
premises of suspect ______ in _________ [insert address of premises which it is 
intended to search].”120 
By the same token, the content of the search warrant used by the procuratorate 
is that “[a]ccording to Articles 109, 111 and 131 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
we send investigator ______ [insert name of person who is to execute warrant] to 
search the premises of suspect ______ in _________ [insert address of premises 
                                                 
118 See 6.3.1. 
119 Article 111 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 
120 Wang Bin, 刑事搜查制度研究 [The Research of Search] (Chinese People’s Public Security 
University Press, Beijing 2008) 282; also available at: <http://doc.laweach.com/doc_31490_1.html> 
accessed 1 January 2011. 
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which it is intended to search].”121 
Law enforcement does not have to go to the judge in China and obtain a warrant 
specifying the particularity. All they have to do is complete the three blanks in the 
overreaching warrants. Without specifying the reason and item to be searched and 
seized, the chief procurator is unable to truly verify that the law enforcement officer 
is conducting a search for legitimate reasons. The inevitable consequence is that the 
searching officer has complete and unsupervised authority to search the entire 
premises from the attic to the basement at anytime for the sole purpose of collecting 
evidence. The Chinese search and seizure powers are too broad, potentially 
interfering with the everyday lives of innocent citizens. If a premises can be searched 
anywhere at anytime without a search warrant, there is no limit to the search power 
of a police officer. 
Take the Blue Videodisc Case as one example. The facts in the Blue Videodisc 
Case were these: on 18 August, 2002 at 2300, Mr. and Mrs. Chang lived in Yanan 
City of Shaanxi province. Four police officers arrived in their residence pursuant to 
information that people were watching a blue movie. The police entered the house 
without a search warrant and tried to seize the TV, videodisc player and the blue 
videodisc. As Mr. Chang tried to stop the seizure, he was detained for the crime of 
disrupting public service. Afterwards, medical reports indicated that the Mr. Chang 
were suffering from varying degrees of acute stress reaction (ASR), which symptoms 
continued to persist in 2003 (for example, intense bursts of anger and laughter, sleep 
disturbance, anxiety and depression, extreme mood swings, and eating cigarette 
butts).122 
                                                 
121  Ibid.; also available at:  <http://doc.lawtime.cn/info/wenshu/qitaws/2007012944988.html> 
accessed 1 January 2011. 
122 The Editor, ‘延安黃碟案引發的法學思考’ [Legal Thoughts Triggered from the Blue Videodisc 
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In fact, however, the behavior of Mr. and Mrs. Chang was neither illegal nor 
immoral. The Criminal Law does not forbid watching a blue movie. They were 
merely watching a movie in their own private space. The police still can conduct an 
illegal search without approval from anybody for any reason. This unapproved search 
was unconstitutional and illegal. 
In China, there is no question of botching the timing of the execution of the 
warrant, because there is no time limit. It seems that the Code of Criminal Procedure 
permits the execution of search warrants at any time of the day or night. Moreover, 
there is no question of seizing unauthorized items, as no item is unauthorized. It is 
frivolous to argue that officers are prohibited from seizing items that are not 
described in the warrant, because the warrant does not particularly describe what 
things will be seized. Removing the judge’s determination from what items should be 
seized could transform a legal warrant into a general warrant. It may lead to the 
unbridled intrusion into a person’s life and property. What, then, is the extent of 
searches and seizures? The short answer is: the sky is the limit. There are no 
limitations on what can or will be searched. 
Therefore, a warrant requirement in the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to 
the current searches and seizures is a mere paper tiger which provides suspects with 
very limited actual protection. It makes the general warrant such a dangerous 
weapon. 
 
6.3.3 The end justifies the means? 
 
Over the past six decades in China, priority is given to the end (convicting offenders) 
                                                                                                                                          
Case in Yanan] (2003) Jurist Review 10, 10-11. 
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above the means (compliance with exclusionary rule). The judiciary dotes on the 
discovery of the “truth”.123 No matter which method is chosen for investigating, if 
the evidence proved the defendant’s guilt; they would rather know exactly how the 
crime occurred.124 Furthermore, Chinese courts cannot provide the external check on 
the investigation method of the executive branch in the matter. In many cases, the 
attitude that the ends justify the means seems to be gaining ground.125 
For some of the police and procuratorates – and by extension some of the 
judges – they are naturally prone to view their role as striking hard against crime and 
seeking “the truth”.126 Using illegally obtained evidence may encourage efficiency 
and expediency in the criminal justice system, a central goal of the crime control 
model.127  Therefore, the need to get a conviction is far more important than 
preserving suspects’ constitutional rights. For example, one procuratorate publicly 
claimed that “to those criminals, we should give these defendants hell. It is 
impossible for me to talk about equality with them, and tell them they can decide to 
say or not to say; I cannot touch him anyway.”128 
This is also the argument some of the police use when they trample on suspects’ 
rights. For instance, Article 39 of the Constitution forbids illegal searches. Article 
247 of the Criminal Law prohibits the use of torture to obtain confessions. In Liu 
Yun,129 the police acted as if they were above the law and regarded their “search for 
                                                 
123 Allison Conner, ‘True Confessions? Chinese Confessions Then and Now’ in K.G. Turner, J.V. 
Feinerman, and R.K. Guy (eds.), The Limits of the Rule of Law in China (Washington University Press, 
Seattle and London 2000) 151-52. 
124 Han Yang, 被訴人的憲法權利 [Constitutional Rights of the Accused] (Chinese People’s Public 
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125 See 6.1.1 and 6.2.2. 
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127 See 1.3. 
128 Huang Qiang and Wang Lily, ‘非法證據排除規則中國化過程中的矛盾分析’ [Analyzing the 
Contradiction of the Exclusionary Rule with Chinese Characteristics] (2005) 10 Chongqing Social 
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129 Xie Zhong Xing Chu 68 (The Tieling Intermediate Court, 2001). (2001) 鐵中刑初字第 68號 （鐵
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truth” as an end that justifing any means including torture. They undermined one of 
the central tenets of criminal justice: No one is above the law. 
One crucial question must be asked: Does the end justify the means? I do not 
believe that the end justifies the means. This argument is never acceptable. I believe 
in the rule of law. The means we must always be in keeping with the law. It is fairly 
clear for me that the answer definitely would be “no” for three reasons. 
First, the nature and characteristic of illegal means does not change. 
The end will never justify the illegal means. The illegal investigatory method, 
for example, torture, is an evil that can never be justified or excused, no matter what 
the result it may produce. It is the violence and the killing of human beings that make 
torture wrong. Torture is torture. An illegal search is an illegal search. The nature of 
this police wrongdoing will not change by what result they can produce. The means 
to achieve the crime control goal have been horrific. Without a fair judicial process, 
there is no justice. 
Secondly, the horrific means will bring terrible retribution. 
Eight decades ago, Justice Brandeis correctly made the following observations 
in a famous dissent in Olmetead v. United States130 and said the following: 
 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if 
it fails to observe the law scrupulously … Crime is contagious. If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that 
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means – to 
declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the 
conviction of a private criminal – would bring terrible retribution. Against 
                                                                                                                                          
嶺市中級人民法院） 
130 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.131 
 
How can the government guarantee a bad means may lead to a good end? A bad 
means may lead to a bad end, instead of a good one. The terrible retribution is the 
evil to punish the innocent and let the real guilt free. 
Thirdly, a good means does not necessary lead to a bad end. 
The result should not be more important than the process. We should consider 
both the means and ends of our actions. A bad means should not justify a good end. 
“Due process” may lead to “due result”. When we deserve “due process”, it does not 
necessary mean that we cannot deserve “due result” at the same time. They are not 
necessarily incompatible. 
One misunderstanding of the exclusionary rule is that once the court excludes a 
piece of illegally obtained evidence, the criminal defendant did in fact commit the act 
charged will definitely go free. As a matter of fact, even if particular evidence were 
excluded, it is likely that overwhelming other evidence will exist to support a 
conviction. For example, in the Liu Yong case,132 it was impossible for Liu Yong to 
be set free because of the exclusion of a piece of confession obtained by torture. 
What better evidence is there of the ineffectiveness of the existing search and 
seizure law than the reaction of the Chinese police to illegal search and seizure? The 
reaction of the police chief in the Xingcheng case also expressed the view of the ends 
justify the means. In 2004, one informant and five police officers, who had neither a 
search warrant nor any evidence to constitute probable cause, committed an illegal 
search in Xingcheng City of Liaoning Province. Four of them climbed into the 
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victims’ home with a ladder through window. Medical reports indicated that the 
female victim in her twenties was suffering from acute stress reaction (ASR) as a 
result.133 
It is unlawful for any policeman to enter and search any private dwelling house 
or place of residence without the authority of a search warrant. Article 245 of the 
Criminal Law provides that: 
 
A person who unlawfully subjects another person to a bodily search or a 
search of his residence or unlawfully intrudes into another person’s 
residence shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not more than 
three years or criminal detention. A judicial officer who abuses his power 
and commits a crime under the preceding paragraph shall be sentenced 
heavily.134 
 
Again, the police conducted an illegal search in this case. 
It is clearly apparent from the police officers’ testimony that they casually 
regard illegal searches as trivialities. In trial, all the police officers admitted that they 
not only did not get a search warrant in this case but also that they had never applied 
for a search warrant before. The police officers all testified to using the method noted 
above, but said they believed that they did not commit a crime. “Before we never 
took out search warrants,” said two officers. They argued that they were not 
“searching” but “taking a look at” the house. They also testified that “we are not 
guilty because we just followed superior orders.”135 However, the Criminal Law 
does not grant a defence to the police who follow superior orders if those orders are 
                                                 
133  Gu Minkang, ‘憲法權利的深層保護  – 從垃圾袋的處理說起 ’ [Further Protections of 
Constitutional Rights: Cases of Handling Garbage Bags] (2006) 7 Law Science 84, 87. 
134 Article 37 of the Chinese Constitution. 
135  Gu Minkang, ‘憲法權利的深層保護  – 從垃圾袋的處理說起 ’ [Further Protections of 
Constitutional Rights: Cases of Handling Garbage Bags] (2006) 7 Law Science 84, 87. 
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manifestly illegal. 
Surprisingly, according to the police chief’s testimony, he did not consider that 
an illegal search is a big deal. He argued that “is it a big deal? The only problem is 
that we did not catch the criminal. If we catch the criminal, everything will be 
fine.”136 Again the police chief firmly believes that the end (catching the criminal) 





The Chinese judiciary has been a bystander to some reforms of the criminal justice 
system. They are hostile to the scrutiny of confessions obtained by torture. In this 
chapter, I have argued that the courts have tended to take an extremely conservative 
approach to arguments related to the exclusionary rule. In my judgment, that both the  
Du Peiwu and Liu Yong were decided wrongly. In the Liu case the Supreme People’s 
Court wasted an opportunity to establish the confession exclusionary rule. Given the 
passive attitude of the court, it should be no surprise that there are extremely limited 
opportunities for exclusion of evidence obtained by torture and no exclusion of 
physical evidence obtained by illegal searches in China. 
In my view, misconduct should not be condoned or redefined as proper conduct. 
The Chinese Supreme Court should not work in an intellectual vacuum. The court’s 
current passive attitude in this area is inadequate and should be replaced with 
positive duties.137 In practice, the exclusionary rule has been administered in a 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
137 For a more detailed discussion, see 8.1.2. 
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perfunctory fashion; it made no impact on police. 
If we cannot actualized the judicial checks, Article 61 of the Supreme People’s 
Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal 
Procedure Law138 and Article 265 of the Chinese People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal 
Procedure Rule139 are merely dead letters and hypocrisies. The authority is obligated 
to investigate and dispel an arguable claim of torture when a defendant claims torture 
by the police. 
The issue of the standard of proof in police torture cases is closely linked to the 
confession exclusionary rule. In China the confession exclusionary rule may apply if 
the defendant could prove torture, brutality, and similar outrageous conduct; the 
question is almost no one can prove that. In practice, the court places on the accused 
person the burden of proof that the confession has been obtained by torture. The 
accused faces the almost impossible task of proving the existence of torture to a 
virtual certainty. It is not right to contemplate a requirement on the defendant to 
prove that he or she was not tortured by the police. In order to properly balance 
vulnerable suspects and powerful procuratorates, the court should place the burden of 
proof on the prosecution whenever the accused pleads inadmissibility of a confession 
obtained by torture. 
The prosecution has the burden of proving every essential fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt and the defendant has no burden to produce any evidence at all. It 
is important to determine whether the burden of proof of torture should fall on the 
                                                 
138 Article 61 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the 
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prosecutor or the defendant. Our commitment to ending torture and police 
wrongdoing in China is questioned when we construe our own laws in ways that 
make it overly burdensome for suspects to prevail torture claims. Accordingly, I 
argue that the current approach in China for burden of proof (heavy burden on 
defendants) is unclear, unprincipled, unfair and ought to be abolished. The defendant 
need not prove the existence of torture. They cannot be presumed that he has not 
been tortured by the police simply because he fails to prove the existence of torture. 
Courts should adopt a better burden and standard that is better equipped to 
administer justice. Thus, I contend the prosecution should bear the burden of proving 
nonexistence of torture. The burden should on the prosecutor to establish lack of 
torture, i.e., the prosecutor have the burden to disprove torture. The prosecutor must 
discharge the burden of proof. I argue that the main reason why the burden of proof 
should be on the procuratorates who want to use the illegally obtained evidence, not 
the defendants. If torture is probably or likely, a confession should be excluded. 
As to the issues regarding the argument about the search and seizure warrants, 
legislatures and courts are granting law enforcement officers not only broad powers 
but also discretion over under what condition searches and seizures can be carried 








Both global and domestic forces share the goal of helping to cement good 
governance, including proper administration of the criminal justice system and the 
rule of law, throughout China. At the same time, the Chinese legal system is 
experiencing a substantial process of reform and transformation.1  This reform 
process responds to global and domestic actors and pressures. In recent years, to 
some extent, it seems that China has started to acknowledge that human rights have a 
universal nature and show some interest in the right to be free from torture. This 
movement is to be applauded. In 2009, for example, China published its first action 
plan on human rights – the National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
(2009-2010)2 – vowing to solve the problem of torture. It argued that: 
 
Effective measures shall be taken to prohibit such acts as corporal 
punishment, abuse, and insult of detainees or the extraction of confessions 
by torture. All interrogation rooms must impose a physical separation 
between detainees and interrogators. The state establishes and promotes the 
system of conducting a physical examination of detainees before and after 
an interrogation.3 
 
                                                 
1 Neil Diamant, Stanley Lubman and Kevin O’Brien, ‘Law and Society in the People’s Republic of 
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(Stanford University Press, Stanford 2005) 3. 
2 Gau Quanxi, ‘國家人權行動計劃值得期待’ [The National Human Rights Action Plan of China 
Deserves Expectation] Legal Daily (Beijing 9 Nov. 2008). 
3 Ibid. 
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Last year, the Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Ministry of State Security and the Ministry of Justice issued the 
Regulations Concerning a Number of Questions of Excluding Illegally Obtained 
Criminal Evidence. 4  However, the power of justice lies in actions, not just 
pronouncements. 
Criminal procedure reform is an important issue in the development of the rule 
of law in China. The interaction of Chinese and foreign criminal procedure laws is an 
irreversible trend. Throughout China, criminal procedure reform is in the air. The 
administration of justice is inefficient, however, unable or unwilling to respond to 
human rights abuses. 5  Chinese police wrongdoing is still like the weather; 
everybody talks about it but nobody does anything. Police wrongdoing has played an 
important role in most wrongful conviction cases throughout China.6 The risk of 
miscarriages of justice that police torture creates could be reduced if certain 
procedural changes were made. The ultimate question for criminal process related to 
interrogation, and search and seizure, is what happens when the Code of Criminal 
Procedure is violated. 
Historically, there is no exclusionary rule to disqualify illegally obtained 
evidence from Chinese criminal trials. It should be noted that the Chinese 
government itself vacillated on this important topic. As noted earlier,7 there is no 
exclusionary rule explicitly in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Practically speaking, 
the exclusionary rule in judicial interpretations8 does not applied in China. Chinese 
                                                 
4 ‘關於辦理刑事案件排除非法證據問題若干問題的規定’ [The Regulations Concerning a Number 
of Questions of Excluding Illegally Obtained Criminal Evidence], promulgated on July 1, 2010. 
5 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
6 See Chapter 5. 
7 See 5.2.2. 
8 Article 61 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the 
Chinese Criminal Procedure Law. Article 265 of the Chinese People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal 
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courts have consistently declined to articulate the exclusionary rule.9 Moreover, law 
and practice are also unclear about the exclusionary rule issues, for example, the 
purpose, scope, and application of the rule, whether to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence and what are the criteria for excluding. The lack of legislative and judicial 
guidance might contribute to various illegal practices by the police. Accordingly, 
such assurances are nonbinding, unenforceable, and therefore inadequate to protect 
the right to be free from torture. One of the goals of establishing the exclusionary 
rule is to provide Chinese police with a clear standard as to the legality of their 
actions. 
The establishment of the exclusionary rule in China is especially important 
because criminal investigations appear to revolve around obtaining torture statements 
from suspects.10 For this reason there is increasing interest in reform; then we will 
need to reform interrogation techniques. In this chapter, the topic is the future – not 
only whether we should establish the exclusionary rule, but how the persistence of 
the exclusionary rule should shape our thinking about the criminal justice system. 
The overarching objective of this chapter is to explore the appropriate approach 
of the exclusionary rule for China. This chapter proceeds in four parts. It begins with 
the threshold question: what is the appropriate approach for China to establish the 
exclusionary rule? In the first place, I will examine why we need to establish the 
exclusionary rule in China. As will be shown later, I contend and hope to 
demonstrate that it is time to establish the exclusionary rule in China. In this part, it 
analyzes the admissibility of illegally obtained confessions. I recommend that the 
evidence obtained from torture must be excluded completely from criminal 
                                                                                                                                          
Procedure Rule. 
9 See 6.1. 
10 See 5.1-5.3. 
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proceedings. Then, two different approaches of the exclusionary rule are discussed: 
first, mandatory exclusion; and second, the discretionary exclusion. I recommend the 
adoption of the mandatory confession exclusionary rule in China. This part then 
analyzes the problems with discretionary exclusion. 
The second part then turns to address the admissibility of illegally obtained 
physical evidence. In China, there exists no deterrent mechanism in this area until 
today. The exclusion of illegal obtained physical evidence, in my opinion, is the most 
efficient remedy in China for such violations. I contend China should adopt a prima 
facie exclusionary rule requiring the exclusion of physical evidence discovered in 
violation of search and seizure rules. Next, I turn to the issue of which procedural 
safeguards should be in place when establishing the exclusionary rule. 
Finally, the last part depicts several regional rules of criminal evidence and 
analyzes the possible effects of each regional rule that can occur when the court 
dealing with the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence. I show how some 




7.1 The exclusion of illegally obtained confessions 
 
In the light of the problems associated with the exclusionary rule examined in the 
preceding chapters, it is clear that the reality is that powers to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence have rarely existed11 and the establishment of the exclusionary 
                                                 
11 See 6.1 
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rule to prohibit illegally obtained evidence from being introduced at trial in China is 
urgently necessary. 
The Criminal Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure are the laws for law 
enforcement agents to follow when they are enforcing the law in the criminal process. 
These laws must be observed. Their enforcement must be strict and lawbreakers must 
be dealt with. The Code of Criminal Procedure differed greatly from the 
constitutional criminal procedure model. Specifically, the “law” of criminal 
investigation in China, however, is in a totally unsatisfactory state.12 A written Code 
of Criminal Procedure as the primary source of law thus serves as the hallmark of the 
civil law tradition country like China. While neither the Constitution nor the Code of 
Criminal Procedure per se requires the suppression of illegally acquired evidence, 
there is currently a momentum behind the right to be free from torture in China.13 
The push for protecting the right arose from a spate of chilling torture cases and 
miscarriages of justice resulting from false confessions14 that have plagued Chinese 
law enforcement and seriously undermined the general public’s faith in the criminal 
justice system. 
Under these circumstances, what is the likelihood that a closed, powerful police 
system with very limited checks and balances would have protected the suspects’ 
human dignity, or, if it somehow did, that Chinese criminal judges would invent the 
explicit exclusionary rule by case law, especially if the crime is brutal, the female 
victim is young, or public sentiment is otherwise particularly aroused? In my view, 
the answer to the first of these questions is “impossible at all”, and to the second it is, 
                                                 
12 See Chapter 6. 
13 Yang Yuguan, 非法證據排除規則研究 [The Study of the Exclusionary Rule] (Chinese People’s 
Public Security University Press, Beijing 2002) 217. 
14 See 5.1-5.2. 
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“not likely”. Currently, courts play a relatively minor role in the criminal process 
regarding the exclusionary rule. For one thing, strictly speaking, judges are not 
allowed to make law, only to interpret and apply it. There are no binding precedents, 
nor judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes. Additionally, given the 
political system within which most Chinese judges operate, a judge will be 
disinclined to exercise his discretion to exclude evidence. 
The current practice results in almost none exclusion. Chinese courts have so far 
shown an unwillingness to even consider suppressing illegally obtained evidence. In 
other words, courts appear unwilling or unable to adopt the confession exclusionary 
rule, not to mention the search and seizure exclusionary rule. Furthermore, we cannot 
tell how the court decides the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence because the 
court gives very limited or even no explanation of the treatment of the evidence. 
Under these situations, we should establish the Chinese exclusionary rule 
immediately for four reasons. 
First, the exclusionary rule shields the citizenry from unbridled police power. 
The rule has the effect of deterring (or at least tending to deter) the police 
misconduct.15 Secondly, the core protection of the confession exclusionary rule 
involves protection against compelled testimony at trial. Regarding the confession 
exclusionary rule, the rule prevents convicting the innocent.16 Thirdly, establishing 
the exclusionary rule will educate the police and the public about the sanctity of the 
fundamental individual right to be free from torture, and will encourage the right to 
be free from illegal searches and seizures. The search and seizure exclusionary rule is 
the primary tool for enforcing search and seizure law. Fourthly, the failure to exclude 
                                                 
15 See 3.1.4. 
16 See Chapter 5. 
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evidence may encourage reliance on illegally obtained evidence. The exclusionary 
rule is the most appropriate method the court has to show its respect for the rule of 
law in China. Otherwise, it is difficult for the citizenry to believe that the Chinese 
government sincerely meant to forbid police torture. 
Furthermore, if it is necessary to establish the exclusionary rule in China, it 
begins with the next logical question: what is the most appropriate approach for 
China to establish the exclusionary rule? 
 
7.1.1 The mandatory confession exclusionary rule 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two general approaches to the exclusionary rule. First, a 
mandatory exclusionary rule refers to that courts must exclude illegally obtained 
evidence. Second, a discretionary exclusionary rule refers to that the exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is primarily decided upon a case-by-case determination. A 
comparison of the two approaches will be made. 
The exclusion of illegally obtained confessions is especially important in China. 
The current practice results in very little exclusion and that the failure to exclude 
confessions may encourage reliance on illegally obtained confessions. Regarding the 
confession exclusionary rule, I recommend the adoption of the most rigid approach – 
Anglo-American-style automatic or mandatory confession exclusionary rule17 – 
confessions obtained by torture, violent, coercive, threat, oppressive, inhuman or 
degrading conduct must be excluded and these confessions are inadmissible in 
judicial proceedings. 
                                                 
17 In the United States, the mandatory exclusionary rule had been developed to address Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment issues. 
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The beauty of this mandatory approach lies in its simplicity. It is not necessary 
for courts to decide whether to admit the illegally obtained confession evidence. 
Such a mandatory approach would lead to a considerable uniform application. Under 
the confession exclusionary rule, where a judge concludes that confessions were 
obtained by torture, he has the duty, not the discretion, to exclude these 
“confessions”. The judge should exclude all confessions directly obtained by torture, 
regardless of its probative value or the seriousness of the case. There is no need and 
no room for balancing. We should permit absolutely no exception to the prohibition 
on illegally obtained confessions, even those suspected of perpetrating heinous 
crimes. The Code of Criminal Procedure should impose an absolute duty upon courts 
to exclude these evidence. 
 
7.1.2 The inadequacy of the discretionary exclusion 
 
In China, a much-advocated way of establishing the exclusionary rule is the 
discretionary approach. Critics of the proposed use of the American exclusionary rule 
in China point out such rule conflict with the national psychology and culture.18 But 
as this part will show, this widespread assumption is simply wrong. According to this 
approach, the exclusion of illegally obtained confessions must be determined upon a 
balancing of competing interests on a case-by-case basis. The judge would consider 
that in all the particular circumstances of this acquisition whether the interest of 
justice are advanced more by admission or exclusion. Is the discretionary 
exclusionary rule the answer in China? The answer is no. 
                                                 
18  Fan Peigen, ‘我國不宜移植美式證據排除規則 ’ [It is Improper to Transplant American 
Exclusionary Rule in China] (2002) 2 Journal of Henan Public Security Academy 35, 36-37. 
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I will criticize the discretionary confession exclusionary rule. I contend that 
mandatory confession exclusionary rule is preferable to a discretionary one. The 
discretionary approach is inadequate to protect the fundamental individual right to be 
free from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; it can hardly be 
considered an adequate safeguard for civil liberties. 
Accurately predicting the development of the law is always a challenge, but I 
predict that the discretionary confession exclusionary rule will become lip service 
paid by the government and will not be seriously enforced. Why should a 
discretionary confession exclusionary rule be rejected? It is worthless for defending 
against governmental invasion of liberty, and hence has no substantial impact on 
police behavior. A discretionary confession exclusionary rule in China will be no 
exclusionary rule at all for four reasons. 
First, the discretionary nature may lead to judicial uncertainty. 
The first weakness of the discretionary approach is its legal uncertainty and it 
results in unpredictable decision making. The discretionary nature may lead to 
inconsistent case law and lack of certainty, and thereby impair judicial integrity by 
decreasing the predictability of cases involving police torture. At first sight, the 
discretionary approach seems attractive. This approach seems gives courts much 
flexibility. Although this approach might meet the current policy temporarily,19 it 
may face serious challenges in the immediate future. The benefit of flexibility can 
also be the cost of unchecked discretion, hence having no substantial impact on 
police illegal behavior. Once the police get the incriminating confessions from the 
suspects, the subsequent procedure, including the trial, is often barely a formality. 
                                                 
19 Susan Trevaskes, Courts and Criminal Justice in Contemporary China (Lexington Books, Lanham 
2007) 114-115. 
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The suspects would face the almost impossible task of countering their confessions. 
Until today, the Code of Criminal Procedure offers no guidance on dealing with 
police torture and illegal search cases. If the courts are going to establish vague 
discretionary exclusion, it may simply make for unpredictability. This approach may 
foster uncertainty among police officers and lawyers as to which confessions will be 
excluded by court. This “case by case” discretionary approach may not only lead to 
inconsistency but also make for unpredictability. 
Secondly, it makes for a lack of judicial accountability. 
Accountability is important to ensure that the judiciary branch is competent and 
honest. In the absence of clear principles and guidelines to govern judicial discretion, 
it is very difficult for judges to justify their decisions on rational grounds. The 
discretionary approach would signal to the police that in those situations in which 
courts will not exercise its discretion to exclude evidence, the confession 
exclusionary rule no longer applies. 
Certainly, in theory, courts can exercise their discretion to exclude torture 
evidence according to the judicial interpretations issued by Supreme People’s Court 
and Supreme People’s Procuratorate. In the current situation, however, courts are 
inclined to believe that there is no legal obligation for them to exclude these 
confessions. So they might think, why bother? 
With regard to the search and seizure exclusionary rule, similarly, in England, 
although the discretion existed in PACE, it was only to be used rare and exceptional 
cases. How can we expect Chinese judges to exercise their discretion granted by 
judicial interpretations, not even granted by the Code of Criminal Procedure? 
Furthermore, if, in each case, the judge must ask herself, “Are the interests of justice 
advanced more by admission or exclusion of the physical evidence at issue?” one 
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may posit that Chinese jurists would be strongly tempted toward admission. 
Thirdly, the misuse of vague discretion by law enforcement officers could be a 
problem. 
The Chinese dictum that “[i]n times of chaos, harsh punishment must be used”20 
remains a prominent part of the law and order psyche. In the future, if Chinese 
legislators include ambiguity when drafting the exclusionary rule in the Constitution 
or the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trouble with this approach is that the 
undefined broad terms may be free to be used by authorities to include all evidence 
they deem relevant and necessary. Judges may admit illegally obtained evidence. 
Fourthly, there would be no deterrent effect in “serious crime”. 
“Wherever there is discretion”, as Dicey points out, “there is room for 
arbitrariness.”21 If the standard is the seriousness of the case, this means the judge 
has to take into account the reprehensibility of a particular defendant’s crime (or the 
gravity of crime generally) and then decide whether the confession obtained by 
torture are admissible. In other words, once the defendant is charged with a “serious” 
crime, the judge is not allowed to exclude the confession in issue. For example, say 
the defendant was charged with a serious drugs offence, and the only evidence 
against him was his confession by torture. The relevant and probative confession 
may be held to be admissible, as the alleged offence is serious and there is a public 
interest in the detection of serious crime. 
For one thing, the short list of “serious crimes” is not likely to stay short. 
Furthermore, courts may tend to create more exceptions to the exclusionary rule to 
allow evidence in cases dealing with serious crimes into the courts. Also, the police 
                                                 
20 治亂世用重典。 
21 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (10th edn., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1964) 188. 
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may learn them and adjust their conduct accordingly. The consequence is that there 
will be little or even no deterrent effect for unconditional police conduct in 
investigations of “serious crime” cases because the police will know that almost 
anything they do will not lead to exclusion of evidence. More significantly, an 
exception to exclusion for evidence of murder, kidnapping, rape or drug cases would 
in essence change the confession exclusionary rule. It is sensible that fairness and 
equality of process should be adjusted to apply to every criminal defendant. 
    For these reasons and, subject to what I have said, the combination of judicial 
uncertainty and the misuse of vague discretion in the hands of law enforcement 
officers may forebode potentially destructive consequences to a suspect’s 
constitutional right (for instance, the right to be free from torture, and the right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures). As a result, adopting a discretionary 
confession exclusionary rule would be ill-advised because it is not only very unlikely 
to deter police wrongdoing but also would further reduce already low constitutional 
safeguards. 
    As alluded to above, the problem with the discretionary exclusion is four-fold. 
For these four disadvantages which affect fundamentally the way in which justice is 
administered and this is why I suggest that China should adopt mandatory confession 
exclusionary rule. 
 
7.1.3 Opinions of the Supreme Court and Supreme 
Procuratorate 
 
Both the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate call for 
exclusion of confessions obtained from torture and ask judges to exclude these 
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confessions. According to Article 61 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation 
on Several Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law, it provides 
that “[i]t shall be strictly forbidden to collect evidence by illegal methods. Evidence 
obtained by torture, threat, enticement and deceit or other illegal methods are 
inadmissible.”22 
Regarding the opinion of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Procuratorate 
has explicitly recognized the confession exclusionary rule and declared that all 
evidence obtained by torture should not be used. In 2001, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate promulgated the Notice of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
Concerning the Prohibition of Using the Confessions Obtained from Torture as 
Evidence. 23  This Notice is the strong support for the mandatory confession 
exclusionary rule in China. 
There are five paragraphs of this Notice. The first paragraph argues that we 
should “never allow condoning torture.”24 The second paragraph argues that we 
should “never miss out any link that might cause problems.”25 The crucial third 
paragraph explicitly argues that “[a]ll procuratorate must strictly enforce the 
[confession exclusionary] rule. When the procuratorate find that confessions from 
suspects, victims and witnesses were obtained by illegal methods, they should firmly 
exclude that. Never leave any leeway to torture.”26 The fourth paragraph argues that 
“once the procuratorate find a torture case, investigate it. Never condoning 
                                                 
22 ‘最高人民法院關於執行《中華人民共和國刑事訴訟法》若干問题的解釋’ [Supreme People’s 
Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law], 
promulgated on 29 June, 1998, effective on 8 Sep., 1998. 
23 ‘最高人民檢察院關於嚴禁將刑訊逼供獲取的犯罪嫌疑人供述作為定案依據的通知’ [The 
Notice of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate Concerning the Prohibition of Using the Confessions 
Obtained from Torture as Evidence], promulgated on 2 Jan., 2001, Gao Jian Fa Su [2001] No. 2. 
24 Ibid, [1] (emphasis added). 
25 Ibid, [2] (emphasis added). 
26 Ibid, [3] (emphasis added). 
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[torture].”27  The fifth paragraph argues that we should “find out the existing 
problems, work out practical solutions and report to the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate.”28 From the tone of this Notice, the attitude of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate is very firm. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate hopes to impose a 
mandatory confession exclusionary rule on the procuratorate in order to ban the 
introduction of confessions obtained by torture. 
In addition, according to Article 265 of the People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal 
Procedure Rule, confessions from suspects, victims and witnesses obtained by torture, 
threat, enticement and deceit cannot be used to incriminate.29 Although it remains to 
be seen how Article 61 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several 
Questions for Enforcing the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law and Article 265 of the 
People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule will be applied by judges and 
procuratorates, from the tone of the Notice of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate 
Concerning the Prohibition of Using the Confessions Obtained from Torture as 
Evidence it is crystal clear that whether to impose exclusion under the Notice is 
mandatory instead of discretionary. 
In sum, the Code of Criminal Procedure should impose a mandatory 
exclusionary rule on courts in order to ban the introduction of evidence obtained in 
violation of its provisions. Establishing the exclusionary rule would have a profound 
effect on judicial behavior. If the exclusionary rule is mandatory, the Chinese judge 
will be able to say he had no choice: the Code of Criminal Procedure required him to 
exclude the evidence obtained by torture. However, if the exclusionary rule is 
                                                 
27 Ibid, [4] (emphasis added). 
28 Ibid, [5] (emphasis added). 
29 ‘人民檢察院刑事訴訟規則’ [People’s Procuratorate’s Criminal Procedure Rule], promulgated on 
16 Dec., 1998, effective on 18 Jan., 1999. 
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discretionary, the judge cannot make this statement. 
 
 
7.2 The exclusion of illegally obtained physical 
evidence 
 
I now turn to the exclusion of illegally obtained physical evidence. Illegally obtained 
physical evidence remained “prima facie admissible” in China. People should be free 
from illegal searches and seizures. To protect this right, as I explain below, the 
establishment of the search and seizure exclusionary rule in China is necessary to 
preclude the use at trial of evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure. 
Physical evidence has always been treated differently. Partly because there is no 
concept of search and seizure exclusionary rule in China, and partly because there is 
no doubt about the reliability of physical evidence, courts refuse to exclude such 
evidence where there are concerns about police behaviour. 
On the one hand, with regard to search and seizure, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure grants broad power to the police.30 On the other hand, with regard to the 
search and seizure exclusionary rule, in order to protect the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures, I contend to minimize judicial discretion. I hope that 
the admissible illegally obtained physical evidence becomes a rarity, exceptions 
rather than the common practice. China should adopt a strict exclusionary rule – in 
other words, new Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure should utilize the “mandatory 
exclusion with exception” approach to control police wrongdoing for two primary 
                                                 
30 See 6.3.1-6.3.2. 
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reasons. 
First, it will provide clear guidance to police and courts, avoiding the slippery 
slope of an unprincipled discretion. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not 
provide adequate guidance to police how to conduct search and seizure. The current 
practice in China results in almost no exclusion and that the failure to exclude 
evidence may encourage reliance on illegally obtained physical evidence. The second 
reason is that the search and seizure exclusionary rule is the only effective weapon 
that the citizen has to enforce his right against illegal searches and seizures. If we 
adopt the lax search and seizure exclusionary rule, we might remove this weapon. 
 
7.2.1 The strict search and seizure exclusionary rule 
 
China has constitutional provisions that explicitly prohibit illegal searches and 
seizures. The use of unconstitutionally searched and seized evidence against a citizen 
may violate his constitutional rights. China should be forbidden from using evidence 
searched and seized in violation of the constitutional rights granted to a criminal 
defendant. The court should impose the search and seizure exclusionary rule in cases 
of constitutional rights violations. 
The triple constitutional principles that “unlawful search of the person of 
citizens is prohibited” (Article 37 of the Chinese Constitution),31 “[t]he home of 
citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. Unlawful search of, or 
intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited.” (Article 39 of the Chinese 
                                                 
31 Article 37 of the Chinese Constitution provides: 
The freedom of person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China is inviolable. No 
citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by decision of a people’s procuratorate 
or by decision of a people’s court, and arrests must be made by a public security organ. 
Unlawful deprivation or restriction of citizen’s freedom of person by detention or other 
means is prohibited; and unlawful search of the person of citizens is prohibited. 
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Constitution),32 and “[t]he State respects and preserves human rights” (Article 33 of 
the Chinese Constitution),33 set the tone and provide the constitutional basis of the 
Chinese search and seizure exclusionary rule. 
    Article 39 provides that all persons should be free from illegal searches. 
Although Article 39 contains no explicit provision precluding the use of evidence in 
its violation, in order to enforce protections granted by the Article 37, the court 
should rule that unconstitutionally obtained evidence cannot be used against a 
defendant. The primary purpose of the Chinese search and seizure exclusionary rule 
is to protect the vitality of Articles 37, 39 and 33 of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, as noted before,34 the separation of powers is the basis of the 
exclusionary rule. The Chinese Constitution, to some extent, also recognizes the 
separation of powers principle requiring each branch to respect the constitutional 
responsibilities that have been assigned to the rival branches. Article 126 of the 
Constitution provides: “The People’s Courts shall, in accordance with the law, 
exercise judicial power independently, and are not subject to interference by any 
administrative organs, public organizations or individuals.” 
Chinese courts, however, are not concerned with the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by illegal searches and seizures. As adopting lax exclusionary rule increases 
the likelihood of illegal searches and seizures, I propose to establish a strict search 
and seizure exclusionary rule in China. In other word, if real evidence is obtained by 
                                                 
32 Article 39 of the Chinese Constitution provides: “The home of citizens of the People’s Republic of 
China is inviolable. Unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a citizen’s home is prohibited.” 
33 Article 33 of the Chinese Constitution provides: 
All persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the 
People’s Republic of China. All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal 
before the law. The State respects and preserves human rights. Every citizen enjoys the 
rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and 
law. 
34 See Chapter 4. 
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illegal searches and seizures, it should be generally excluded. This thesis suggests 
that the Chinese legislature is in a better position than the court to adopt the 
exclusionary rule. It might be naive to think that Chinese courts will establish the 
exclusionary rule on a case-by-case basis under the current political climate. We 
might establish exceptions as there may be some cases where the officer exceed by 
only a little the limits of the law and has no intention to neglect the law. The 
legislature, however, must be extremely careful about the exceptions. We must be 
very careful about establishing the exception; otherwise the exception may replace 
the principle (i.e., the exclusionary rule). This important issue will be discussed in 
more detail in 7.3.1. In the context of the search and seizure exclusionary rule, it is 
imperative that the court formulate principles which provide sufficient guidance as to 
how the discretion should be exercised in individual cases. In determining whether to 
exclude physical evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures, some, but not an 
exhaustive list, of the factors that the judge may take into account as follows: 
–  what kind of evidence was obtained? 
– was the Code of Criminal Procedure violation serious or was it a merely technical 
nature? 
– was it deliberate, wilful or flagrant, or was it inadvertent or committed in good 
faith? 
– would the evidence have been obtained in any event? 
When the police have broken the law in obtaining physical evidence, the court 
shall not admit the evidence unless it is, on the balance of probabilities, satisfied by 
the prosecution that admission of the evidence would specifically and substantially 
benefit the public interest without unduly prejudicing the rights and freedoms of any 
person. Physical evidence may be suppressed if societal interests in crime detection 
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and punishment outweigh the invasion of individual privacy based on a balancing of 
factors mentioned above. 
 
7.2.2 Adopting the British Approach? 
 
Britain, Canada and Australia have employed only a discretionary search and seizure 
exclusionary rule. In England, under s 78 of PACE, it is the duty of the judge to have 
regard to the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained and then apply the 
statutory criterion “whether the admission of the evidence would have such effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”35 Some people 
might ask, “If a discretionary search and seizure exclusionary rule has worked in 
Great Britain, why not try it in China? Maybe this approach could also be effective.” 
There is, however, some danger in assuming that discretionary exclusionary rule 
effective in the United Kingdom will also work in China. The situation is different in 
China from that in the United Kingdom. Before we decide whether to follow other 
countries in adopting a discretionary exclusionary rule, some of the differences 
between China and the United Kingdom must be examined. I argue that the British 
model may not suitable for China for two reasons. 
First, it is doubtful whether those Chinese judges with no formal legal training 
have the competence to exercise a discretionary search and seizure exclusionary rule. 
I am concerned with the quality of the Chinese judge. The search and seizure 
exclusionary rule revolves around the question as to whether to exclude illegally 
obtained physical evidence by judges. Accordingly, judges have a vital role to play 
here. Incompetent judges may make the criminal justice system unfair regarding the 
                                                 
35 Section 78 of PACE. 
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exclusionary rule. 
    One obvious difference is that the overall legal ability, which encompasses a 
sound knowledge of the law and experience of its application, of British judges is 
much higher than their counterparts in China. In general, recruitment to the bench in 
England is limited to barristers. Only barristers are eligible for appointment to Crown 
and County courts, appellate courts, the High Court, Court of Appeal, and the 
Judicial Committee in the House of Lords. The concentration of educational 
backgrounds is intensive. In the twentieth century, for example, three quarters of the 
judges in England and Wales received their education from private schools, their law 
training from either Oxford or Cambridge, the two elite universities in Britain,36 and 
thereafter obtained pupilage at prominent chambers of barristers.37 Furthermore, it is 
nevertheless impressive that more than half of the Lord Justices of Appeal (53%) 
attended either New or Corpus Christi College at Oxford, or Trinity or Magdalene 
College at Cambridge.38 
By contrast, in the last several decades, while the judiciary in China is 
increasing in education, it is doubtful whether those Chinese judges with no formal 
legal training and sometimes little or no formal education have the competence and 
courage to serve as the guardian of the Constitution. 
I cannot think of any reason to believe that Chinese courts’ administration of a 
discretionary exclusionary rule would be similar to the administration of such a rule 
                                                 
36 A.H. Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England and Walse 1750-1950 (Butterworths, 
London 1980) 81.  
37 Maimon Schwarzschild, ‘Class, National Character, and the Bar Reforms in Britain: Will There 
Always be an England?’ (1994) 9 Conn Journal of International Law 185, 195-208. 
38 Burton Atkins, ‘Judicial Selection in Context: The American and English Experience’ (1989) 77 
Kentucky Law Journal 577, 596. On one side of the spectrum, the problems were caused by the lack 
of education and qualification of Chinese judges. On the other hand, the homogeneity and elite status 
of the (mostly white male middle class) judiciary in the United Kingdom has long been critiqued by 
feminists and others. 
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in England. I think legal training and qualification of a judge is the answer. Many 
Chinese judges either lacked formal legal training, or the training they did receive 
was very abstract, as in the late 1970s, China emerged from the disasters of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In 1967, Mao Tsetung asked the Red Guards to 
“smash Gongjiafa39 (police, procuracy and courts)”.40 Judicial organs (procuracy 
and courts) were suspended. Finally, law schools were closed. Not until 1979, law 
schools were reopened to offer law training programs. As a consequence, during the 
1980s judges were appointed from the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party and the 
military.41 Only rarely did these judges have a college education. Merely 10 % of the 
judges and procurators at all levels in the entire country had an education above 
college level in 1989, and only 65% of all court personnel were college educated in 
1991.42 In the 1990s, there were about 140,000 judges, but merely 10,000 had 
degrees in law. In 1993 only two-thirds of judges had post-secondary training in any 
subject, including non-legal subjects. About 30% of chief judges of High Courts in 
China lacked a university background.43 One senior procuratorate pointed out that in 
a South China municipal procuratorate, 15.6% of procuratorates were college 
educated and only 8% of procuratorates have earned a law degree. In some county 
courts and procuratorates, there is no college graduate.44 Even today, more than 
                                                 
39 打爛公檢法。 
40 Leng Shao-Chuan, ‘The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao 
Tse-Tung’s Influence’ (1977) 68 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 356, 356. 
41 S.B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in China after Mao (Stanford University Press, 
California 2002) 253. 
42 Li Maoguan, ‘Why Laws go Unenforced?’ (1989) Beijing Review 18-24. 
43 He Weifang, ‘透過司法實現社會正義：對中國法官現狀的一個透視’[The Realization of Social 
Justice through Judicature: A Look at the Current Situation of Chinese Judges], in Xia Yong (ed.), 走
向權利的時代：中國公民權利發展研究 [Toward an Era of Rights: Research on the Civil Rights 
Development in China], (China University of Political Science and Law Press, Beijing 1995) 328. 
44 Liu Yousheng, ‘司法官的素質與職業培訓研究’ [The Study of Competence and Career Training 
of Judges](2008) 12 People’s Procuratorial Monthly 24, 27. 
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200,000 Chinese judges have not earned a law degree.45 
Secondly, it is more difficult to keep qualified judges. 
It has been more difficult to keep qualified judges in the west and southwest of 
China because of the difficult working environment. It is important to note that the 
problem of a lack of qualified judges is especially serious in the west and southwest 
of the country,46 and rural China. Although after 2002, the first National Judicial 
Examination was held in China, these young law school students who passed the 
exam prefer staying in high level courts and procuratorates or wealthy areas instead 
of staying in remote and poor areas.47 The difficult working environment and the 
low wage are two significant reasons why most law students decided not to work in 
these areas. 
In short, in order to rectify the situation mentioned above, the Chinese Judges 
Law sets forth qualifications for judges after 1995. All judges must have an associate 
bachelor’s, bachelor’s or graduate degree in law, or if not in law, then the judge must 
have professional legal knowledge and two years’ work experience.48 The general 
lack of legal education of judges, however, leaves many of them without ability to 
make rulings in this context. As a result, it is completely unrealistic to expect judges 
without a proper educational background, professional knowledge and experience to 
exercise a search and seizure exclusionary rule. 
The Chinese exclusionary rule, of course, has its limits, as the Chinese criminal 
                                                 
45 He Weifang, ‘透過司法實現社會正義：對中國法官現狀的一個透視’[The Realization of Social 
Justice through Judicature: A Look at the Current Situation of Chinese Judges], in Xia Yong (ed.), 走
向權利的時代：中國公民權利發展研究 [Toward an Era of Rights: Research on the Civil Rights 
Development in China], (China University of Political Science and Law Press, Beijing 1995) 328. 
46 For example, the Xinjiang, Sichuan, Yunnan Province. 
47 Liu Yousheng, ‘司法官的素質與職業培訓研究’ [The Study of Competence and Career Training 
of Judges](2008) 12 People’s Procuratorial Monthly 24, 27. 
48 Article 9 of the Chinese Judges Law. 
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justice system differs from the common law model – continental courts decide both 
questions of law and of fact. The exclusionary rule in China is not aimed at 
insulating the trier of fact (the Chinese judge himself) from the impact of the 
inadmissible evidence. The momentous difference between the Chinese model and 
the Anglo-American model concerning the exclusionary rule is that in the Chinese 
criminal justice system, the judge decides both the question of admissibility and 
determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Therefore, the bifurcated trial common 
to the Anglo-American setting in which the judge handles questions of law – 
including the admissibility of evidence – and the lay jury handles questions of fact, 
does not exist in the Chinese model. It is of course far from certain that excluding 
evidence is the same thing as forgetting evidence. 
 
7.2.3 Complementary measures 
 
It is undoubtedly the case that I am a great supporter of establishing the exclusionary 
rule in China. We may consider transplanting Anglo-American notions of the 
exclusionary rule into Chinese law. This is not to say that adoption and adaptation of 
the exclusionary rule to China would provide a panacea for its interrogation woes 
and cure all ills with China. There are no easy answers to the problems posed by 
wrongful convictions in China.49 There are no quick fixes and the exclusionary rule 
is not an overnight solution to the current problem of police wrongdoing. In order to 
ensure the smooth development of the establishment of the exclusionary rule in 
China, there are a number of complementary measures that should be accomplished. 
                                                 
49 Other factors, for example, widespread use of administrative detention, inadequate monitoring 
mechanisms in the criminal justice system, denying defendants’ communications with lawyers before 
trial, and, political control of the judiciary, may contribute to wrongful convictions. 
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These measures are explicitly and implicitly linked to the exclusionary rule. 
First of all, and most significantly, China should consider the establishment of 
the right to silence. 
Until today, Chinese defendants have enjoyed no right to silence.50 On the 
contrary, under Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure suspects were obligated 
to tell the “truth”. The accused has no right to refuse to answer questions.51 These 
circumstances convey the message: that the government has the power to interrogate 
suspects, and the suspects have a duty to talk, and to help to convict themselves. 
Critics of the right to silence have argued that China should not adopt the right to 
silence as the economic, cultural and legal environment is not mature.52 Moreover, 
some may argue that the guilty do not need the right, and that it will hinder the 
investigation, thus increasing the incidence of erroneous acquittals. 
Absent the right to silence, however, in my opinion, any real right to be free 
from torture will not occur. Specifically, Article 93 provides guilty suspects and 
defendants an attractive alternative to lying. Absent the right to silence and under 
Article 93, innocents were obliged to tell the “truth”, whereas guilty suspects and 
criminals have no option but to tell lies instead of confessing. If guilty (as well as 
                                                 
50 Chinese defendants enjoy neither privilege against self-incrimination nor the presumption of 
innocence. 
51 Article 93 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: 
When interrogating a criminal suspect, the investigators shall first ask the criminal suspect 
whether or not he has committed any criminal act, and let him state the circumstances of 
his guilt or explain his innocence; then may ask him questions. The criminal suspect shall 
answer the investigators’ questions truthfully … . 
52 Yang Yuan, ‘淺談我國沉默權應當緩行’ [The Right to Silence in China Should Not be Established 
Currently] (2009) Legal System and Society 32, 32-33; See also Zhang Songmei, ‘中國尚不具備確立
沉默權的社會條件’ [China Does Not Have the Social Condition to Establish the Right to Silence] 
(2001) Law Science 26, 26-29; Zhang Songmei, ‘沉默權生長的社會條件’ [The Social Condition for 
the Right to Silence] (2001) Public Administration and Law 45, 45-46; Cui Min, ‘關於沉默權問題的
理性思考’ [The Rationale Knowledge about “the Right to Silence”] (2001) 89 Journal of Chinese 
People’s University of Public Security 55, 55-63; Cui Min, ‘關於沉默權問題的理性思考’ [The 
Rationale Knowledge about “the Right to Silence”] (2001) 66 Journal of Hubei Public Security 
College 23, 23-29. 
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innocent) suspects and defendants were compelled to submit to interrogation, the 
result would be innocent suspects offer true exculpatory evidence and the guilty 
would tell lies to avoid conviction. Consequently, guilty and innocent defendants 
become more indistinguishable as all of them offer exculpatory statements. 
Secondly, there is the issue of allocating the burden of proof to the prosecution. 
The problems regarding the burden of proof are very significant when dealing 
with the exclusionary rule issues. Under the current approach in China, how will an 
individual be able to demonstrate the existence of torture? As I have argued in the 
previous chapter,53 China should reject the traditional practice of allocating the 
burden of proof to the defendant when the defendant argued that they were subjected 
to torture. Otherwise, an exclusionary rule established in the books will be useless 
unless the burden of proof was allocated to the prosecution. 
Thirdly, mandatory videotaping is required. 
A suggestion would be the mandatory videotaping of entire interrogations. 
Mandatory videotaping (or even audiotaping) of interrogations would be helpful to 
judges deciding whether the defendant in fact made a confession and, if so, under 
what circumstances. Mandatory videotaping of interrogation is one of the solutions 
to Chinese problem of false confessions. It will limit police coercion. Video 
recordings are devastating to a defendant’s contention that he was tortured or did not 
in fact make the statements the police claim. Judicial police and the Ministry of 
Public Security may oppose mandatory taping and argue that additional requirement 
requires additional funding, but the cost of the equipment is small. 
Furthermore, mandatory videotaping of interrogation benefits not only 
defendants but also the police. On the one hand, it creates conditions that protect 
                                                 
53 See 6.2. 
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suspects from suffering torture. It deters law enforcement officers from using torture 
or other illegal tactics that put innocents at risk. On the other hand, it deters the 
suspects from claiming they were tortured when they were not. It is apparently very 
rare for suspects to fake torture on videotape or allege that videotape have been 
tampered with. If guilty confessors intentionally fabricate torture by the police, the 
videotaping of interrogation can prove the innocence of the police. For example, in 
Zhu Xinjian case,54 the videotaping of interrogation was used to prove that the police 
did not torture the suspect. Relying on the video evidence, the judge found the 
innocence of the police proven. 
In the United Kingdom, violence is rare in police interrogations since they are 
tape recorded.55 As John Baldwin rightly observes, “[t]here is reason to believe that 
the introduction of an effective system of tape recording is proving to be the single 
most important reform of the criminal justice system in this country in the 1980s.”56 
Of course, there are other safeguards including the keeping of accurate and 
corroborated custody records, and access on demand to legal and medical assistance. 
 
 
7.3 Problems with regional rules of criminal evidence 
 
In China, provincial high courts have provided lowers courts with their own 
regulations of criminal evidence and powers to supervise conditions in their own 
                                                 
54 Kun Xing San Chu 73 (The Kunming Intermediate Court, 2005). (2005) 昆刑三初字第 73 號 （雲
南省昆明市中級人民法院） 
55 Andrew Sanders and Richard Young, “From Suspect to Trial” in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and 
Robert Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) 966. 
56 John Baldwin, ‘Police Interviews on Tape’ (1990) 11 New Law Journal 662, 663. 
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areas.57 In recent years, regional high courts have enacted regulations that endow the 
criminal defendant with procedural rights, including the exclusionary rule, not 
otherwise fully guaranteed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. For example, the 
Beijing city,58 the Jiangsu Province,59 the Jiangxi Province,60 the Hubei Province,61 
and the Sichuan Province62 – all issued regulations governing police torture. 
Referring to the confession exclusionary rule, for instance, Article 76 of the 
Regulations Concerning Evidence Issues in Beijing High People’s Court (Provisional) 
provides that “a confession obtained by torture, duress, incitement, deceit and 
psychological torment should be inadmissible.”63 In addition, Article 23 of A 
Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence in Sichuan Province 
stipulates that “a confession obtained by torture, incitement and deceit should be 
inadmissible.”64 Moreover, it appears that effective mechanisms to enforce these 
regional rules of criminal evidence may not exist. 
In this section, I explore the existing problems of regional rules of criminal 
evidence and contend that the new Chinese Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to 
the exclusionary rule must put the principle (the exclusion of the illegally obtained 
evidence) and its exception in the right place. The Court never should forget that its 
                                                 
57 Fang Baoguo, ‘事實已經發生 – 論我國地方性刑事證據規則’ [The Fact is There – On Rules of 
Criminal Evidence in China] (2007) 25 Tribune of Political Science and Law (Journal of China 
University of Political Science and Law) 41, 41. 
58 ‘北京市高級人民法院關於辦理各類案件有關證據問題的規定(試行)’ [Regulations Concerning 
Evidence Issues in Beijing High People’s Court (Provisional)], promulgated on April 2, 2003. 
59 ‘江蘇省關於刑事審判證據和定案的若干意見(試行)’ [A Number of Opinions Concerning 
Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in Jiangsu Province (Provisional)], promulgated on August 28, 
2003. 
60  ‘江西省關於死刑案件言詞證據的若干意見(試行)’ [A Number of Opinions Concerning 
Confessions in Death Cases in Jiangxi Province (Provisional)], promulgated on August 10, 2006. 
61 ‘湖北省關於關於刑事證據若干問題的規定(試行)’ [A Number of Regulations Concerning 
Criminal Evidence in Hubei Province (Provisional)], promulgated on January 1, 2006. 
62 ‘四川省關於刑事證據工作的若干意見(試行)’ [A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial 
Evidence in Sichuan Province (Provisional)], promulgated on May 1, 2005. 
63 Article 23 of the A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence in Sichuan Province. 
64 Ibid. 
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primary obligation is to prevent tyranny. 
 
7.3.1 Future dangerousness: Exceptions replace the 
exclusionary rule 
 
The search and seizure exclusionary rule is designed to protect a suspect’s right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures by prohibiting the admission of physical 
evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures. As analyzed in detail above,65 
we might adopt some statutory exceptions to the search and seizure exclusionary rule. 
However, we must be very careful about exceptions. Some exceptions might replace 
the exclusionary rule per se. Once the exception replaces the principle, then, the 
hollow “exclusionary rule” provides little or no guidance to lower courts and law 
enforcement agencies. As a practical matter, there are two examples that the 
exception replaces the principle. 
First, let us take a look at the latest regional version of the exclusionary rule in 
China – The Opinions Concerning a Number of Questions of Criminal Evidence in 
Jiangsu Province,66 which was promulgated in 2008. Article 61 provides that “[a] 
confession obtained by illegal methods should be inadmissible.” Article 61 defines 
the term “illegally obtained confession” as “[c]onfessions of defendants, witnesses, 
and victims obtained by any of the following means are illegally obtained 
confessions: (1) interference by beating and rope; (2) the use of duress, seduction and 
deceitful means.”67 This is the confession exclusionary rule. Article 62, however, 
                                                 
65 See 7.2.1. 
66 ‘江蘇省關於刑事案件證據若干問題的意見’ [The Opinions Concerning a Number of Questions 
of Criminal Evidence in Jiangsu Province], promulgated on April 3, 2008. 
67 Article 61 of the Opinions Concerning a Number of Questions of Criminal Evidence in Jiangsu 
Province. 
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stipulates: “A confession obtained by illegal methods would be admissible if matched 
with another confession obtained by legal methods, as long as these confessions were 
collected by different investigators in the same force.” 
It is very easy to replace Article 61 (the principle) with Article 62 (the 
exception). The Opinions Concerning a Number of Questions of Criminal Evidence 
in Jiangsu Province allowed a second bite of the apple for the government. If 
officers’ actions did not meet the specific requirements of the right to be free from 
torture, they could have another chance for admission of evidence under Article 62. 
For example, if police officer A first tortured the suspect to get the confession, the 
suspect admitted that he committed the crime. Then police officer B interrogated the 
suspect; the suspect admitted again. The second confession, according to Article 62, 
is admissible. Unfortunately, the exception replaces the principle. 
Second, Article 63 of A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial 
Evidence and Conviction in Jiangsu Province (Provisional)68 argues that “physical 
evidence obtained by illegal methods is inadmissible.”69 This is the search and 
seizure exclusionary rule. However, Article 63 then argues that “if combined with 
other other evidence obtained by legal methods, it can prove facts, it is admissible.”70 
Once again, the exception replaces the principle. Under these circumstances, the 
exclusionary rule is unlikely to achieve its objective, primarily because the 
exceptions to the rule make exclusion uncertain or even replace the rule per se. 
 
                                                 
68 ‘江蘇省關於刑事審判證據和定案的若干意見(試行)’ [A Number of Opinions Concerning 
Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in Jiangsu Province (Provisional)], promulgated on August 28, 
2003. 
69 Article 63 of A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in 
Jiangsu Province (Provisional). 
70 Ibid. 
 295
7.3.2 Once the evidence can prove facts, it is admissible? 
 
First, Article 63 of A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence and 
Conviction in Jiangsu Province (Provisional) governs the admission of illegally 
obtained physical evidence; it stipulates “physical evidence obtained by illegal 
methods cannot be used as evidence directly. However, combined with other 
evidence obtained by legal methods, if it can prove facts, it is admissible.”71 Second, 
similarly Article 64 involved the admissibility of derivative evidence of illegally 
obtained confessions; once again, it argues that: 
 
If derivative evidence obtained from illegally obtained confessions can 
prove facts, it is admissible. The derivative evidence obtained from 
illegally obtained confessions are inadmissible, if it cannot directly prove 
the fact; however, combined with other evidence obtained by legal 
methods, if it can prove facts, it is admissible.”72 
 
These articles suggest, I assume, that if the evidence can prove facts, it is 
admissible. The evidence will help courts to ascertain the truth. A central reason 
behind this, as I have explained,73 is that China identifies strongly with the crime 
control model. Of course, this is not to imply that seeking the truth is not a goal of 
the criminal process. I add merely that when due process is subordinated to 
truth-seeking, Articles 63 and 64 distort the exclusionary rule; Articles 63 and 64 
articulated a new rule: once the evidence can prove facts, it is admissible. 
This is problematic in that the drafter of Article 63 mistakenly mixed up the 
                                                 
71 Article 63 of A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in 
Jiangsu Province (Provisional) (emphasis added). 
72 Article 64 of A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in 
Jiangsu Province (Provisional) (emphasis added). 
73 See 5.2.4. 
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concepts of the “admissibility of evidence” and the “weight of evidence”. These are 
two quite distinct issues. It is worth pointing out that there is a distinction between 
admissibility and weight. In my judgment the most significant cost of this mistake is 
an overemphasis on factual guilt. 
In the United Kingdom and the United States, the distinction between a concept 
of admissibility and one of weight was critical. In common law systems, 
admissibility is decided by the judge, whereas weight is determined by juries. The 
exclusionary rule is not based on concerns about the value of the evidence. That is 
the reason why the reliability rationale is no longer the principal and only test of 
admissibility in this context after the 1940s in the United States and 1980 in the 
United Kingdom.74 
 
7.3.3 The absence of the search and seizure exclusionary rule 
 
This thesis draws a distinction between two kinds of exclusionary rule: the 
confession exclusionary rule, and the search and seizure exclusionary rule. The latter 
seeks to prevent constitutional violations that deny individuals their freedom from 
illegal search and seizure; the rule serves as another check against an overzealous 
police officer. Whilst there exists substantial differences between two kinds of 
exclusionary rule, most regional rules of criminal evidence merely ignore the search 
and seizure exclusionary rule. For instance, A Number of Regulations Concerning 
Criminal Evidence in Hubei Province (Provisional), A Number of Opinions 
Concerning Confessions in Death Cases in Jiangxi Province (Provisional), A Number 
of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence in Sichuan Province (Provisional) 
                                                 
74 See 2.2.1. 
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and the Regulations Concerning a Number of Questions of Excluding Illegally 
Obtained Criminal Evidence, 75  are all silent about the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule. 
With regards to the issue of the burden of proof, it seems that the burden of 
proof was on defendant to show the existence of torture. For instance, under Article 
32 of A Number of Regulations Concerning Criminal Evidence in Hubei Province, it 
is for a victim, witness, suspect, defendant or, their lawyers, where torture is alleged, 
to enumerate related facts. 76  Likewise, Article 7 of A Number of Opinions 
Concerning Confessions in Death Cases in Jiangxi Province requires a defendant or 
witness, where torture is alleged, to provide the name of police officer committing 
torture, the time, and location.77 I find it inherently unfair to expect defendants to 
provide this information, if it is possible. How could the defendant know the name of 
police officer committing torture? The detainees are allowed no watches. How could 
they know the time of torture? 
It is important to bear in mind that I am not arguing for the inclusion of the 
exclusionary rule that already exist in the Code of Criminal Procedure. In China, the 
Code of Criminal Procedure remained silent about the admissibility of evidence 
obtained by torture. My position is that the vague and ambiguous judicial 
interpretations regarding the exclusionary rule should be replaced by the black and 
white letter of the exclusionary rule in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
At first sight, although confession exclusionary norms were addressed by a few 
judicial interpretations,78 it should be emphasized that these judicial interpretations 
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76 Article 32 of A Number of Regulations Concerning Criminal Evidence in Hubei Province. 
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were not a legislative product, nor were they promulgated with formal legal 
consultation. These judicial interpretations are not rules of law but merely 
administrative directives which police officers were encouraged to follow. That is to 
say, judicial interpretations do not have any legal binding status. 
Most of these judicial interpretations are provisional only. 79  They are 
“experimental” and the place to experiment is their own areas. In the regions with 
confession exclusionary norms in judicial interpretations,80 police officers were 
expected to follow them. Take the example of the Opinions Concerning a Number of 
Questions of Criminal Evidence in Jiangsu Province. While this is what the police in 
Jiangsu Province are supposed to follow, this judicial interpretation may be regarded 
in a general way as prescribing a standard of propriety rather than a rigid requirement. 
It does not carry the force of law, and the violation of it does not necessarily lead to 
any negative consequences. Therefore, evidence was not inadmissible per se for lack 
of conformity with judicial interpretations. Recognition of the very limited status of 
judicial interpretations regarding the exclusionary rule, courts and the police do not 
pay attention to these interpretations. These judicial interpretations are routinely 
ignored or flouted. Because of this, the right to be free from torture is still illusory. 
And for this reason these judicial interpretations do not bind the courts as well as the 
police. 
It is also noteworthy that, strictly speaking, the authority to undertake judicial 
                                                                                                                                          
in Jiangsu Province and Article 32 of A Number of Regulations Concerning Criminal Evidence in 
Hubei Province (Provisional). 
79  For example, Regulations Concerning Evidence Issues in Beijing High People’s Court 
(Provisional); A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence and Conviction in Jiangsu 
Province (Provisional); A Number of Opinions Concerning Confessions in Death Cases in Jiangxi 
Province (Provisional); A Number of Regulations Concerning Criminal Evidence in Hubei Province 
(Provisional) and A Number of Opinions Concerning Criminal Trial Evidence in Sichuan Province 
(Provisional). 
80 For example, Jiangsu Province, Jiangxi Province, Hubei Province and Sichuan Province. 
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interpretation belongs to the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate. 81  Other courts should not provide lower courts with their own 
interpretations of the law. Therefore, the legal status of “judicial interpretations” 





Lying at the heart of this thesis is a wish to establish a suitable exclusionary rule for 
China. I am a proponent of the exclusionary rule. I have no doubt that we should 
establish the exclusionary rule in China. The right to be free from torture and the 
confession exclusionary rule in China are necessities, not luxuries. I can think of no 
substantial argument against the establishment of the exclusionary rule. I also firmly 
believe that the exclusionary rule has the effect of deterring or at least tending to 
deter the police misconduct. The exclusionary rule is an idea whose time has come. 
In China, the time is ripe for a change in the context of exclusionary rule. The 
judicial response to the illegally obtained evidence should be based on the need to 
uphold the rule of law. The evidence obtained by illegal methods should be excluded, 
not because it has no weight, but because the police have behaved illegally. The 
admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It 
has been noted that the current scheme affords little practical protection to the 
accused as Chinese judges often condone procedural violations by the police which 
would trigger the exclusionary rule as long as evidence indicates the defendant’s 
                                                 
81 Li Wei, ‘Judicial Interpretation in China’ (1997) 5 Willamette Journal of International Law and 
Dispute Resolution 87, 93. 
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guilt. 
In addition, the establishment of the exclusionary rule is urgently needed. To 
improve human rights conditions, I recommend that the Chinese government 
explicitly establish the exclusionary rule. Although the confession exclusionary rule 
existed in the judicial interpretations, it was only to be used in rare and exceptional 
cases. The exclusionary rule should not continue to hang in China on the slender 
thread of judicial interpretations. The judicial interpretation of the exclusionary rule 
is far from enough. It should be written into the Chinese Constitution. The right to be 
free from torture is one of the highest values protected by the Chinese Constitution. 
My basic notion is that breaches of the rights can and should lead to the exclusion of 
evidence. We require the closest scrutiny of the fairness of a process designed to find 
whether an individual is at a substantial risk of torture. I advocate the major reforms 
would require reconceptualizing a considerable amount of constitutional criminal 
procedure. The exclusionary rule will become a bulwark of constitutional protection 
for criminal suspects in China. 
Referring to the illegally obtained confessions, I am unalterably opposed to the 
use of any evidence obtained by police torture. Confessions obtained illegally would 
be subject to mandatory exclusion, rather than discretionary exclusion. Referring to 
the confession exclusionary rule, my essential thesis is that prevailing discretionary 
exclusion is insufficient and should be replaced by compulsory exclusion. I argue 
that the constitutionally and legally mandated exclusion from the trial of illegally 
obtained evidence will have dramatic effects on law enforcement procedure in China. 
Under the confession exclusionary rule, where a judge concludes that confessions 
were obtained by torture, he has the duty, not the discretion, to exclude these 
confessions. 
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Referring to the illegally obtained physical evidence, I cannot recall any 
decisions by judges to exclude evidence on the ground that the evidence had been 
obtained by an illegal search and seizure in China. Ostensibly, there are some 
alternatives to the exclusionary rule in China – including criminal prosecution of the 
offending officer82 payment of monetary damages by the officer after a civil lawsuit, 
internal discipline and termination of employment. In 2007, He Xing, Chief of 
Criminal Investigation Department, Ministry of Public Security, claimed that there is 
a mechanism in the police force to oversee the quality of cases. Each level of the 
police force, from officer to captain to inspector to superintendent to commander, 
will oversee the cases. The difficulty, however, is that, no effective alternative to the 
exclusionary rule has yet been discovered in China. At present, criminal prosecutions 
of the police are rare. Internal police discipline is also ineffective. Obviously, these 
sanctions are not strong enough to motivate police officers to avoid inappropriate 
forms of search and seizure. Accordingly, in the Chinese criminal justice system, 
police illegality in obtaining evidence of guilt becomes immaterial. 
Although the confession exclusionary rule is an attempt to curb police torture in 
China, we should then ask the next question: Why do you think the exclusionary rule 
would prevent the police behaving lawlessly? I argue that the mandatory 
exclusionary rule will make a difference in China for the following two reasons.83 
Firstly, the exclusionary rule will extract the “firewood” (i.e., incentive) from 
                                                 
82 Article 245 of the Criminal Law provides: 
A person who unlawfully subjects another person to a bodily search or a search of his 
residence or unlawfully intrudes into another person’s residence shall be sentenced to 
fixed-term imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention. A judicial 
officer who abuses his power and commits a crime under the preceding paragraph shall be 
sentenced heavily. 
83 In 7.1.2, I have analysed why a discretionary confession exclusionary rule in China will be no 
exclusionary rule at all. We are not dealing here with any question of whether China will enforce the 
law. Of course, the exclusionary rule is worthless if no one can enforce it. 
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under the cauldron (i.e., police torture). 
One of the deterrent functions of the exclusionary rule is its tendency to 
promote institutional compliance with Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
requirements on the part of law enforcement agencies. Now we understand the 
reasons why an interrogator might resort to torture;84 one important reason is that the 
police desire to obtain confessions. The drive behind police torture is rooted in a 
police desire to extract confessions. Hence, police officers who wish to secure 
confessions for trial will not waste their time in activities made unproductive, once 
they find that they cannot use evidence obtained through torture anymore. Under this 
situation, it is fairly clear that they have less incentive to seek confessions by torture. 
Then there will be no practical necessity for evasion of Article 43 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure by the police. 
Secondly, from a historical perspective, the exclusionary rule solved the same 
problem of police torture in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
History is an important part of the story here. As described above,85 one thing is 
clear; the exclusionary rule deters police misconduct. Historically, torture was a 
contagious disease in Northern Ireland,86  the United States, 87  and around the 
world;88 the solution of exclusionary rule seems sensible and workable in the 
jurisdictions mentioned above.89 And, as Agustin Parise has noted, “[i]deals tend to 
spread quickly when they are successfully implemented. Legal ideas are no 
                                                 
84 See 5.1. 
85 See 3.1.4. 
86 Michael O’Connor and Celia Rumann, ‘Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned by the Same 
Mistakes Made Fighting Terrorism in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 24 Cardozo Law Review 1657, 1682. 
87 See 2.1.2. 
88 Amnesty International, Torture Worldwide: An Affront to Human Dignity (Amnesty International, 
New York 2000) 10. 
89 See Chapter 3. 
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exceptions.”90 The Chinese have become aware of the seriousness of the problem of 
police torture gradually. If they find the exclusionary rule workable, it would be 
natural for them to adopt it in practice. Hence, the Chinese legal system might well 
benefit from adopting by way of reform certain evidence rules that operate sensibly 
in common law systems. It is a practical problem not a theoretical one for the 
Chinese criminal justice system and that practically it does not matter that the 
original ideals are Western. 
Opponents of the exclusionary rule say that China should not adopt the 
exclusionary rule as the social and economic condition is not mature; the crime rate 
is high. It seems they suggested that we should wait until conditions change.91 But 
we might be waiting a long time. Of course, crime and the public interest are of 
grave concern to society. Regarding the right to be free from torture, the public 
interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained as a result of police torture. 
Regarding the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, whether this right 
should reasonably yield to another right is to be decided by the court, not by the 
police. In addition, the crime rate fear does not appear to have been borne out in 
other countries which have adopted the exclusionary rule: the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
Furthermore, to argue for the balanced approach is one thing, but knowing how 
to do so is quite another. Some judges often turned a blind eye to defendants charged 
with specific crimes in the name of balancing and just ignored the illegality and 
admit the illegally secured evidence. I found this reluctance was especially acute in 
                                                 
90 Agustin Parise, ‘Legal Transplants and Codification: Exploring the North American Sources of the 
Civil Code of Argentina (1871)’ (2010) 21 Jindal Global Law Review 40, 40. 
91 Wang Zhjian and Yang Yamin, ‘我國非法證據排除規則的模式選擇’ [The Choosing of the 
Model for Chinese Exclusionary Rule] (2009) Law Science 145, 146. 
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guns and drugs related criminal cases in the context of the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule. Hence, I propose that the current metaphor of a balancing 
approach in the exclusionary rule jurisprudence in Taiwan actually may encourage 
the police to violate the standards of conduct imposed upon them by the constitution 
doctrine. Before 2003, Taiwan had no legislated rule of evidence concerning illegally 
obtained physical evidence. In 2003, the Taiwanese Code of Criminal Procedure 
amended Article 158(4) provides that “[u]nless otherwise provided by law, evidence 
obtained in violation of statutory procedure by officials having the responsibility of 
carrying out criminal procedure shall be decided as to its capacity of proof taking 
into account the maintenance of the balance between the protection of human rights 
and public interests.” For the first time in the history of Taiwanese criminal justice, 
the judiciary was given statutory power to exclude improperly obtained 
non-confessional evidence. After scrutinizing the cases of the Taiwan Supreme Court 
from 2003 to 2011, however, I found that the Court was almost unwilling to exercise 
their discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence when the cases were related to 
guns and drugs. 
Certainly, the exclusionary rule alone is no panacea for preventing police 
torture.92 However, with no effective alternatives to exclusion seemingly in sight,93 
and with the prospect of a worsening of the problem of police torture, the 
exclusionary rule is essential and a desideratum for the Chinese criminal justice 
system and without which it is impossible to eliminate police torture. Establishing 
the exclusionary rule at the level of criminal procedure law is the necessary first step 
in protecting the right to be free from torture. After all, the exclusionary rule is 
                                                 
92 See 7.2.3. In addition, we are not dealing here with any question of whether China will enforce the 
law. This is the question of implementation of the law. 
93 See 3.2 and 8.3.1. 
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worthless if no one can access it from the Code of Criminal Procedure and enforce it. 
Change is hard. However, inertia begets inertia. We still have a long way to go, but it 








The study of foreign law can lead new concepts, notions, ideas, and even solutions 
infiltrating national law and may also help dispel myths 1  about imagined 
consequences in the event of establishing a new rule or a change in the local criminal 
procedure law. As Thomas Mann remarked: “it is only by making comparisons that 
we can distinguish who we are, in order to become all that we are meant to be.”2 
In assessing the exclusionary rule from a comparative perspective, this thesis is 
divided into two major parts. The first part of this thesis explores lessons from the 
past; it deals in depth with the development of the exclusionary rule both in the 
United Kingdom3 and United States, covering rationales, debates and theoretical 
foundation of the exclusionary rule in the constitutional context. The purposes of this 
research are to (1) assess the exclusionary rule in the United Kingdom and United 
States;4 and (2) explore the theoretical constitutional foundation of the rule.5 The 
second part then looks to the future, to (3) establish a Chinese exclusionary rule. Part 
II focuses on the exclusionary rule in China, including the effect of police torture, the 
passive attitude of judges and the necessity of establishing the rule. It explores the 
reasons why we value both the right to be free from torture and the right to be free 
                                                 
1 See 3.4. 
2 Thomas Mann, Joseph in Egypt, (Alfred-A-Knopf, New York 1933), translated in D.P. Currie, The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Chicago University Press, Chicago 1994) v. 
3 More specifically, England and Wales. 
4 See Chapters 1-3 
5 See Chapter 4 
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from illegal searches and seizures primarily for its capacity to protect citizens’ rights 
in the future. 
The topic of the exclusionary rule is wonderfully perplexing. This thesis 
combines diagnosis and prescription – the problem of police torture in China6 and 
the solution of exclusionary rule. 7  This research also illustrates many of the 
problems with past and present patterns in this context, and shows that existing 
Chinese laws do not adequately address these problems. The ultimate goal of the 
research is to find a suitable exclusionary rule for China to solve the serious problem 




8.1 The constitutional foundation 
of the exclusionary rule 
 
In this thesis, my concern is a fundamental one – the constitutional foundation. The 
rejection of torture and illegal search is characterized as a constitutional principle and 
not merely a criminal procedure or evidence rule. The exclusionary rule is essential 
to the enforcement of fundamental rights and appropriate to safeguard a criminal’s 
constitutional rights. As suggested in Chapter 4, the exclusionary rule is more aptly 
categorized as a constitutional principle than as a rule of evidence. The exclusionary 
rule is constitutionally required and has constitutional roots. At the level of theory, 
my exclusionary rule framework is grounded in the separation of powers. We should 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 5. 
7 See Chapters 6 and 7. 
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proceed the exclusionary rule on the constitutional level. Constitutional law, however, 
is not an empty promise. If the Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure is to 
have any meaning, it necessarily must provide a remedy whenever its terms are 
violated. Accordingly, the courts should provide some means of enforcing the 
constitutional prohibitions. Otherwise, the constitutional provision will be reduced to 
a form of words. 
That constitutional level of concern for preventing official lawlessness, 
unfortunately, has never been present in China. On the one hand, from an intrinsic 
perspective, the exclusionary rule is designed to improve truth-finding.8 On the other 
hand, from an extrinsic perspective, the exclusionary rule is governed by 
considerations extraneous to fact-finding accuracy. I argue that an explicit 
exclusionary rule should be written into the Chinese Constitution. My study 
addressed two aspects of this constitutional foundation in the context of the 
exclusionary rule: (1) separation of powers and (2) the positive duties. 
 
8.1.1 Separation of powers 
 
The concept of the separation of powers is not merely limited to constitutional law 
and political theory. What has been completely overlooked in the scholarly literature 
is what the separation of powers requires when the government proceeds in the 
criminal justice system.  The separation of powers captures core exclusionary rule 
values. I propose that the separation of powers doctrine should stand as a primary 
animating principle of the exclusionary rule. While separation of powers as a concept 
has always been the structural safeguard centered on the constitution, in the context 
                                                 
8 See 2.2.1. 
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of the exclusionary rule, it has been severely underdeveloped both in the case law 
and in the academic literature. I seek to bring separation of powers to the fore as a 
usable interpretive device that supports a truly protective exclusionary rule. 
The separation of powers doctrine perfectly fits into the primary animating 
principle of the exclusionary rule in at least two ways. First, the separation of powers 
is a core component of the constitution’s system of checks and balances, a system in 
which each branch of the government is endowed with a constitutional control over 
the others. As I have indicated throughout the thesis, our purpose of the exclusionary 
rule is to prevent, and to protect people from, torture and illegal searches. Under the 
scheme of separation of powers, the various branches of government have exclusive, 
and limited, spheres of operation. The executive does not have the authority to apply 
any means of interrogation that are illegal. The judiciary is a necessary check on the 
executive exuberance, and it must safeguard constitutional limits on policing. The 
search warrant is the intrinsic and preventive measure. The search and seizure 
exclusionary rule is the extrinsic and deterrent measure. 
Second, the primary responsibility for enforcing the constitution’s limits on 
government is vested in the judiciary. Thus, as Ashworth has convincingly argued, “it 
seems contradictory for one organ of the State, the courts, to take advantage of a 
breach of the law by another organ of the State, a law enforcement officer.”9 
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in cases like Boyd also 
emphasized the judicial duty to enforce constitutional rights against even the mildest 
forms of overreaching by the executive and legislative.10 Without the exclusionary 
rule and the power of judicial review, what check – what constitutional control – 
                                                 
9 Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure (Sweet and Maxwell, 
London 2002) 35. 
10 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-27 (1886). 
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would the judiciary have on the executive in the context of the right to be free from 
torture, and the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures? The answer is 
none. As a consequence, the exclusionary rule is an essential and inevitable 
component of constitutional judicial review of police wrongdoing in the criminal 
process. The constitution is absolutely not a set of unenforceable guiding principles 
or a code of ethics under an honour system. The related principle is ubi ius, ibi 
remedium: where there is a right, there should be a remedy to fit the right. The right 
without remedy is nonsense. Historical experience and a review of the violations of 
the right to be free from torture11 and the right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures12 in today’s China suggest that defendants’ rights are better protected in the 
criminal justice system and with checks and balances that prevent excessive 
concentration of the executive power. 
Above all, my approach depends crucially on the construction of a judicial 
system of checks and balances. The exclusionary rule has three essential 
characteristics: the first, for the court, is the protection of constitutional rights; the 
second, for the rule per se, is preventing arbitrary governmental invasion and the 
third, for the police, is adherence to the constitution law and criminal procedure law. 
The police would usually seek search warrants before searching, magistrates or 
judges would screen search warrants requests, and courts would exercise the 
exclusionary rule to exclude the illegally obtained evidence. 
                                                 
11 See Chapter 5. 
12 See 6.3. 
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8.1.2 The positive duties 
 
As I have indicated above,13 the right to fair trial is connected to the exclusionary 
rule at the constitutional level. Further, in this section, I intend to highlight the 
absence of attention to the positive duties of states – not negative duties to restrain 
from acting (such as a duty not to infringe upon the right to be free from torture), but 
positive, affirmative duties to protect people14 – from our criminal procedural and 
constitutional dialogue about the exclusionary rule. Traditionally, in the field of 
constitutional criminal procedure, most of the Constitution is aimed at prohibiting the 
government from acting in various ways, such as the Fourth Amendment and the 
Fifth Amendment in the Bill of Rights, which protects a variety of activities from 
government interference. The international bodies, however, established under 
human right treaties have interpreted states’ obligation as giving rise to take positive 
actions to protect people from arbitrary state interference. States were obligated not 
only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful police torture, but also to take 
concrete and appropriate steps to safeguard the right to be free from torture of their 
nationals within its jurisdiction. These obligations are often known as positive 
obligations, or obligations to protect. 
Governments have not only negative duties but also have positive duties. The 
right to be free from torture, and the right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures entails: first, the obvious correlative negative duty not to use illegal methods, 
for example, using torture to obtain evidence; second, positive duties such as a duty 
to educate people about the wrongfulness of illegal methods, a duty to investigate 
                                                 
13 See 4.1.4. 
14 It is connected to the protective rationale. See 2.2.4. 
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complaints of illegal methods, and a duty to prevent illegal methods. From a human 
rights law perspective, I argue that the exclusionary rule imposes two distinct but 
complementary duties on the state: negative duty and positive duty. At first, there is a 
negative duty not intentionally to use illegal methods in investigation. This 
undertaking compels governments to abstain from arbitrary public authorities’ 
interference. In addition, governments should do more than eschew illegal practice of 
torture and illegal search. The second duty is that states are obligated to take 
substantive positive actions to protect individuals from arbitrary intrusion. In relation 
to substance of the exclusionary rule, governments should establish a three-fold 
obligation in relation to illegally secured evidence cases. 
Firstly, governments should develop clear judicial guidance to the police about 
what is expected to them. The legislature has positive, affirmative duties to enact and 
pass laws to punish torture and illegal investigation practices. If there is a set of clear 
rules of permissible police conduct, the police can be expected to follow them. The 
lack of detailed guidance will result in police transgressions of constitutional rights. 
In order to decide which evidence should be excluded, courts should establish a set 
of criteria to replace the vague ones. The court needs to formulate a clear identifiable 
standard of review for police misconduct claims and apply it consistently. 
Secondly, governments should take reasonable preventive measures to protect 
defendants whose constitutional rights are at risk whether from illegal acts of the 
police or other agents of the state. There should be effective official investigations 
when defendants have been tortured or illegally searched by the police. Complaints 
about torture or ill treatment must be investigated immediately and effectively by 
impartial prosecutors. In addition, Article 2(3) of the ICCPR imposes an obligation to 
investigate allegations of torture. The duty to investigate is implicit in the notion of 
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an “effective remedy”.15 As the ECtHR stated in Aksoy v. Turkey:16 
 
Accordingly, as regards Article 13, where an individual has an arguable 
claim that he has been tortured by agents of the State, the notion of an 
“effective remedy” entails, in addition to the payment of compensation 
where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation capable of 
leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and 
including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory 
procedure.17 
 
Thirdly, it is the duty of governments to establish a substantive mechanism to 
protect their people by excluding evidence adduced by torture or other unfair 
techniques. Past history also demonstrates that the very idea of protecting the 
defendant’s right is completely empty unless it is linked to an efficient mechanism.18 
The capricious exclusionary rule cannot provide substantial protection for people. 
Further, the ECHR also imposes positive duties. Positive duties exist under 
Articles 2, 3, 8,19 (“everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life 
and his home) and 13. The ECtHR found that Article 2 imposes positive duties on the 
member states to take steps to prevent police or other activities which may endanger 
life.20 The ECtHR has interpreted the ECHR and the duty of the Court much 
differently from the traditional passive approach. A member state has positive duties 
under the ECHR. The duty to investigate claims of torture is implied under both 
Articles 3 and 13 of the ECHR.21 The states have the obligation to ensure that there 
are adequate prevention measures. Under Article 13, states have an obligation to 
                                                 
15 Aksoy v. Turkey (App no 18896/91) (1997) 23 EHRR 553. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., [98]. 
18 See 4.3. 
19 Lopez Ostra v. Spain (App no 16798/90) (1993) 20 EHRR 277. 
20 McCann v. United Kingdom, (App no 18984/91) (1995) 21 EHRR 97. 
21 Aydin v. Turkey (App no 23178/94) (1997) 5 EHRR 1866. 
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investigate complaints of torture or ill-treatment. The obligation arises whenever an 
individual raises an “arguable claim” of torture or ill treatment by state authorities.22 
The jurisprudence in the ECtHR emerging from the human rights law suggests that 
there are principles that can be developed to help police malpractice victims in the 
criminal justice system. States must recognize their accountability in ensuring an 
adequate legal framework as a supportive legitimating safety net. A member state has 
a positive duty to undertake actions that will enforce the protections to people 
granted by the ECHR.23 
The ECtHR held that the positive obligation to launch an official investigation 
into accusations of torturous conduct “cannot be considered in principle to be limited 
solely to cases of ill-treatment by state agents.”24 These measures should provide 
effective protection of the accused and include reasonable steps to prevent 
ill-treatment of which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge. 
 
 
8.2 Lessons from Anglo-American 
exclusionary rule history 
 
The United Kingdom and the United States have created and expanded many related 
defendants’ rights and formulated civilizing structures in the context of the 
exclusionary rule. The Anglo-American exclusionary rule history has offered 
valuable lessons to the rest of the world.25 If introduced against a defendant at trial, 
                                                 
22 Silver and Others v. United Kingdom (App no 6205/73) (1983) 6 EHRR 62. 
23 Z v. United Kingdom (App no 29392/95) (2002) 34 EHRR 3. 
24 MC v. Bulgaria (App no 39272/98) (2003) 15 EHRR 627. 
25 See 3.1.5. 
 315
false confessions are highly likely to lead to the mistaken convictions of the innocent. 
In a 1998 study of 60 false confessions, Leo and Ofshe found that 73% of the false 
confessors who took their cases to trial were erroneously convicted.26 In a 2004 
study of 125 false confessions, Drizin and Leo found that the number went up to 
81% of the false confessors whose cases went to trial were erroneously convicted.27 
Furthermore, wrongful convictions “may inflict unnecessary and unpleasant 
treatment on someone who is in fact harmless; deprive her, needlessly, of the ability 
to predict and control her own life; and injure her reputation and her prospects, if it 
leads others to believe mistakenly that she is a law-breaker.”28 
The exclusionary rule is no longer “unique to American jurisprudence”.29 In 
English law, a confession that is obtained by oppression must be excluded.30 For the 
last century, in the United States, the confession exclusionary rule stems from the 
rights granted defendants in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution. The United States Supreme Court has banned torture, cruel, inhuman or 
any degrading conduct whatsoever. In addition, from 1914, evidence seized in 
violation of one’s Fourth Amendment rights cannot be used against that person in a 
criminal prosecution.31 There are a number of lessons about the exclusionary rule to 
be learned from the United Kingdom and the United States. 
                                                 
26 Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, ‘The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty 
and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation’ (1998) 88 Journal of Law and 
Criminology 429, 481-482. 
27 Steven Drizin and Richard Leo, ‘The Problem of False Confessions in Post-DNA World’ (2004) 82 
North Carolina Law Review 891, 891. 
28 R.A. Duff, Trials and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1986) 105. 
29 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
30 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78(1). 
31 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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8.2.1 No shortcut methods 
 
We must emphasize the fact that the short-cut of an involuntary confession 
becomes a boomerang which flies back and hits not only the officer himself 
but his entire department and the community as a whole. 
                                                Quinn Tamm32 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate how comparative research into 
Anglo-American criminal justice systems can offer a variety of choices for the 
reform of Chinese criminal procedure. At first sight, in the short run, police 
wrongdoing might seem to get the “results” and “convictions” faster. These 
misconducts by the law enforcement authorities, however, are by no means the 
shortcut methods. In the long run, the criminal justice as a whole and even society 
has to pay the price someday. The price may be much higher. Police wrongdoing is 
unfair, dangerous, and even illegal. The history of the Anglo-American exclusionary 
rule proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement not only impair its 
enduring effectiveness, but also encourages law enforcement officers to engage in 
them.33 History has shown that torture, illegal searches and entrapment are not the 
shortcuts. In order to rule out general warrants, in general, both the United Kingdom 
and United States have developed a procedure that allows premises to be searched 
under authorization by the court.34 
Referring to the rationales of the exclusionary rule, I identity four justifications 
for the exclusionary rule: (1) the reliability rationale (ensuring the reliability of 
confessions), (2) the self-incrimination rationale (protecting the right of suspects to 
                                                 
32 Quinn Tamm, Reported in 8 Civil Liberties in New York, No. 2, p. 4, col. 5 (November 1959). 
33 See 2.1. 
34 See 4.1.2. 
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make autonomous decisions), (3) the deterrence rationale (preventing future police 
wrongdoing) and (4) the protective rationale (protecting suspects’ rights from 
disadvantages). 35  Some rationales are complementary. There are two primary 
considerations: the internal rationale, i.e., the reliability rationale which is more 
relevant to the confession exclusionary rule; the external rationale, the dominant 
consideration, which is relevant to both the confession exclusionary rule, and search 
and seizure exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule can be justified by reference to 
considerations of internal and external rationale. I argue that no specific rationale is 
perfect, absolutely better than the others; furthermore there is a trend to combine 
both internal and external rationale. 
 
8.2.2 The right to be free from torture 
 
If the wrongful conviction of the innocent is a pressing issue in China today, police 
torture is the flashpoint. The right to be free from torture, one of the most 
fundamental values of democratic society, is considered a fundamental right at the 
international, European36 and national levels. It is the most fundamental human right 
already apparent from its long history and widespread codification, and has been 
repeatedly recognized by British, United States, and international courts. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE), along 
with its attached codes of practice, were enacted in 1984. PACE was among other 
things intended to produce a series of safeguards against torture during police 
questioning. 
                                                 
35 See 2.2. 
36 Article 3 of the ECHR. 
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From the perspective of international human rights law, the international 
prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment enjoys the highest 
normative force recognized by international law. The question of whether a 
government’s decision to commit torture could ever be invoked as a justification of 
torture when states of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or states in 
a state of emergency receives the answer, no, because an exception in this case would 
undermine the right to be free from torture. The right to be free from torture is an 
absolute right and must not be derogated from any exceptional circumstances, 
whatsoever. This right was included in the list of non-derogable rights under Article 
4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, the right was 
not seriously enforced in China. Official statements, government documents, 
newspaper articles, writing of Chinese intellectuals, and other materials indicate that 
torture gradually became a controversial issue that could not be ignored or 
minimized.37 
The right to be free from torture is a basic principle, and it should not give way 
in the face of complex or unusually serious types of cases. Once these exceptions of 
the right to be free from torture were introduced it will be interpreted with greater 
and greater elasticity, meaning that far more suspects and defendants will be affected 
than originally intended. Given the general unreliability of confessions extracted 
under torture and our fears about the “slippery slope”,38 Chinese society is more 
secure with an absolute prohibition on torture. 
In this thesis, regarding the power to exclude illegally obtained evidence, I 
conclude that Chinese judges were generally reluctant to exercise their confession 
                                                 
37 See Chapter 5. 
38 See 5.4.3. 
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exclusionary powers following a finding that evidence had been illegally obtained. 
However, the judiciary should act as an impartial, independent arbiter, rather than 
merely a tool of policy. It would be appropriate that judges be given a free hand to 
shoulder their responsibilities in this respect. Chinese judges may play crucial 
backstopping roles within the criminal justice system. On the macro-level, they help 
enforce the mechanism of checks and balances. On the micro-level, they protect the 
defendant’s core right to fair trial. In addition, this is the right understood to apply to 
every critical step of the proceedings, not only the trial stage but also pretrial 
proceedings. I argue that not only that the absolute prohibition on torture should 
remain in force, but also any attempt to use evidence obtained by torture would affect 
our ability to sustain the constitution’s commitment to human dignity and 
nonbrutality. 
In my opinion, the evidence obtained from torture must be excluded completely 
from proceedings. I hold to views about torture and evidence obtained from torture 
that are rather simple and straightforward. First, I denounce torture, threat, 
enticement, deceit or other unlawful means under any circumstances. There is no 
exception to it and there is no room for balancing. Second, as also pointed out in 7.1, 
we should permit absolutely no exception to the prohibition on illegally obtained 
confessions. False confessions lead to miscarriages of justice when the procedural 
safeguards built into the criminal justice system fail. The fear of opening the 
floodgates would lead China down the slippery slope to torture. There is no going 
back. If China leaves the window open a crack, the wind that has chilled to the bone 
in imperial China will soon fill the whole room. 
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8.2.3 The right to be free from illegal searches and seizures 
 
The right is sacrosanct; it protects the sanctity of our homes. When the sanctity is 
violated by the lawless actions of the police, the exclusionary rule remedies the 
violation by the status quo ante. Furthermore, the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule is a bulwark of the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. The rule is 
the most appropriate and effective route to ensure the protection of the right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures. It is also the only remedy that provides 
sufficient incentives to prevent future violations of the right to be free from illegal 
searches and seizures. That is the reason why the United States Supreme Court has 
relied on the search and seizure exclusionary rule for the last 100 years. 
One of the important lessons is that the exclusionary rule of history in the 
United Kingdom and United States had a huge impact on the police. While tracing 
the evolution of the exclusionary rule,39 history tells us that the exclusionary rule 
had huge impact on the police.40 In contrast, the lack of the exclusionary rule would 
result in little or no protection for privacy rights.41 The exclusionary rule deters, both 
specifically (by deterring those whose searches result in exclusion) and generally (by 
deterring other officers). Accordingly, the deterrence of the exclusionary rule 
generally comprises specific deterrence and general deterrence. 
 
                                                 
39 See 2.1. 
40 See 4.2.2. 
41 See 4.3. 
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8.3 Establishing the Chinese exclusionary rule 
 
The common law forbids the admission of evidence obtained by torture. The 
confession exclusionary rule is perhaps the most fundamental rule of the English 
criminal law.42 There is no reason to believe that the position should be any different 
in the jurisprudence of Chinese courts. In contrast, in China, evidence extracted by 
torture has been routinely used to secure guilty verdicts.43 Throughout the history of 
the People’s Republic of China, no enforcement mechanism protected both the right 
to be free from torture and the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. 
Protection, if any exists, against illegal and unreliable evidence is relaxed. The court 
is not concerned with how evidence was obtained and considers only the probative 
value of the evidence gathered by the police. Judges close their eyes to the 
exclusionary rule.44 The sole issue is whether the confession is true; whether the 
confession was obtained by torture or coerced is irrelevant. The reliability principle 
always outweighs the other principles. The current Chinese approach in the context 
of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate, unfair, and immoral by punishing innocent 
suspects. 
 
8.3.1 No feasible alternative to the exclusionary rule 
 
Again we are forced to confront the fundamental and nagging question: Whether 
adequate alternative remedies exist in China to safeguard the protections of the 
exclusionary rule? At least in theory, there are three alternatives to the exclusionary 
                                                 
42 R v. Mushtag, [2005] UKHL 25, [2005] WLR 1513, [7], [45]-[46], [71]. 
43 See Chapter 5. 
44 See 6.1. 
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rule: criminal prosecution of the offending officer; payment of a fine by the officer; 
and internal discipline (including termination of employment). Under current 
practice, however, existing criminal, civil and administrative remedies are 
unfortunately ineffectual and sadly inadequate. The remedies which China has 
neither deter nor compensate. Again, I emphasize that other methods of enforcing the 
right to be free from torture have proven to be a failure in curbing the brazen, illegal 
practices of Chinese police. These “alternatives” are not working in China. The 
current approach leaves many individuals with no remedy when the government 
violates their rights to be free from torture. I conclude that there exist no viable and 
effective alternative to the exclusionary rule in China. The exclusionary rule is the 
only efficient weapon in the Chinese court’s armoury as reliance on other remedies is 
worthless and futile. 
Civil and criminal penalties without force cannot constitute a disincentive to 
torture. First, in theory, police are significantly less likely use torture if they know 
that that punishment is likely to be severe. As regards the criminal prosecution of the 
officials responsible for the conduct, however, prosecutors are reluctant to indict 
police. Successful prosecutions do happen, but they are relatively rare and the 
number of prosecution is small. In addition, Chinese judges are reluctant to convict 
police officers. For example, in Cheng Jinhao case, the suspect was tortured to death 
by three police, including Wang Jiti. The defendant was exempted from criminal 
punishment.45 In the Sh Ming case, the suspect was tortured to death by five police 
officers. Three police torturers and murderers were sentenced to three years with 
                                                 
45 Jin Xing Er Zhong 72 (The Shanxi High Court, 2002). (2002) 晉刑二終字第 72 號 (山西省高級
人民法院) 
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three to five years’ probation.46 Moreover, two other police torturers and murderers 
were exempted from criminal punishment. In the Zhung Hanzhong case, the police 
torturer was sentenced to one year and six month with two years’ probation.47 The 
failure of the Chinese government to investigate torture claims and the courts to hold 
police torturers accountable for their acts of torture indirectly encourages the 
continuing use of torture by the police. The most obvious cost of the passive attitude 
from the court is the general public’s loss of confidence in the criminal justice system, 
both in policing and in adjudication. 
Next, there is no effective measure to provide civil compensation to victims of 
torture in all cases. In China, innocent victims of illegal searches and seizures 
generally recover nothing. Few Chinese plaintiffs filed civil suits against police 
officers for their wrongdoing. In the context of illegal searches and seizures, reported 
cases involving civil actions against law enforcement officers are rare, and those 
involving successful criminal prosecutions against police officers are nonexistent. 
Police know and count on the fact that the exclusionary rule in the judicial 
interpretations is rarely applied, and believe that the wrongdoing will not result in 
prosecution. It creates an incentive for law enforcement officers to disregard 
constitutional guarantees. Thus, considering the “benefits” of using illegal 
investigative methods, police have much to gain and almost nothing to lose if the 
statements obtained by torture are trustworthy or the illegally seized physical 
evidence can prove the defendant guilty. Currently, there exists no deterrence in 
China at all. 
                                                 
46 Dong Xing Chua 11 (The Qinghai High Court, 2007). (2007) 東刑初字第 11 號 (青海省海東地
區高級人民法院) 
47 Hai Nan Xing Chua 15 ( The Hainan Intermediate Court, 2003). (2003) 海南刑終字第 15 號 (海
口市海南中級法院) 
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8.3.2 The confession exclusionary rule 
 
Today, abusing suspects to obtain confessions has resulted in scandal and 
miscarriages of justice in China.48 The confession exclusionary rule is an essential 
ingredient of the right to be free from torture. However, when faced with the 
possibility of excluding reliable confessions, courts often strain logic to find that no 
violation of Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has occurred, thereby 
leaving the confessions admissible. If there is no action by the courts to ensure 
adequate protection by a suitable route for an individual’s right to be free from 
torture under Article 43 of Code of Criminal Procedure, then China’s Code of 
Criminal Procedure requirements will remain unfulfilled. 
The exclusion of illegally obtained confessions is especially important in China 
since confessions were considered admissible no matter how they were obtained. 
Regarding the confession exclusionary rule, I recommend the adoption of the most 
rigid approach – a mandatory confession exclusionary rule – as confessions obtained 
by torture, violent, coercive, threat, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct must 
be excluded and these confessions are inadmissible in judicial proceedings. 
Of course, China could adopt a case-by-case approach in the context of 
confession exclusionary rule. But this makes for such uncertainty and 
unpredictability that it would be impossible to foretell. This approach will make the 
exclusion of evidence the exception rather than the rule when police violate the right 
to be free from torture. By contrast, a benefit of the mandatory confession 
exclusionary rule is its consistency. Furthermore, from a practical perspective, the 
discretionary confession exclusionary rule in judicial interpretations has not worked 
                                                 
48 See Chapter 5. 
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in China and merely tinkering with it by arguing that China’s social and economic 
condition is not mature will unlikely solve the torture problems, especially since the 
judges have shown little inclination toward deterring police misconduct through the 
exclusionary rule. The high frequency of Article 43 of Code of Criminal Procedure 
violations, despite substantial efforts to restrain illegal police conduct, is cause for 
deep concern. There can be little doubt that the level of Article 43 of Code of 
Criminal Procedure violations is high. In China, the operation of the confession 
exclusionary rule should not involve the exercise of discretion. 
The next question is who must prove an incident of torture. The current 
approach in China requires that, before evidence can be excluded, the defendant must 
establish two separate propositions. First, the defendant must demonstrate that 
beatings occurred. Second, the defendant must further prove that his wounds are 
caused by the police, and he did not hurt himself “accidentally”.49 Requiring the 
defense to establish the existence of torture, in my opinion, will severely restrict the 
availability of exclusion as a remedy for constitutional violations. To satisfy this 
prong of the test, a defendant has the burden of establishing the existence of torture. 
It creates a totally arbitrary impediment to law enforcement without protecting the 
interest of the defendant. This barrier seems nearly insurmountable as a practical 
matter, because a defendant cannot get any physical evidence on the subject in 
almost all situations. The state should prove its own case without assistance from the 
defendant. 
                                                 
49 See 6.2.1. 
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8.3.3 The search and seizure exclusionary rule 
 
The search and seizure exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the right to be 
free from illegal searches and seizures; the rule guarantees that a person shall be 
secure against illegal searches and seizures. The mechanism to control search and 
seizure activities consists of three parts. The first part involves the mandate that 
police must meet certain requirements of a warrant before conducting a search. It 
was designed to ensure that a neutral judge will review a warrant prior to its issuance, 
which protects suspects from investigatory overreaching. Without it, I cannot 
imagine how to assure that government is acting under lawful authority and 
performing necessary criminal investigations that require invasions of privacy and 
the seizure of property. However, as I have already discussed,50 the protections 
afforded by a neutral third person are missing as Chinese judges cannot review a 
search warrant prior to its issuance. The second part consists of the evaluation of the 
nature of the sanction that will be delivered when faced with law enforcement 
officers’ flagrant disregard for the commands of a warrant. The third part involves 
the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. 
I contend that the lack of a search and seizure exclusionary rule is caused by a 
flawed criminal justice policy which seeks to enforce complex search and seizure 
situations with merely ten simplistic articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
Code of Criminal Procedure should be amended to require that law enforcement 
officials have probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed 
in order to conduct a search in criminal investigations. The police should establish a 
nexus between (1) the criminal activity under investigation; (2) the items to be seized; 
                                                 
50 See 6.3.1. 
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and (3) the place to be searched. When judges come into possession of physical 
evidence against defendants that they believe on reasonable grounds was obtained 
through illegal or unfair methods, they should exclude such evidence. 
Chinese courts refuse to exercise their discretion to exclude evidence obtained 
or derived through illegal means. From 1949 until now, courts did not exclude 
evidence from criminal trials even if it had been obtained by police during an illegal 
search. Chinese courts, merely concern themselves with whether or not the physical 
evidence is probative: if the evidence is probative to determine the guilt of the 
accused, the evidence is admissible, regardless of how it was obtained.51 If there is 
no action by the courts to ensure adequate protection by a suitable route for an 
individual’s free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law. Therefore, with regard to the search and seizure 
exclusionary rule, in order to protect the right to be free from illegal searches and 
seizures, China should adopt a strict exclusionary rule – in other words, a new Code 
of Criminal Procedure should utilize the “mandatory exclusion with exception” 
approach to control police wrongdoing. I contend to minimize judicial discretion and 
hope that the admissible illegally obtained physical evidence becomes a rarity rather 





There are countless possible variations of police wrongdoing, which offers 
                                                 
51 See 6.3. 
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inexhaustible material for the criminal procedure and evidence scholar. No matter 
how many times we shake the tree, more fruit remains on the branch for further 
consideration. Further, if there is any fixed star in our constitutional and criminal 
procedure constellation, it is that torture is illegal and torture-introduced evidence is 
inadmissible. We simply do not legally torture defendants and use the evidence 
obtained by torture. It seems to me, therefore, that condoning illegal activity 
conducted in the name of the state is hard to justify under any circumstances. There 
are no exceptions to the confession exclusionary rule under the corpus of human 
rights law. There can be no torture warrants, and no balancing.52 
There is no such thing as lawful torture in China. Police torture in China, 
however, is the prevalent evil not the isolated anecdote. It is not a few bad apples – it 
is the apple tree. And allegations of police misconduct continue to fill the air. Police 
torture deals a traumatic blow at the Chinese criminal justice system. On the whole, 
China grants the police too much power and has too little judicial supervision over 
police investigations. It creates imbalance in the existing Chinese criminal justice 
system. It is such an imbalance and the lack of separation of powers in the criminal 
justice system that poses a significant and growing threat for the protection of 
defendants’ rights. In the past, the basic assumption in China is that all relevant 
evidence should be available to judges. The time is ripe for a change in this context. 
Rights, for example, the right to be free from torture, and the right to be free from 
illegal searches and seizures, would mean nothing without adequate remedies to 
ensure these rights. The exclusion of evidence obtained contrary to the right to be 
free from torture, and the right to be free from illegal searches and seizures should be 
considered as an essential corollary of the right, if such right is to be of any value. To 
                                                 
52 See 3.3. 
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protect freedom from torture and advance the administration of the criminal justice 
system, it is strongly suggested that China establish the exclusionary rule 
immediately. 
The law of evidence is not solely designed to assist the truth-finding process of 
a criminal trial. The exclusionary rule will not change the substantive law of search 
and seizure at all. Opponents claim that the rule causes criminals to go free. In the 
Back-from-the-dead Wife Case (Yu Xianglin Case)53 and the Du Peiwu Case,54 the 
criminals went free, but it is Article 93 of Code of Criminal Procedure and police 
torture that has set them free, not the exclusionary rule per se. 
By contrast, in the United States, the exclusionary rule does a good job at 
deterring police misbehavior, motivating police departments to take the constitution 
seriously, and ensuring the Fourth Amendment is enforced by the courts. The 
exclusionary rule stands as a significant bulwark against governmental invasion of 
liberty. It is essential that China should admonish the use of torture-introduced 
evidence. Additionally, the courts are not willing conduits for governmental 
lawlessness. One undoubted benefit of the confession exclusionary rule is that it 
creates a strong disincentive for coercive tactics. 
The time has come for China to try to establish the exclusionary rule so that 
Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be more easily followed by the 
police and the courts and, at the same time, provide the public with consistent and 
predictable protection against torture, and illegal searches and seizures. Unlawfully 
obtained confessions must be excluded in all cases where the defendant has had no 
legal recourse to a measure that would have prevented the execution of investigatory 
                                                 
53 See 5.2.3. 
54 See 6.1.1. 
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acts which unlawfully infringe upon his fundamental rights. The prohibition of police 
torture requires states not merely to refrain from condoning at police torture but also 
to discourage the practice of police torture and not to conniving it. I predict exclusion 
of evidence by the exclusionary rule will be the only effective sanction in China. If 
the confessions obtained by torture can be used, no matter how lawless the 
investigation, the right to be free from torture might as well be stricken from the 
constitution and criminal procedure. 
A comparative view once again offers the prospect for a preferable solution. The 
approach of the United States is instructive. The search and seizure exclusionary rule 
commands that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees be 
excluded at a criminal trial. By the same token, courts should not soil their hands by 
admitting in unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence. A court is not be a 
party to the use of illegally obtained confessions or illegally seized evidence. The 
judiciary should avoid the taint of partnership in police wrongdoing. If law 
enforcement officials do not adhere to the rule of law and uphold it themselves it will 
become increasingly difficult for them to persuade individuals in the society to obey 
the law. 
 Experiences of police misconduct in China clearly correlate with low 
confidence in the police and the courts. In order to bolster public trust in the Chinese 
judicial system, courts should accomplish this by ensuring fairness. The public 
confidence will keep diminishing in China when apparently innocent individuals 
were convicted for the crime they did not commit through the evidence by torture. 
Hence, the key to the Chinese exclusionary rule should focus on the crucial roles the 
court should play. The judiciary should serve as the beacon light of justice and 
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should not forget that its obligation is to prevent tyranny.55 Every court has an 
inherent duty and responsibility to ensure that the proceedings have been fair. The 
judge is the only person who can protect the right to be free from torture, and the 
right to be free from illegal searches and seizures. Judges must understand their role 
if they are to fulfill their responsibility with integrity and courage. 
In general, when Chinese law enforcement officers violate a person’s right to be 
free from torture, they do so in attempting to obtain confessions for use in criminal 
proceedings. The application of the exclusionary rule can preclude law enforcement 
officials from profiting from its own illegality. To give effect to the constitution’s 
prohibition against torture, it is necessary for the judiciary to remove the incentive 
for violating it. The exclusionary rule allows a court to deliver a public reprimand to 
the offender along with a public warning to other potential violators that the very 
goals that they are pursuing by illegal methods will be frustrated if they do not 
comply with the constitution’s or law’s commands. I assert that police officers who 
know both illegally tortured confessions and illegally seized evidence cannot be used 
can avoid illegal wrongdoing because they will have nothing to gain from them; 
when the police themselves break the law they and other agencies of government will 
not use the benefits which flow from the violation. More specifically, once the police 
know that they would not profit from their lawless behaviors, torture will no longer 
be a useful option. Application of the exclusionary rule to China would serve a 
deterrence function and compel compliance with the right to be free from torture by 
removing the incentive for law enforcement agents to disregard it. On the contrary, 
Chinese police doubts are very likely to be stronger and stronger now than they 
                                                 
55 James Wilson, ‘Altered States: A Comparison of Separation of Powers in the United States and in 
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would be if the exclusionary rule in the judicial interpretations had never been 
imposed. 
It would be intolerable if the guarantee against torture and illegal searches could 
be violated without practical consequence. The exclusion of evidence will be an 
effective way of deterring police misconduct and illegal searches in China. The 
exclusionary rule is needed to make the right to be free from torture, and the right to 
be free from illegal searches and seizures something real; a guarantee of the right 
mentioned above that does not carry with it the exclusionary rule by its violation is a 
chimera. Choosing not to establish the Chinese exclusionary rule will do nothing to 
solve the problem of miscarriages of justice, on the contrary, it may increase the 
number of wrong convictions; it certainly will not reduce crime levels in China. As I 
have already made clear I regard the exclusionary rule as a valuable part of the 
criminal justice system. To be clear, I do not advocate expanding defendants’ rights 
at the cost of the public safety in China. To the contrary, I do contend that the social 
contract philosophy underlying the exclusionary rule imposes a strong obligation on 
the state to protect public order and the exclusionary rule is as much about the rights 
of the people as it is about any individual. 
I liken the exclusionary rule to wild clover, not poison ivy. Once rooted, the 
exclusionary rule may spread, ultimately changing the hue of the Chinese criminal 
justice landscape. It should be emphasized that there is no denying that controlling 
crime is important. However, crime control and constitutional rights are not 
dichotomous. This is not a question of sacrificing constitutional rights for safety. The 
exclusionary rule that I have favoured will not damage the criminal justice system 
and I believe an effective anti-crime campaign can be conducted without torture. It is 
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